istanbul&bilbao (ispanyolcakursu.blogspot.com)

2011-06-11T14:30:00.000+02:00

2011-06-11T14:23:00.000+02:00

2011-06-11T14:15:00.000+02:00

2011-06-11T14:13:00.000+02:00

"Estambul me regaló una novela"JON ARRETXE Escritor

2009-12-09T23:25:00.000+01:00

Shahmarán es un ser mitológico procedente del Asia central, medio reptil, medio mujer, con dos cabezas, que simboliza la fertilidad y la sabiduría. Shahmarán (Erein) es también el título elegido por el escritor Jon Arretxe para una novela negra que publica simultáneamente en euskera y castellano.

Pregunta. Es usted viajero y escritor.

Respuesta. No me defino, pero viajo y escribo. Empecé a escribir para recoger las experiencias que había recogido después de viajar durante diez años por la Amazonía, por países africanos o por Asia. Los primeros libros fueron literatura de viajes: crónica cuando el viaje era suficientemente interesante o ficción basada en esos viajes.

P. ¿Por qué dio el paso a la literatura de género negro?

R. Porque me apetecía, sin más. Siempre me ha gustado la literatura negra, los clásicos americanos como Dashiell Hammett o Chester Himes, y los nuevos como Mankell o Donna Leon. La novela y el cine negro siempre me han atraído.

P. Pero empezó introduciendo el componente del humor.

R. Sí, escribí un par de parodias de novela negra. Con la estructura del género, pero con un toque de absurdo.

P. En el salto a la novela negra parece que no rompe del todo con su afición a los viajes.

R. Sí, he aprovechado el poso de escritor de viajes. En los tres últimos libros el lugar donde transcurría la historia no ha sido un encuadre casual. Morto vivace (2007) se sitúa en París. Fatum (2008), en Lisboa. La ciudad es el personaje principal. Y ahora Shahmarán, que transcurre en Estambul y Munich, con continuas referencias al Kurdistán.

P. ¿Qué encuentra de literario en Estambul? Le dedica mucha atención en la novela.

R. Todo, todo. Lo que ves, lo que oyes, lo que hueles al salir a la calle. La ciudad va mostrando personajes, te ofrece las historias. El vendedor de sanguijuelas de la novela existe. Estambul me regaló una novela. Y luego aproveché lo que conocía del Kurdistán y de Munich. Me gusta ver la vida real de las ciudades y plasmarlo en la novela, no inventarlo. Me siento más cómodo cuando escribo de sitios que conozco bien. Me voy allí y escribo parte de la novela en el mismo escenario en el que se desarrolla la historia.

P. De Munich no muestra la cara de la gran capital de Baviera.

R. No, no aparecen las cerveceras o los museos. No son los escenarios donde se mueven los emigrantes turcos pobres. Es el contraste entre una madre que mantiene vivo el orgullo de su origen kurdo y los hijos que se preocupan por sobrevivir. Uno de ellos, matando por encargo.

P. La xenofobia aparece claramente en la historia

R. Sí, un poco de crítica social es una característica de la novela negra. El rechazo a los turcos es claro en Alemania, y en época de crisis más todavía.

P. ¿Por qué cree que está de moda la novela negra?

R. No tengo ni idea. No sabía ni que estaba de moda cuando empecé a hacerlo. Lo mismo me pasó cuando empecé a escribir de viajes.

P. Escribe siempre en euskera. ¿Por qué deja la traducción al castellano en manos de otra persona?

R. Mi primer libro lo traduje yo. Pensaba que estaba impecable y cuando lo leyeron otras personas les daba la risa. No nos damos cuenta de los vasquismos que utilizamos. Es mejor dejarlo en manos de profesionales que lo van a hacer mejor.

P. Pero este libro aparece simultáneamente en euskera y castellano.

R. Sí, la tirada es un poco mayor en euskera. El público euskaldun ya me conoce

Los balnearios del Detroit turco Bursa. Cabeza de la ruta de la seda

2009-04-14T20:00:00.002+02:00

Es paradójico. Los automóviles se han convertido en su alimento. Bursa subsiste gracias a las inmensas factorías de multinacionales como Fiat, Renault, Peugeot, Honda, Hyundai, Ford y Toyota. Pero la ciudad de los coches, la cuarta más importante de Turquía, los odia. Quiere desterrarlos de sus calles para convertirse en un foco turístico que compita con el exotismo de Estambul. Sus credenciales: las aguas termales que fluyen por sus cimientos, las inmensas pistas de esquí que parten desde la montaña Uludag... Y la Historia, ésa que la convirtió en la primera capital del imperio otomano en el siglo XIV -aún conserva los mauseleos de los dos primeros sultanes- y que le erigió en núcleo fundamental en el comercio de la seda. «Nuestro principal problema es el tráfico, que genera mucha contaminación. Por eso queremos limitar el movimiento de coches y acabar con la polución», expresa Sahabettin Harput, gobernador de este enclave situado en el noroeste de la república.
Resulta, en efecto, un tanto agobiante el impacto que recibe el visitante al desembarcar en una ciudad que lucha por convertirse en sede de los Juegos Olímpicos de Invierno de 2018. Los vehículos circulan con dificultad -por decirlo de alguna manera- por un lugar de estrechas calles, aunque acogedoras, atestadas de escaparates en los que golpean a la vista la gran cantidad de vestidos de novia y prendas de llamativos colores. A su lado compite el penetrante olor de las cafeterías y las pastelerías, con tentadoras pastas de té y las suculentas castañas escarchadas típicas de la zona, irresistibles para los golosos.
Roscos patrióticos
Es difícil no toparse con vendedores ambulantes que ofrecen roscos de sésamo con banderas turcas -la exaltación nacionalista es máxima- o con uno de sus múltiples restaurantes kebabs, donde venden el bocadillo del mundo árabe. Eso sí, con pan de pita. Pero en esta región hay que probar el 'iskender kebap', con finas tiras de carne de cordero y salsa de tomate. El visitante siempre encontrará uno; da igual que se mueva por la ciudad nueva o por la fortificada urbe antigua.
Y es que hay dos Bursas. La parte amurallada deslumbra en lo alto de una colina desde la que se descubre toda la ciudad. Se asientan los mauseleos de los dos primeros sultantes del imperio otomano, dos pequeños recintos en el que se conservan sus restos y el de su corte. También el castillo y la imponente torre del reloj, de 33 metros de altura y con 89 escalones de madera, llaman la atención en esta especie de parque por el que pasean los adolescentes con sus uniformes escolares propios de las universidades americanas.
En el resto del municipio se mezclan el pasado y el presente. Delante, por ejemplo, del mercado de la seda Koza Han (1491) y de la Gran Mezquita Ulu Camii (finales del siglo XIV) han plantado un McDonalds. Efectos de la globalización actual. Porque hubo otra. Esa época en la que esta ciudad crecía como uno de los principales centros de la Ruta de la Seda, ubicada en su extremo más occidental. «Éste era el centro mundial del comercio. Venían mercaderes de todas partes», proclama el guía local Nihat Tinik.
Conservado a la perfección, este recinto, de dos plantas cuadradas y con una especie de patio interior en el que se construyó una pequeña mezquita para que los comerciantes árabes oraran, guarda el atractivo de aquellos tiempos. Ahora no hay puestos, sino tiendas en las que se puede comprar todo tipo de prendas de seda: corbatas, pañuelos, camisas... Con una amable sonrisa, los comerciantes suelen ofrecer té (o café, siempre sin leche) y pastas al visitante, una proposición que se magnifica cuando se cierra una transacción. Entonces, idolatran al comprador como hicieron con la reina de Inglaterra cuando les visitó en octubre. Momento histórico que reflejan las fotografías que compiten con el colorido de los atractivos escaparates.
La Gran Mezquita, en la misma explanada, vigila el mercado. Es otro mundo. Un lugar de recogimiento. A las doce, una de las cinco horas de rezo, una multitud -la mayoría hombres, aunque este recinto posee una zona reservada para mujeres- se aproxima a la mayor mezquita de Bursa, con capacidad para dos mil personas y muestra de las primeras construcciones otomanas. Su gran aforo provocó que en el centro del recinto -formado por veinte cúpulas- se habilitara una fuente para purificar el ambiente y evitar una sensación de ahogo y pesadez en el aire (se consigue a medias). Cuenta la leyenda que el sonido del agua es uno de los preferidos en el islam. Hay otros dos: el del dinero y el de las mujeres.
Nieve y baños termales
Éste es sólo uno de los múltiples centros de oración que salpican cualquier ciudad del mundo árabe. Todas se distinguen por sus minaretes, desde donde se llama a los fieles. Y en la parte antigua de Bursa también luce la Mezquita Verde, que quedó inacabada por los problemas económicos que padeció el sultán Mehmet I en el siglo XV. En su interior aún se pueden ver las marcas que dejó el terremoto que destruyó parte de la ciudad en 1855. Su nombre se debe a su color, una tonalidad predilecta en el mundo musulmán y que deslumbra en los bosques que rodean la ciudad. El verde inunda las montañas que rodean este enclave, como el parque nacional del monte Uludag, candidata a acoger los Juegos de Invierno de 2018,o el color de su equipo de fútbol -con un estadio que parece una plaza de toros, redondo, y con una decena de tiendas de alquiler de coches en los bajos-...
Este color es su marca. Como en el futuro serán los hoteles termales y el esquí. Complejos en los que en lugar de sol y playa se disfrutará de la nieve y los baños relajantes. Ya existen varios balnearios con spa y todo tipo de actividades en las que el agua toma su máximo protagonismo. Pero Bursa quiere más. Y para ello invertirá una ingente cantidad de dinero. Con esta meta, y con la de limpiar su aire, ése que han contaminado los coches de los que ahora vive.

Podría circuito de Estambul quedar fuera de la Fórmula Uno para 2011

2009-02-09T08:18:00.000+01:00

Tras los problemas entre la organización de la pista y el presidente de la categoría
El Financiero en línea
Estambul, 8 de febrero.- El circuito de Estambul podría quedar fuera de la temporada de Fórmula Uno a partir de 2011 debido a los problemas entre la organización de la pista y el presidente de la categoría, Bernie Ecclestone.
El mandatario de la máxima categoría del deporte motor señaló que la falta de pago de la renta del circuito obligaría a pensar en otras sedes pese a que el contrato expira dentro de dos años.
Ante esto, Can Guclu, director general de la pista turca, mencionó que se debe llegar a un acuerdo de forma rápida en busca de alargar el contrato para mantener a la ciudad como sede de la Fórmula Uno.
"Tememos que 2011 sea el último año que habrá Fórmula Uno en Estambul. Si queremos que el Gran Premio siga en el calendario, tenemos que empezar a trabajar de inmediato. No podemos empezar a negociar para la carrera el último año de contrato", indicó el directivo al diario local Zaman.
En caso de que el Gran Premio de Estambul quede fuera del calendario de Fórmula Uno, existen tres países interesados en albergar un "gran circo" como Bulgaria, Corea del Sur y Rusia.
En la temporada 2009 que arrancará el próximo mes de marzo, Estambul recibirá la competencia del 5 al 7 de junio. (Con información de Notime

SOCIEDAD ESPANOLA: LA GENERACION MILEURISTA

2008-07-18T22:55:00.001+02:00

Mileurista
De Wikipedia, la enciclopedia libre

El neologismo mileurista (surgido a partir de mil euros) se aplica para definir a una persona perteneciente a la generación nacida en España entre 1965 y 1985 (aproximadamente) y con unos ingresos que no suelen superar los 1.000 euros al mes (según el Instituto Nacional de Estadística, el salario medio del asalariado español es de 1.538,17 euros brutos al mes (1.703,87 euros al mes para los que trabajan a jornada completa)[cita requerida]).

Además de a la situación económica, el concepto se refiere a la alta formación académica exigida, pues con frecuencia para ser mileurista suele ser necesario tener estudios superiores incluidos los de máster, postgrado, e idiomas, todo ello en un mercado laboral que evidentemente no compensa dicha preparación.

NUMERO DE AFECTADOSSegún Europa Press,[1] basándose en datos de la Agencia Tributaria del año 2006 recogidos por los Técnicos del Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (Gestha) Existen casi 11 millones de personas que ganan menos de 13500 € brutos anuales, es decir, menos de 1100€ al mes, lo cual supone el 58% de los asalariados.Las comunidades autónomas con más mileuristas serían por este orden, Extremadura, con casi el 70% de la población, Murcia con el 67% y Andalucía con el 64%. Por encima del 50% se encontrarían Canarias, donde el 65% de sus asalariados son 'mileuristas', seguida de Castilla-La Mancha (60,6% del total), Galicia (60,6%), Baleares (60,3%) y Comunidad Valenciana (60,3%). La comunidad con menos "mileuristas" es, según Gestha, Ceuta, con el 45%.

El mileurismo como fenómeno sociológico El Mileurismo, refiriéndose a una corriente sociológica más que a un tramo concreto de renta, es una palabra que fue empleada por la escritora española Espido Freire, quien ha escrito dos libros sobre la situación socioeconómica de la juventud española después de la Transición democrática que describe el vocablo. El primero fue Mileuristas: cuerpo, alma y mente de la generación de los 1000 euros (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 2006).

Espido Freire define a los mileuristas, más que por sus ingresos alrededor de los mil euros al mes, como

El conjunto de españoles de entre 25 y 30 años con formación superior, que desempeñan trabajos por debajo de su capacidad, que vuelcan buena parte de sus expectativas vitales en el ocio, se interesan por la cultura en sus formas más modernas y son pasivos y protestones. Pertenecen a la generación más preparada de la historia de España. Rondan la treintena, son universitarios y saben idiomas. Pero los bajos sueldos, la sobreabundancia de titulados y los cambios sociales les han impedido llegar a donde pensaban llegar. Comparten piso; no tienen coche, ni casa, ni hijos y ya se han dado cuenta de que el futuro no estaba donde creían. Es el equivalente español de los llamados JASP, "Jóvenes aunque sobradamente preparados". Universitarios, se encuentran en un mercado sobresaturado de universitarios. Con poco más de mil euros deben sostener una vida de adultos, por lo cual no pueden permitirse hijos ni relaciones estables, comparten piso con otros mileuristas y, aunque están mejor formados que sus jefes y saben idiomas y manejan instrumentos informáticos que éstos no conocen, son sistemáticamente ninguneados y despreciados por estos y no acceden a puestos de superior retribución. No se comunican por los habituales medios de comunicación de masas, sino por internet o móvil, medios que sus jefes no valoran e ignoran, son individualistas y carecen de conciencia de clase social. Son víctimas de hipotecas abusivas y emplean casi todo su dinero en el ocio.

A threat of turmoil in Turkey

2008-04-01T18:41:00.000+02:00

Considering a ban on the ruling party

TURKEY edged towards prolonged political and economic turmoil on Monday March 31st after the country's most senior court unanimously agreed to consider a case calling for the banning of the ruling Justice and Development (AK) party and for the prime minister to be barred from office.
The decision by the Constitutional Court could lead to a dangerous escalation in tensions between the AK party, with its roots in Islam, and its secular detractors in the army and the judiciary, who accuse the party of leading the country towards sharia rule.

In a 162-page indictment AK is accused of becoming “a centre for anti-secular activities” and the prosecutor calls for 71 of the party’s officials, including the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to be banned from politics for five years. The court, which is dominated by secular judges, voted without exception to consider the case. A majority of the judges also agreed to hear similar charges against the president, Abdullah Gul.
Mr Gul, who began politics in an overtly Islamist party, said the decision came as no surprise and promised to “carry on with business as usual.” The first signs of the case came at the start of the year after AK set out to ease a strict ban on the wearing of Islamic headscarves in universities. That provoked uproar among secular university rectors, who called it an assault on Ataturk's republic. It was cited as evidence in the prosecutor’s indictment along with various comments made by Mr Erdogan when he criticised restrictions on religious garb.
Turkey has shut at least four pro-Islamic parties since 1970. AK was formed by a group of moderate Islamists led by Mr Erdogan who came to power five years ago pledging to lead Turkey into the European Union. During its first term AK enacted a raft of radical reforms that persuaded EU leaders to open long-delayed membership talks. These, along with a strong economic record, helped AK to return to office last year with an increased share of the vote.
Western observers say the case against AK is unabashedly political and could further dampen Turkey's hopes of joining the EU. “In a normal European democracy, political issues are debated in parliament and decided in the ballot box, not in the courtroom,” said the EU's enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn.
The case may be an act of desperation by an old guard whose power is waning as EU-inspired changes take hold. Most obvious among them is the army, which has long tried to dictate policy from behind the scenes. The generals suffered a humiliating defeat last year when a campaign to prevent Mr Gul from becoming president backfired. Fearing that Mr Gul would rubber stamp AK-inspired laws, they went as far as to threaten a coup. Judges weighed in on the army's side and Mr Gul was forced to withdraw after the Constitutional Court upheld opposition claims that parliament lacked a quorum during a first round of balloting.
But AK's big electoral win allowed Mr Gul to revive his presidential ambitions and to claim the post in a fresh vote. Meddling by the army probably helped to bolster AK's ratings. A defiant Mr Erdogan has predicted that efforts to ban his party will have the same effect now. In any case, most outlawed parties resurrect themselves under a new name. So why bother trying to ban AK? Some pundits speculate that, rather than closing the party, the court will bar Mr Erdogan and a few of his lieutenants from politics. Without its charismatic leader the party would disintegrate, allowing the secular opposition to seize power again.
But things may not be that simple. Mr Erdogan is threatening to tweak the constitution to make it harder to ban political parties. He would then seek a referendum on the changes. Opposition leaders give warning that such “provocations” would lead to more tensions. AK officials counter that the greater risk is if their disgruntled supporters disregard Mr Erdogan's appeals for calm and take to the streets. Violence might ensue. Either way, Turkey's future is looking decidedly more unsure.

ispanyolca kursu: Vocabulario de PROFESIONES, LUGARES DE TRABAJO Y ESTUDIOS (MESLEKLER, IŞ YERLERİ VE ÖĞRENİMLER Sözlüğü)

2008-03-24T07:44:00.000+01:00

Vocabulario / Sözlük-Verbos /Fiiller:Estudiar: verbo regular. Ders çalışmakTrabajar: verbo regular.Çalışmak-Conjunción /Bağlaç:O: veya.-Interrogativo /Soru:¿Qué?: Ne...?-Nombres /Isimler:Estudiante: ÖğrenciMedicina: Hekimlik, TıpUniversidad: Üniversite-Profesiones /Meslekler -Estudios /Öğrenim -Lugar / YerMédico - Medicina - HospitalEnfermero/a - Enfermería - Hospitalfarmaceutico/a - Farmacia - FarmaciaAbogado/a - Derecho - OficinaEmpresario/a - Empresariales - OficinaSecretario/a - Secretariado - OficinaContable - Contabilidad - OficinaIngeniero - Ingenieria - OficinaBanquero/a - Economía - BancoPeriodista - Periodismo - Television, Radio, PrensaPolicia - ComisaríaCamarero/a Hostelería Bar, Restaurante, HotelCocinero/a " "Arquitecto Arquitectura EstudioFrutero/a FruteríaCarnicero/a CarniceríaPanadero/a PanaderíaPescatero /a PescaderíaDependiente/a TiendaCantante - Mùsica, SolfeoMusico - Mùsica, SolfeoPintor/a -Bellas ArtesEscultor/a - Bellas ArtesFotografo/aTaxista - TaxiChofer - AutobusCamionero - CamiónJubilado/aActivadades / Aktiviteler¿Estudias o Trabajas? Soy banquero. (Okuyormusun veya çalışıyormusun?) Ben Bankacıyım¿Dónde trabajas? Trabajo en el banco Kredi. (Nerede çalışıyorsun? Yapı Kredi de çalışıyorum)¿Estudias o Trabajas? Soy estudiante. (Okuyormusun veya çalışıyormusun?) Öğrenciyim¿Qué estudias? Estudio Bellas Artes. (Ne okuyorsun? Güzel Sanatlar okuyorum)¿Dónde estudias? Estudio en la Universidad de Bilbao. (Nerede okuyorsun?)¿Estudias o Trabajas? Soy camarero. (Okuyormusun veya çalışıyormusun?) Garsonum¿Dónde trabajas? Trabajo en el Hotel Malena. (Nerede çalışıyorsun?)

ispanyolca kursu:LECCION 2- Verbos Regulares (Tiempo Presente) /Düzenli Fiiller (Şimdiki Zaman)

2008-03-05T08:42:00.002+01:00

Verbos /FiillerHay verbos irregulares y regulares. Ahora aprendemos a conjugar los verbos regulares. Hay 3 tipos:İspanyolca'da düzensiz ve düzenli fiiller vardır. Şimdi Düzenli Fiiller çekimini ögreniyoruz. 3 tip vardır:

1)Terminación –AR (Ej. hablAR) (Sonu -AR ile bitenler)
Yo habl-O
Tú habl-AS
Él /Ella /Usted habl-A
Nosotros /Nosotras habl-AMOS
Vosotros /Vosotras habl-AIS
Ellos /Ellas /Ustedes habl-AN

2)Terminación –ER (Ej. bebER) (Sonu -ER ile bitenler)
Yo beb-OTú beb-ES
Él /Ella /Usted beb-E
Nosotros /Nosotras beb-EMOS
Vosotros /Vosotras beb-EIS
Ellos /Ellas /Ustedes beb-EN

3)Terminación –IR (Ej. vivIR) (Sonu -İR ile bitenler)
Yo viv-O
Tú viv-ES
Él /Ella /Usted viv-E
Nosotros /Nosotras viv-IMOS
Vosotros /Vosotras viv-IS
Ellos /Ellas /Ustedes viv-EN

Vocabulario
Lenguas: diller
Un poco de: Bir az
Español: ispanyolca
Turco: türkçe
Cola: cola

Interrogativo /Soru¿Qué?: Ne? Hangi?

ispanyolca kursu:LECCION 1- Saludos y Despedidas (Selamlar ve Vedalaşmalar)

2008-03-04T19:53:00.001+01:00

Hola (Merhaba)
Adiós (Allaha Ismarladık)
Buenos días (Günaydın)
Hasta luego (Sonra görüşürüz)
Buenas tardes (İyi akşamlar)
Hasta mañana (Yarın görüşürüz)
Buenas noches (İyi geceler)
Nos vemos (Görüşürüz)
Encantado: Memnun oldum (erkek için)
Encantada: memnun oldum (kız için)
Pronombres Personales (Kişi zamirleri):
Yo (Ben)
Tú (Sen)
Él ( O /erkek)
Ella ( O /kız)
Usted (Siz /erkek ve kız/resmi konuşmalarda)
Nosotros (Biz erkek yoksa Karışık Grup)Nosotras (Biz Kız)
Vosotros (Siz erkek yoksa Karışık Grup)Vosotras (Siz kız)
Ellos (Onlar erkek yoksa Karışık grup)Ellas (Onlar kız)Ustedes (Sizler erkek ve kız/resmi konuşmalarda)
Verbo (Fiiller):
Llamarse (Adı ... olmak)Yo me llamoTú te llamasÉl /Ella /Usted se llamaNosotros /Nosotras nos llamamosVosotros /Vosotras os llamaisEllos /Ellas /Ustedes se llaman
Not: İspanyolcada fiilli cümleler yapılırken kişi zamirleri cümlede olmak zorunda değildir. Kişi fiil çekiminde ifade edilebilir.
Interrogativo (Soru Kelimeleri): ¿Cómo? (Nasıl)Símbolos (Semboller): ¡(...)! ¿(...)? (İspanyolcada soru cümlelerinin başına ters soru işareti sonuna da normal soru işareti konulur.)
Actividad (Aktivite):Adın ne? Adım Ozan. ¿Cómo te llamas (tú)? Me llamo OzanAdı ne? Adı Gülay. ¿Cómo se llama (ella)? Se llama GülayAdınız ne? Adımız Kaan ve Alper. ¿Cómo os llamais? Nos llamamos Kaan y AlperAdları ne? Adları Eda ve Furkan. ¿Cómo se llaman? Se llaman Eda y FurkanAdınız ne? Adım Lara. ¿Cómo se llama (Usted)? Me llamo Lara

Turkey strives for 21st century form of Islam

2008-02-27T11:18:00.000+01:00

Ian Traynor, Europe editor The Guardian,
Wednesday February 27 2008

Turkey is engaged in a bold and profound attempt to rewrite the basis for Islamic sharia law while also officially reinterpreting the Qur'an for the modern age.
The exercise in reforming Islamic jurisprudence, sponsored by the modernising and mildly Islamic government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, is being seen as an iconoclastic campaign to establish a 21st century form of Islam, fusing Muslim beliefs and tradition with European and western philosophical methods and principles.
The result, say experts following the ambitious experiment, could be to diminish Muslim discrimination against women, banish some of the brutal penalties associated with Islamic law, such as stoning and amputation, and redefine Islam as a modern, dynamic force in the large country that pivots between east and west, leaning into the Middle East while aspiring to join the European Union.
A team of reformist Islamic scholars at Ankara University, acting under the auspices of the Diyanet or Directorate of Religious Affairs, the government body which oversees the country's 8,000 mosques and appoints imams, is said to be close to concluding a "reinterpretation" of parts of the Hadith, the collection of thousands of aphorisms and comments said to derive from the prophet Muhammad and which form the basis of Islamic jurisprudence or sharia law. "One of the team doing the revision said they are nearly finished," said Mustafa Akyol, an Istanbul commentator who reflects the thinking of the liberal camp in Erdogan's governing AK party. "They have problems with the misogynistic hadith, the ones against women. They may delete some from the collection, declaring them not authentic. That would be a very bold step. Or they may just add footnotes, saying they should be understood from a different historical context."
Fadi Hakura, a Turkey expert at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, described the project as an attempt to make Turkish Sunni Islam "fully compatible with contemporary social and moral values.
"They see this not as a revolution, but as a return to the original Islam, away from the excessive conservatism that has stymied all reforms for the last few centuries. It's somewhat akin to the Christian reformation, although not the same."
Under the guidance of Ali Bardokoglu, the liberal Islamic scholar who heads the religious directorate and was appointed by Erdogan, the Ankara theologians are writing a new five-volume "exegesis" of the Qur'an, taking the sacred text apart forensically, rooting it in its time and place, and redefining its message to and relevance for Muslims today. They are also ditching some of the Hadith, sayings ascribed to and comments on the prophet collected a couple of hundred years after his death.
A Roman Catholic Jesuit expert on Turkey and Islam, Felix Koerner, is working with the Ankara professors, reportedly schooling them in the history of western religious and philosophical change and how to apply the lessons of historical Christian reform movements to modern Islam. "This is really a synthesis of modern European critical thought and Muslim Ottoman Koranic tradition," said Koerner. "There is also a political agenda. With this government there is more confidence in these modern theologians."
Erdogan insists his AK party, in a country that is constitutionally secularist, is a Turkish Muslim equivalent of a European Christian democratic party - traditionalist, conservative, based on religious values, but democratic, tolerant, and liberal. With Spain and the Zapatero government, he is pushing an "Alliance of Civilisations" aimed at a rapprochement between the Muslim and western worlds. After years of fighting the militantly secularist Turkish establishment, he has just succeeded in lifting the ban on Islamic headscarves for girls in higher education. His many opponents decry it as part of Turkey's slide away from secularism down the slippery slope of Islamism.
Sources say the Islamic reform project is so ambitious and so fundamental it will take years to complete, but that it is already paying dividends - abolition of the death penalty, a campaign against honour killings, and the training and appointment of several hundred women as imams.
At a glance
The Hadith are narrations of the life of the prophet Muhammad and his companions and are considered an important source of material on religious practice, law, history and biography. Hadith relate what the prophet said, did or liked. Most Muslims consider the Hadith to be an essential addition to and clarification of the Qur'an. In Islamic jurisprudence the holy book contains guidelines about the behaviour expected from Muslims but there are no specific rules on many matters. Hadith influence around 90% of sharia, or Islamic law, and the most controversial ones concern the violent punishments meted out to adulterers and apostates, the role and treatment of women and jihad.Riazat Butt

Manchester am Bosporus

2008-02-22T08:11:00.001+01:00

Die Türkei feiert ihr »Wirtschaftswunder«. Vor allem der Werftsektor boomt. Arbeiter hingegen müssen für Hungerlöhne ihr Leben riskieren
Von Nico Sandfuchs, Ankara

Der türkische Schiffbau boomt. Wie die meisten anderen Sektoren der Wirtschaft konnten sich auch die Eigner der großen Werften, die fast alle in der südlich von Istanbul gelegenen Region Tuzla angesiedelt sind, in den vergangenen Jahren über satte Gewinne freuen. Allein die Exporterlöse der Branche verdreifachten sich zwischen 2004 und 2007 von rund 700 Millionen US-Dollar auf knapp zwei Milliarden Dollar jährlich. Die Erfolgsstory der Werftbosse ist bezeichnend für die Türkei, wo nahezu sämtliche Wirtschaftszweige seit Amtsantritt der gemäßigt-islamischen Regierung unter Ministerpräsident Tayyip Erdogan ähnliche Umsatzsteigerungen hinlegen konnten. Auch der Umstand, daß sich die zweistelligen Zuwächse der Schiffbauunternehmen in den Lohntüten der Werftarbeiter nicht widerspiegelt, ist typisch: Ähnlich sieht es bei ihren Kollegen im Textilsektor oder im Baugewerbe aus. Denn von dem vielbeschworenen »türkischen Wirtschaftswunder«, das die neoliberale Politik Erdogans dem Lande angeblich beschert hat, ist bei der werktätigen Bevölkerung bislang nichts angekommen. Tageslöhne von umgerechnet kaum 15 Euro, fehlende Sozialversicherung, Wochenarbeitszeiten von 60 Stunden und mehr, Lohnkürzung oder Kündigung im Krankheitsfalle – unter diesen Umständen wird die türkische Arbeitskraft billig gehalten und so das vermeintliche Wirtschaftswunder am Bosporus überhaupt erst ermöglicht.
Tödliche ArbeitsunfälleDie Arbeitsbedingungen beim Schiffbau sind sogar für türkische Verhältnisse derart kraß, daß sie inzwischen selbst in der einheimischen Boulevardpresse thematisiert werden. Denn nicht nur die Gewinne der Werfteigner haben sich in den letzten Jahren verdreifacht: Die Zahl der Arbeiter, die während der Maloche ums Leben kommen, ist von durchschnittlich fünf auf mindestens 20 pro Jahr in die Höhe geschnellt. Allein seit Anfang des Jahres starben in der Region Tuzla bereits vier Werftarbeiter bei Arbeitsunfällen. Für den Verband der Schiffbauer (GISBIR) tragen die Arbeiter allerdings selbst die Schuld an den Unfällen. »Wir treffen alle Vorkehrungen, aber die Arbeiter sind einfach viel zu nachlässig bei der Umsetzung«, behauptete kürzlich Verbandschef Kenan Torlak. »Es ist Pflicht, Handschuhe und Schutzhelm zu tragen. Aber manche halten diese Vorschrift nicht ein.« In den Ohren der Funktionäre der Gewerkschaft Limter-Is klingen die Worte der Werftbesitzer geradezu wie Hohn. Viele der verunglückten Arbeiter wurden von tonnenschweren Stahlteilen erschlagen oder stürzten von wackeligen Gerüsten mehrere Dutzend Meter in die Tiefe. Daß das Tragen von Handschuhen und Helm die Überlebenschancen bei dieser Art von Unfällen kaum wesentlich erhöht, dürfte auch den Werftbossen klar sein, meint der Gewerkschaftsvorsitzende Cem Dinc. In Wahrheit würden die Arbeitsunfälle bewußt in Kauf genommen. Die Auftragsbücher sind voll, das Arbeitstempo ist dementsprechend hoch, selbst einfache Arbeitsschutzvorkehrungen würden umgangen, weil sie zu einem Zeitverlust führten. So würde ganz bewußt eher der Tod eines Arbeiters in Kauf genommen als die Konventionalstrafe, die drohe, wenn ein Auftrag nicht pünktlich ausgeführt wird. Verschärfend komme noch hinzu, daß ein Großteil der Beschäftigten ungelernte Leiharbeiter seien, die von Arbeitsvermittlern vor allem in Südostanatolien, dem Armenhaus des Landes, für Hungerlöhne rekrutiert würden. Gerade einmal zehn Prozent der 24000 Werftarbeiter, die in der Region Tuzla ihr Brot verdienten, sind den Angaben von Limter-Is zufolge fest angestellt. Der Rest sind ungelernte Zeitarbeiter, die zumeist nie zuvor in der Branche gearbeitet haben. Eine Umgehung sämtlicher Sicherheitsstandards, völlig übermüdete Malocher, die statt der vorgeschriebenen 37,5 Wochenstunden selten weniger als 70 Stunden arbeiten, ungelerntes Personal – tödliche Unfälle sind unter diesen Bedingungen geradezu programmiert.Die Angaben der Gewerkschaft über die horrenden Arbeitsbedingungen werden auch durch eine Studie der Regierung bestätigt. Im April des vergangenen Jahres ließ das Arbeitsministerium 44 Werften auf die Einhaltung der Arbeitsschutzbestimmungen überprüfen. Mehr als 500 schwerwiegende Mängel traten dabei zutage. Grund genug für ein Eingreifen ist dies allerdings auch vor dem Hintergrund der gehäuften Todesfälle nicht – man will die boomende Industrie schließlich nicht bremsen.
Streik für mehr SicherheitDie Gewerkschaft Limter plant deshalb nun einen Streik, um zumindest die Einhaltung der Sicherheitsstandards und einen Einstellungsstopp für Leiharbeiter zu erreichen. Von Gesprächsbereitschaft ist auf seiten der Werftbesitzer derweil keine Spur. Arbeiter, die vergangenen Samstag protestiertenw, wurden statt dessen kurzerhand auf die Straße gesetzt. Das rigide Vorgehen gegen jede Form von gewerkschaftlicher Organisation und Widerstand hat bereits dafür gesorgt, daß gerade viele der Leiharbeiter, die keine festen Verträge haben, einem Streik skeptisch gegenüberstehen: »Die Bosse sitzen einfach am längeren Hebel. Denn wenn Ali nicht arbeitet, dann kommt eben Mehmet und arbeitet für ihn. Und wenn Mehmet nicht arbeitet, dann kommt Hasan. Wenn ich sage, ich setze mich für 15 Euro am Tag nicht länger diesen Bedingungen aus, dann kommt einer, der die gleiche Arbeit sogar für zehn Euro macht – weil er das Geld noch viel nötiger braucht als ich«, sagt ein Arbeiter. Arbeitskraft ist billig im Wirtschaftswunderland Türkei. Und Menschenleben sind es auch.

Turkey and Islam Veils of half-truth

2008-02-18T09:10:00.001+01:00

Feb 14th 2008 ISTANBULFrom The Economist print edition
What lies behind the row over lifting the headscarf ban in universities
TO TURKEY'S secular elite it is a step back to the dark ages; to its conservatives, an overdue right. Either way, the constitutional changes approved by parliament to ease the ban on the wearing of the Muslim headscarf in universities will trigger a new battle between the mildly Islamist prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and his secular opponents.
Scores of university heads have declared they will ignore the changes, although they were approved by a big parliamentary majority on February 9th. Tens of thousands of Turks have taken to the streets in protest. The opposition leader, Deniz Baykal, promises to go to the constitutional court, arguing that the measures contravene constitutional guarantees of secularism. The court may rule in his favour, as it did in a dispute about the Turkish presidency last May. In any case, before the measures take effect the government has to change more specific rules about garb on campuses. Some doomsayers predict the sort of violence that flared between leftist students and nationalists and Islamists in the 1970s.
Mr Erdogan's Justice and Development (AK) party has been under pressure from its base to scrap the headscarf restriction, which was imposed only in the 1990s, ever since it came to power in 2002. Polls show that most Turks favour lifting the ban for university students. Even the country's generals have remained silent, for a change. So what is all the fuss about?
One answer is that the battle over headscarves is not really about religion at all. Rather it is a power struggle between a rising class of observant Turks from the Anatolian hinterland and an entrenched elite of secular “white” Turks, backed by the generals and the judiciary. “Women with scarves used to be our maids, now they have become our neighbours,” sniffs one Istanbul socialite.
But snobbery and power are only part of the story. The headscarf debate reflects a clash between tradition and modernity as much as one between Islam and democracy. Many Westernised, middle-class Turks, especially women, fear for their lifestyle. They cite government plans to ban the showing of alcohol on television as another example of creeping conservatism. It did not help when one AK member of parliament crowed that, after getting the headscarf into universities, government offices would be next.
Even headscarf campaigners complain that they knew nothing about the government's plans. Some believe they were designed merely to win votes in the local elections due next year. If the AK were serious about bolstering equality between the sexes, “there would be more than one woman in the cabinet,” says one AK-supporting lady. And if letting women cover their heads were a matter of rights, as Mr Erdogan claims, why has the government not scrapped Article 301 of the penal code, which criminalises free speech? (Its most recent victim is Atilla Yayla, a liberal academic, given a suspended three-year jail sentence for calling Ataturk “that man”.) The government is also dragging its feet on European Union demands to make it easier for non-Muslim minorities to reclaim properties confiscated by the state.
One reason for this, some suggest, is that the AK government needed to placate a small far-right party whose support it needed in parliament to secure a two-thirds majority on the headscarf. At all events, Mr Erdogan's waning interest in joining the EU has led to growing disenchantment among his liberal supporters. Their problem is that they have nowhere else to turn. Mr Baykal, who purports to stand for Ataturk and modernity, is among the country's most strident opponents of EU-imposed reforms. Despite losing three elections within the space of a decade, he remains firmly in position.
The bigger worry is that Turkey has not yet devised a system of checks and balances that can protect the rights of all individuals, be they secular or pious, Turks or Kurds. As Abdullah Gul, the pro-European Turkish president, argued this week, EU membership could offer a panacea for Turkey's ills. If only Mr Erdogan (and existing EU members) would agree.

TURKEY: WORRIES MOUNT OVER GOVERNMENT’S COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIZATION

2008-02-14T11:35:00.001+01:00

Yigal Schleifer 2/13/08
The recent vote in the Turkish parliament ending the ban on headscarves at public universities is raising concern about the future direction of Turkey. Some political observers are voicing concern that the government may be turning away from its broad reform agenda covering domestic democratization and Turkey’s European Union bid.
"The perception shared by many intellectuals is that this reform [over headscarves] will come at the expense of other reforms," says veteran Turkish journalist Yavuz Baydar, a columnist for the English-language newspaper Today’s Zaman.
"Some intellectuals [who support the government] are starting to have second thoughts about whether the government has a well-defined strategy for change for Turkey, and what triggered this doubt is the priority that the government has put on the headscarf issue."
The constitutional reform package that ended the headscarf ban zipped through parliament, after first being introduced only a few weeks ago by the liberal Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. The rapid passage of the measure contrasted sharply with the AKP’s drive to promote European Union membership. Over the last year, many of Turkey’s EU-related reforms have stalled.
For example, article 301 of the penal code, used to punish those who have "insulted Turkishness" and which has marred Turkey’s record on freedom of expression issues, remains unchanged despite numerous promises by the government to amend it. Meanwhile, the draft version of a new civilian-minded constitution, meant to replace one written by the military following a 1980 coup, has been ready for months but has yet to be presented by the government.
"What Turkey really needs to have is a very profound constitutional debate," says Katinka Barysch, an expert on Turkey at the Centre for European Reform, a think tank based in London. "The headscarf is only the tip of the iceberg."
Ali Babacan, Turkey’s foreign minister, claimed that lifting the headscarf ban was part of the effort to meet EU membership requirements. But EU officials were quick to make clear that the issue was strictly a domestic Turkish matter. "There is no EU legislation on the issue of wearing the headscarf," Krisztina Nagy, the spokesperson for the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, told reporters in Brussels after the Turkish vote.
Says a European diplomat based in Ankara: "The fighting over the headscarf issue is distracting from dealing with other issues, and could make it more difficult for the different sides to come together on these issues, if it reinforces antagonisms and skepticism."
"It is unfortunate that this has taken up priority over these other issues, such as the reform of 301 and the constitutional process as a whole," the diplomat continued. "We hear from the government that reforms are in the pipeline. … But those never come true."
Also worrisome for observers was that in order to pass the headscarf legislation, the AKP had to enter what some have termed an "unholy alliance" with the opposition Nationalist Action Party (MHP), a hard-line group that has taken a rejectionist stance on many of Turkey’s EU reforms. Already, parliamentary debate over a bill that would provide for the return of property confiscated by the Turkish state from religious minority groups has been delayed by the AKP government, in order not to antagonize the MHP, which opposes the legislation.
Academics, meanwhile, are expressing concern that the focus on the headscarf issue is obscuring the need for more substantive reforms in Turkey’s higher education system. The same 1982 constitution that created the headscarf ban also put in place a highly centralized and bureaucratic university system that many academics assert stifles academic and intellectual freedom.
"The whole higher education system needs a greater look and needs to be reformed," says Ustun Erguder, a political scientist at Sabanci University in Istanbul. "This headscarf issue just delays the whole thing."
But Sahin Alpay, a professor at Istanbul’s Bahcesehir University and a leading Turkish liberal secularist, counters that getting the headscarf issue out of the way may actually make it easier to bring about other constitutional changes. "It may be a good thing that the headscarf issue is dealt with separately, because then the discussion of the new constitution will not be overshadowed by this extremely divisive issue," he said.
AKP government representatives insist that the party pushed for lifting the ban in the name of human rights and civil liberties. "Our main aim is to end the discrimination experienced by a section of society, just because of their personal beliefs," AKP parliamentarian Sadullah Ergin recently told private broadcaster NTV.
Because of the ban, many covered women went abroad to study. (The covered daughters of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for example, attended college in the United States). Other women have resorted to wearing wigs over their headscarves in order to attend classes at Turkish state universities.
According to one recent poll, 60 percent of Turks support ending the headscarf ban. Still, the reaction from Turkey’s secular establishment has been forceful. While parliament was voting February 9 in Ankara, tens of thousands of flag-waving demonstrators turned out for pro-secularism rally only a few blocks away.
Although Turkey’s powerful military, considered the ultimate guardian of the country’s secular tradition, has, for now, remained quiet on the issue, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the main secular opposition party in parliament, has vowed to appeal to the country’s top court to annul the vote lifting the headscarf ban.
"The aim [of the legislation] is to erode the principle of secularism in the constitution," said Kemal Anadol, spokesman for the CHP, at the start of the debate in parliament.
Editor’s Note: Yigal Schleifer is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul.
Posted February 13, 2008 © Eurasianet http://www.eurasianet.org

MUJERES-TURQUÍA: Un velo sobre la identidad nacional

2008-02-06T11:18:00.001+01:00

Análisis de Hilmi Toros
ESTAMBUL, 6 feb (IPS) - El gobierno de Turquía mantiene vivo el debate hacia una reforma constitucional que, de concretarse, levantaría la prohibición a las mujeres de cubrir la cabeza con la tradicional mantilla musulmana cuando asisten a las universidades.
La oposición percibe en la iniciativa un intento de debilitar el actual régimen secular y de imponer principios islámicos, incluso más allá de la educación superior. Temen que este país aspirante a miembro de la Unión Europea (UE) se deslice, en realidad, hacia restricciones religiosas. Pero el oficialismo considera que el levantamiento de la prohibición representaría, en cambio, un paso hacia una libertad de expresión similar a la que disfrutan las estudiantes de universidades occidentales. El gobernante Partido de Justicia y Desarrollo (AKP), fundado por miembros de un partido islamista proscripto y que hoy se definen como conservadores, se unieron con el Partido de Movimientos Nacionalistas para concretar la enmienda que deroga la prohibición. Los dos partidos suman 410 votos en el parlamento, y se requieren 367 para aprobar la reforma. El proyecto ya se encuentra a estudio de una comisión legislativo y el trámite elegido es de carácter acelerado. Podría adoptarse en un plazo de 10 días. El Partido Popular Republicano (CHP), el principal de la oposición y fundado en los años 20 por el padre de la Turquía secular, Mustafá Kemal Ataturk, anunció que, de aprobarse la reforma, procuraría anularla mediante una demanda ante la Corte Constitucional. Unas 100.000 personas marcharon en Ankara el sábado contra los cambios propuestos. La reforma se concretará solamente en relación al denominado "basortusu", pequeño pañuelo usado por millones de mujeres en todo este país de 70 millones de habitantes. Los turbantes, por ejemplo, seguirán prohibidos, pues se los considera símbolo del fundamentalismo islámico. La mayoría de las esposas de los miembros del AKP usan turbante. El primer ministro y líder del AKP Recep Tayyip Erdogan, otrora islamista, había prometido a la devota base musulmana del partido que levantaría la prohibición. La enmienda, según Erdogan, solo pretende acabar con la discriminación contra las universitarias devotas y a restablecer su derecho a recibir educación terciaria. "Ningún derecho humano básico plantea una amenaza a la democracia o a los valores fundamentales de la república. El gobierno del AKP garantiza nuestro orden secular", declaró Erdogan. Mientras, el líder del opositor CHP, Deniz Baykal, consideró que "éste no es un asunto religioso, sino altamente político". Baykal acusó al AKP de intentar hacer pasar el turbante por "basortusu", y dijo que el turbante "no es turco, sino importado" de la secta musulmana wahabi, extremadamente religiosa y originaria de la Península Arábiga. El dirigente Husnu Tuna, del AKP, afirmó que "el objetivo" de la reforma "es levantar la prohibición en todos los ámbitos", lo que condujo a críticas de la oposición sobre la existencia de una agenda islámica oculta en el oficialismo, que alega lo contrario. "El problema real es el peligro de que esta libertad (de usar el pañuelo) se propague a todas las áreas públicas y también contamine las escuelas primarias y secundarias, los hospitales y los juzgados con el paso del tiempo", dijo el analista liberal Mehmet Alí Birand, del periódico Posta. "El peligro real es generar hombres y mujeres de turbante, que sean jueces, fiscales o médicos, y que afronten instancias en que médicas se nieguen a examinar a pacientes hombres o que mujeres se nieguen a que las examine un médico", sostuvo. El mundo académico, directamente afectado, está dividido. "Advertimos a quienes apoyan la reforma y a quienes permanecen en silencio que la enmienda socavará los avances de la república y que el orden secular llegará a un fin", dijo el profesor Mustafá Akaydin, presidente del Consejo Interuniversitario y presidente de la Universidad de Akdeniz. "Esto transformará de modo inevitable a la República Turca en un estado religioso", advirtió. El rectorado de la Universidad de Estambul, la mayor del país, con 50.000 estudiantes, sostuvo que "los intereses y opciones políticas, disfrazadas de libertad de credo, no pueden permitirse para amenazar la libertad científica en las universidades". "Turquía no será una escena para juegos de sharia (ley islámica) y abuso de religión. No podemos hacer la vista gorda ante quienes por su voluntad o su ignorancia debilitan nuestro orden social", señaló el rectorado en una declaración pública. El profesor Ural Bulut, rector de la prestigiosa Universidad Técnica de Medio Oriente en Ankara, dijo, entrevistado por CNN Turquía: "Si la reforma se adopta, los islamistas radicales presionarán para que la prohibición se levante en los niveles inferiores de la enseñanza y en otras áreas. Quienes no usan el pañuelo quedarán bajo presión." Pero, en el mismo programa, su colega Ihsan Dagi acotó que "las universidades no deberían preocuparse por las prohibiciones sino por las libertades y la educación". Dagi presentó una petición para levantar la prohibición, y dijo que en 24 horas sería apoyado por más de 600 profesores universitarios de todo el país. Dos poderosas organizaciones del sector privado, la Asociación de la Empresa y la Industria y la Organización Empresarial Femenina, se oponen a derogar la prohibición por entender que el gobierno se concentra en el velo y no en las reformas en materia de derechos humanos que reclama la UE. La oposición también teme que un retroceso de los valores seculares aumente el sentimiento antiturco en la UE. "Habrá confusión y más polarización, con la posibilidad de que el conflicto escale", dijo a IPS el profesor Ilter Turan, ex rector de la Universidad Bilgi de Estambul. Las fuerzas armadas, que derrocaron a cuatro gobiernos civiles, uno de ellos islamista, desde 1960, y que se consideran a sí mismas guardianes del orden secular, no formularon comentarios. Sólo advirtieron que su posición en la materia es bien conocida, en evidente referencia a una declaración de abril pasado en la que se reivindicaron como "parte interesada" en el debate sobre secularismo, y manifestaron que actuarían en su defensa cuando fuere necesario. La prohibición entró en vigor en 1989, cuando un tribunal falló que la mantilla violaba el artículo 2 de la Constitución, sobre la inmodificable naturaleza secular de la república. En los conservadores años 90, se prohibió el ingreso a las universidades a las estudiantes que no cumplieran con la disposición. El propio Erdogan envió a sus hijas a estudiar al exterior para eludir la norma. La hija del presidente Abdullah Gul cubrió su pañuelo con una peluca al estilo occidental. Su esposa, primera primera dama de la república secular que usa velo, demandó en el pasado al Estado turco ante la Corte Europea de Derechos Humanos para reivindicar su derecho a lucirlo. Pero retiró la demanda cuando su esposo ascendía en el gobierno. En otra oportunidad, el tribunal europeo avaló la prohibición de la mantilla. Millones de mujeres turcas cubren hoy sus cabezas, y la práctica es cada vez más visible. También son más frecuentes otras modalidades de velo. La "burka" que cubre la mayor parte del rostro y se extiende hasta los pies --como en Irán y Afganistán-- todavía es inusual. La enmienda propuesta establece, además, que un pañuelo admisible debe ser lo suficientemente pequeño para dejar el rostro descubierto, a fin de permitir la identificación, con un nudo bajo el mentón. Tal como están las cosas, ni la primera dama ni la esposa del primer ministro calificarán para ser admitidas en una universidad turca. El pañuelo que cubre sus cabezas no está atado bajo la barbilla, sino en la nuca. (FIN/2008)

Analysis: Turkey embraces wind power

2008-02-02T08:26:00.000+01:00

WASHINGTON, Feb. 1 In an era of record high oil prices, many countries increasingly are turning to alternative fuels, including biofuel, solar energy and wind power. This pattern is typically pronounced in Turkey, forced to import more than 90 percent of its energy needs, with energy suppliers that are not only expensive, but erratic.In 2006, Turkey spent $29 billion on energy imports, primarily from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia. High prices and fickle suppliers have stimulated Turkey's growing interest in wind power.Turkish interest in alternative fuels has been spurred by recent events. Turkish natural gas imports come primarily from Russia via the South Stream pipeline and Iran. On Dec. 31, Turkmenistan halted its deliveries of natural gas deliveries to Iran, citing the need for urgent pipeline repairs. The cutoff subsequently forced Iran to reduce its gas exports to Turkey by 75 percent, from 20 million cubic meters to 5 million cu. m., as inclement weather increased domestic demand, disrupting Iran's domestic gas distribution. Tehran subsequently claimed that Turkmen action was, in fact, a retaliatory move over proposed price increases. Iran then stopped shipments completely Jan. 8, leading Ankara the next day to halt the flow of Azeri gas to Greece because of the suspension of gas supplies from Iran.Turkey is Iran's sole export market for natural gas, but the relationship has not been smooth, again due to disputes over price. The Turkmen incident had a feeling of deja vu, as in January 2006 Iran halved its supplies of natural gas to Turkey to around 7 million cubic feet per day, citing "climactic conditions" and increased domestic need, while in December 2006 it temporarily shut off supplies completely.During the most recent dispute, Turkey turned to Russia with a request for additional natural gas supplies, but was rebuffed. Instead, Moscow also reduced exports, citing severe weather. As natural gas powers half of Turkey's power stations, state pipeline company Botas was forced to tap reserves in its gas depot near Silivri, Turkey's sole gas-storage facility.The incident has provided further incentives to Turkish efforts to seek alternatives. A measure of Ankara's determination to free itself from the grip of avaricious, erratic energy suppliers is a dramatic rise in governmental interest in wind power, which is illustrated in government figures. While in 2006, wind power in Turkey generated 19 megawatts of electricity, last year Turkey's 10 wind farms produced nearly 140 megawatts, a 736 percent increase.Turkey's interest in renewable energy dates back to 2005, when the Turkish Grand National Assembly passed a renewable energy law harmonizing government legislation with European Union legislation to support renewable sources, including wind power. The new law provided a government guarantee to purchase electricity at a set price for seven years.Marmara University Energy Department Associate Professor and World Wind Energy Association Vice President Tanay Sidki Uyar recently said that if Turkey properly developed all of its renewable energy potential resources, including solar, wind, hydroelectric and geothermal power sources, the country could become self-sufficient in energy. Uyar told RenewableEnergyAccess.com, "Wind power could supply Turkey's electricity needs twice over within five to 10 years if the government had the political will to develop this sector." Uyar added, "We have terrific geographic conditions for solar and wind power in Turkey. Exploiting it is already economically and technically possible, but the problem is that the government favors fossil fuels and nuclear energy."Epitomizing Ankara's determination to become energy self-sufficient is a contract signed last July with General Electric for 52 of its latest generation of wind turbines with a generating capacity of 2.5 megawatts apiece. The GE 2.5xl is the largest GE wind turbine available for onshore applications and is specifically designed to meet EU requirements, where the relative lack of available land is a significant constraint on project size. While previous wind park projects were primarily situated in Turkey's western regions and the Aegean coast, the 130-megawatt GE wind power project in southeastern Turkey will be the world's largest installation of GE latest 2.5xl wind turbine technology and will more than double Turkey's installed wind capacity.Turkey is not limiting itself to U.S. suppliers; on Jan. 30, Turkey's Rotor Energy Co., a subsidiary of Zorlu Energy, signed a contract with Ecosecurities to build a wind power plant in the southern province of Osmaniye. The Osmaniye facility, scheduled to come online in 2009, will initially generate about 135 megawatts daily, with an annual capacity of 500,000 megawatts.Ankara is not moving on the issue as swiftly as alternative energy advocates would like, however; proposals to build wind farms with a total operating capacity of 8,000 megawatts is still awaiting government approval. Ankara has already issued about 40 licenses for wind parks, each with an installed 20-60 megawatt capacity.The future looks bright for alternative energy companies, as the Turkish government intends to privatize a significant proportion of the country's primarily state-owned energy and gas supply companies over the next few years. Given the "pipeline politics" that Turkey has recently endured with its fickle natural gas suppliers Russia and Iran, Ankara's move toward alternative energy makes both fiscal and ecological sense.
http://www.earthtimes.org/

Orhan Pamuk:«Lo que une a los pueblos es el sonido del corazón»

2008-01-28T07:40:00.000+01:00

El Premio Nobel de Literatura de hace dos años aspira a que Turquía entre en la Unión Europea, a pesar de los inconvenientes que hay EFE / MADRID

efe / madrid El escritor turco Orhan Pamuk cree que «el nacionalismo ascendente» que se da en buena parte del mundo es uno de los motivos que impide el ingreso de Turquía en la UE, aunque su experiencia le ha enseñado que «lo que une a los pueblos no es la política, sino el sonido del corazón, la música de los cuerpos». Pamuk, Premio Nobel de Literatura 2006, lanzó hace unos días esta reflexión en un reciente encuentro con la prensa en el que tanto él como Juan Goytisolo defendieron con énfasis la necesidad de que la UE «abra sus puertas» a Turquía, porque así podría aflorar a la superficie «toda la riqueza, la belleza y la multiculturalidad de este país». El novelista turco, que desde el principio dejó claro que en España se siente «como en casa» y que su cultura no le es ajena, tuvo un doble motivo para estar en Madrid: lo han hecho doctor honoris causa por la Universidad Complutense, y por intervenir, junto con Goytisolo, en el programa Miradas turcas que se desarrolla estos días en la capital. A ambos escritores les une una fuerte amistad desde hace dieciocho años y una recíproca admiración. Uno y otro son también claro ejemplo de intelectuales «comprometidos con el tiempo que les ha tocado vivir», como puso de manifiesto la coordinadora de esta iniciativa, Concha Hernández. La creencia en la Alianza de Civilizaciones, «no en el choque» de las mismas, es otra de las cuestiones que une a Pamuk y a Goytisolo, si bien este último prefiere hablar de «alianza de valores» porque hay «civilizaciones distintas que comparten valores como la democracia y el concepto de ciudadanía». «Hay dos países musulmanes en los que estos conceptos tienen validez: la desdichada Bosnia, a la que la Unión Europea y el mundo dejaron machacar hace unos años por el simple hecho de ser musulmana, y Turquía. La relación con estas naciones es esencial para la UE», subrayó Goytisolo, cuya defensa del mundo y la cultura árabes es de sobra conocida. Uno y otro reconocieron que la situación otomana «es compleja» y que su ingreso en la UE lo puede dificultar la existencia de grupos ultranacionalistas o el que, como dijo Pamuk, su país «no es una sociedad libre, no hay libertad de expresión», tal y como muchos turcos desearían que hubiera. sin excusas. Pero esa falta de libertad de expresión no afecta sólo a su país y «no se debe utilizar como excusa» para evitar su ingreso. El autor de El libro negro -novela que impresionó profundamente a Goytisolo-, Me llamo Rojo o Estambul, está convencido de que, cuando se superen estos problemas, Turquía «aportará mucho a la Unión Europea», y viceversa. Lamentablemente, «y a pesar del esfuerzo que realizan muchos compatriotas», esos inconvenientes «aún no se han superado» y, además, «la emoción y el entusiasmo que había hace cinco o seis años en Turquía» por incorporarse a la Unión Europea «se va apagando», y eso le entristece. Esta «situación actual negativa» es transitoria y Turquía camina hacia «otro nivel de convivencia y de relaciones», aseveró Pamuk, a quien su propia experiencia vital le ha servido para sacar una conclusión: «La cultura oriental y la occidental no son diferentes; es una misma cosa con diferentes caras». Como las preguntas de tipo político fueron incesantes durante el encuentro con la prensa, recordó que sus denuncias sobre lo que sucede en su país le han acarreado problemas con el Gobierno y algún que otro castigo. Además, le gustaría ser conocido «no como un escritor activista que opina sobre la política actual», sino como «una persona sentada ante su mesa de Estambul que intenta crear un universo de ficción».

La larga travesía por el desierto

2008-01-20T08:41:00.000+01:00

http://www.elpais.com/
F. C. 20/01/2008
Turquía cumple todos los requisitos técnicos para entrar en la UE, pero no logra completar sus reformas

La visita del primer ministro turco Recep Tayyip Erdogan a España ha reactivado el debate sobre el ingreso del país euroasiático a la Unión Europea. El propio presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, manifestaba abiertamente su apoyo a la adhesión turca, mientras que Erdogan aprovechaba la ocasión para recordar que Turquía cumple con todos los requisitos técnicos de la Comisión, razón suficiente para que la UE "explique de forma científica por qué no se les acepta dentro del club comunitario". Para el jefe del Ejecutivo turco, su país cumple los criterios de Maastricht, a diferencia de muchos actuales socios de la UE.
Un largo camino
La adhesión de Turquía a la Unión Europea ha estado marcada por un largo y tortuoso camino de más de 40 años y que comenzó formalmente en octubre de 2004. Unas negociaciones que casi siempre han estado condicionadas por la política, la religión y los derechos civiles, pero también por la economía. Precisamente, el argumento que Erdogan ha tomado como referencia para agilizar su ingreso. Los datos indican que Turquía ha crecido a tasas que duplican a la Unión Europea en el último lustro, realizando importantes esfuerzos para adaptar su economía a estándares comunitarios.
Después de solventar la severa crisis del sistema financiero de 2001, el país ha tenido un crecimiento sostenido que le ha permitido casi triplicar su PIB en seis años. Con una producción de 500.000 millones de dólares, el país se ha colocado en el puesto número 17 de las economías más grandes del mundo y en el sexto del continente, después de los Países Bajos. Durante esta década, la Administración turca también ha logrado controlar sus elevadas tasas de inflación, un mal que ha afectado históricamente a las finanzas turcas, con tasas que en el año 1997 rozaron el 100% de crecimiento anual. En 2001, este indicador llegaba al 68,5%, producto de la fuerte depreciación de la moneda local, la lira, reduciéndose hasta el 8,6% en 2007.
Esta evolución ha ido acompañada con el control de las cuentas públicas que, de momento, le permiten cumplir con los criterios de austeridad presupuestaria establecidos en Maastricht. Después de una serie de acuerdos con el FMI, Turquía ha pasado de tener un déficit fiscal del 12,9% del PIB en 2002 hasta bajar del 3% exigido por Europa a partir del año 2005. En cuanto a la deuda pública, ésta se ha reducido hasta el 64% en 2006, desde el 104% de 2001. Datos que, según Turquía, le hacen cumplir adecuadamente los estándares europeos. No obstante, para el club comunitario hay una serie de reformas que aún están pendientes.
Descontando las disputas con Chipre, el problema kurdo, los escasos avances en materia de derechos civiles y mejoras del sistema judicial, hay trabas económicas que siguen siendo un problema. En sus sucesivos informes sobre la adhesión, la Comisión ha advertido que la autoridad monetaria no es lo suficientemente independiente del poder político y que las autoridades públicas no terminan de desligarse del sistema financiero. En al ámbito del empleo, la UE ha detectado incumplimientos relativamente importantes en lo que se refiere al respeto de los derechos sindicales, a la lucha contra el empleo no declarado y a las capacidades administrativas.
Temas pendientes
Otro de los temas aún pendientes para la UE es la fiscalidad y su escasa adaptación al acervo comunitario en temas como el IVA y los tipos aplicados, la estructura y los tipos de los impuestos especiales y la fiscalidad directa. No obstante, la Comisión reconoce que, en cuanto a la competencia, la armonización con el acervo en el ámbito de los acuerdos entre empresas está ya muy avanzada y que la adaptación legislativa en este ámbito continúa progresando. También destaca la consolidación de la intermediación financiera, aunque aún se detectan problemas en el avance de sectores clave como la energía y los transportes.
Por su parte, la OCDE agrega que se debe hacer más esfuerzos para atraer al inversor extranjero, además de trabajar para reducir los elevados tipos de interés y mejorar la flexibilidad de los mercados laborales, lo que debería ayudar a la economía a mejorar su competitividad. En su último informe de 2007, la Comisión advierte un panorama positivo para la constitución de empresas.
Esto ha permitido que la inversión extranjera directa (IED) haya tocado niveles récord durante 2007. Los últimos datos del Gobierno turco indican que este indicador pasó de los 1.700 millones de euros de 2003 a los 16.000 millones de euros hasta octubre de 2007. Un dato que en su mayoría se debe al proceso privatizador que se está emprendiendo y que podría disparar hasta los 30.000 millones de dólares la IED.
Precisamente la inversión es uno de los puntos clave para las empresas europeas y españolas. Durante 2006, más del 70% de las inversiones llegadas al país llegaron desde los países europeos, superando los 10.500 millones de euros durante 2006 y los 2.700 millones hasta abril de 2007. Los sectores más apetecidos son la construcción, el turismo y las infraestructuras. Pero no sólo eso. Con más de 80 millones de habitantes, los intercambios comerciales de Turquía con Europa van en alza. En 2005 se dirigieron a la Unión Europea el 52,3% de las exportaciones turcas. En importaciones turcas, en 2005, el 42,1% de las mismas procedían de la UE. El saldo comercial es tradicionalmente favorable a la UE.
La conexión española
La apuesta de Zapatero por Turquía, manifestada esta semana, no es una casualidad. En los últimos años, las cifras de intercambios comerciales entre ambos países marcan sucesivos récords. En 2007 se alcanzaron los 7.000 millones de euros, frente a los 6.000 millones del ejercicio anterior. El propio Erdogan ha señalado que su deseo es que esta cifra se eleve a los 10.000 millones cuanto antes. De esta manera, las exportaciones de la economía española hacia Turquía alcanzaron en 2006 un 2,8% de la cuota de mercado. De acuerdo con los datos de la Oficina Económica y Comercial de España en Ankara, España fue el sexto país receptor de exportaciones turcas en 2006 con un 4,3%.
Según el Instituto de Comercio Exterior (Icex), el punto débil en las relaciones económicas y comerciales entre España y Turquía es la inversión. La concentración de las inversiones españolas en países de Latinoamérica y la UE hace que Turquía no sea un objetivo prioritario. Con todo, los datos oficiales del país euroasiático indican que Turquía es el undécimo receptor de la inversión española al extranjero, con 333 millones de euros acumulados hasta marzo de 2007. Las posibilidades españolas están centradas en sectores como las infraestructuras, el turismo y la energía.

Turkey economy slowed sharply in '07-

2008-01-16T07:31:00.000+01:00

Reuters
Tuesday January 15 2008
(Adds comments from interview with minister)
By Daliah Merzaban
DUBAI, Jan 15 (Reuters) - Turkish economic growth last year slowed significantly because of a doubling in energy prices and a drought, but growth of 4 to 4.5 percent would still be a good performance, Economy Minister Mehmet Simsek said on Tuesday.
"Growth has slowed down significantly in 2007. It is simply a number of supply side shocks; energy prices doubling and a drought," Simsek told an investors' conference in Dubai.
Economic growth of between 4 percent and 4.5 percent would be "quite a strong performance", he added.
Simsek told Reuters in an interview after the conference the government would speed up its privatisation programme and would decide by March how to sell its 75 percent stake in Halkbank.
Agricultural output in the first three quarters of 2007 shrank nearly 6 percent, he said at the conference organised by EFG Istanbul Securities.
Turkey had a 5 percent growth target for 2007, but third-quarter data showed gross national product growing at only 2 percent. The growth target for 2008 is 5.5 percent, and actual growth in 2006 was 6.0 percent.
Simsek said reducing inflation was critical to achieving the government's economic growth targets.
"Inflation is likely to trend downward ... If we continue to privatise, promote competition, attract foreign direct investment and make the labour market more flexible, I think that will help reduce inflation," he said.
Simsek said he was optimistic that inflation in the medium term would be in the low single digits.
Turkey's consumer price inflation in 2007 came in at 8.39 percent, twice the government's 4 percent target.
PRICE STABILITY
"Price stability is absolutely critical because without that it would be difficult to sustain these growth rates," Simsek said, referring to a medium-term 7 percent potential target rate for Turkey.
Simsek said he expected tourism revenues at $18-$20 billion in 2007 and this should rise to $30 billion in the next few years as foreign tourist numbers rise to 30 million from 22 million at present.
Simsek said the government would speed up its privatisation drive in 2008, when Ankara hopes to sell off tobacco firm Tekel, a 75 percent stake in Halkbank , electricity distributions grids and sugar factories.
The government would decide by March whether to sell its Halkbank stake to a strategic investor or via a secondary public offering, with a sale concluded by the end of the year, he said.
Turkey attracted $19 billion in foreign direct investment in 2007 including revenues from privatisation, and would at least match this figure this year, the minister said.
The Halkbank sale alone would generate $9 billion in revenues, according to EFG Istanbul estimates.
"Privatisation is gaining momentum," Simsek said. "While the global backdrop has somewhat weakened, Turkey plans to accelerate the privatisation programme."
Privatisation of the country's electricity production assets would be completed in 2011 or 2012, rather than an initial 2010 goal, he said.
Simsek said the government aimed to have a business-friendly new constitution in the second half of 2008.
"In the second half of 2008, we will have a brand new constitution that will be business-friendly and involve more individual freedoms," he said.
Simsek's ruling centre-right AK Party is drawing up a new draft constitution for Turkey, a European Union candidate country, to replace the current document, which dates back to a period of military rule in the early 1980s.
Turkey is also on target to pass a social security reform law through parliament by the end of the month, he said. (Editing by Selcuk Gokoluk and Stephen Nisbet)

Turkey and tolerance Deviating from the path

2008-01-11T07:27:00.000+01:00

Jan 10th 2008 ISTANBULFrom The Economist print edition
A cross-dresser's troubles with a resurgent Islam

FOR more than 30 years a cross-dresser with a razor-sharp wit and a merciless tongue has won the affection of millions of Turks. And his success on television has been vaunted as evidence of the tolerance of Turkey's unique mix of Islam and secularism.
But for the past year Huysuz Virjin (the Petulant Virgin) has been replaced by his less exotic self, Seyfi Dursunoglu, in a show aired on a private television channel. The 76-year-old entertainer claims to have been forced to trade in his trademark blonde wig, silk stockings and sexy gowns for more conventional male garb after Turkey's broadcasting watchdog, the RTUK, put pressure on television stations to ban cross-dressing.
RTUK denies such censorship. But Mr Dursunoglu insists that he is the victim of a creeping conservatism that he believes has infected the country ever since the mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party came to power five years ago. Although he was allowed to appear in drag for a special new-year programme, he says that “as a performer, I am no longer as free”. Similar concerns about artistic freedom and secularism were aired last month by Fazil Say, a Turkish pianist, who accused the AK party of being unfriendly.
Debate over whether Turkey is veering off the determinedly secular course laid down by Ataturk has intensified ever since AK was returned to power for a second five-year term in last July's parliamentary election, when it took 47% of the vote. Most Turks are plainly unfazed by such fears. Recent opinion polls suggest that support for AK has risen to a record 52%. “There is no evidence of a systematic plan by the government to make Turkey more Islamic,” concedes Nilufer Narli, an Istanbul-based sociologist. Yet she adds that “expressions of Islamic piety are becoming increasingly overt, indeed a vehicle for networking and social mobility.”
Awkwardly for AK, an openly gay fashion designer has emerged as its most passionate defender. Cemil Ipekci has declared that AK is the best government to have ruled the country in the history of the republic and that, had he been born a woman, “I would have covered my head [ie, Islamic-style].” Pressed to explain, a demure Mr Ipekci says “I am a conservative homosexual.”

Turkey must move fast to avoid EU setbacks

2008-01-05T08:43:00.000+01:00

By Paul Taylor Reuters
Published: January 4, 2008
BRUSSELS: Turkey faces a potential "triple whammy" of blows to its European Union membership bid later this year unless re-elected Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan moves quickly to enact human rights reforms, EU diplomats say.
Ankara's accession talks, launched in October 2005, have already been slowed to a trickle by the suspension of part of the negotiations over its refusal to open its ports and airports to traffic from EU member Cyprus.
Now the Turks face a negative European Commission progress report, renewed pressure from Cyprus, and French demands for the EU to discuss setting final borders, with Turkey on the outside.
"Erdogan needs to push laws through the new parliament on freedom of expression, the rights of religious minorities and other fundamental freedoms quickly to give the Commission something positive to report," a senior EU official said.
Without that, the annual progress report due on Nov. 7 is bound to conclude that reforms have virtually ceased over the last year, he said.
EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn made the point forcefully in congratulating Erdogan on Sunday's landslide general election victory for his Islamist-rooted AK party.
"We need in particular to see concrete results in areas of fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression and religious freedom," he told a news conference on Monday.
"I trust that the new government in Turkey will immediately relaunch the reform process so we can produce results (before) our next progress report in early November."
Joost Lagendijk, co-chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Assembly, said the top priority was to amend or abolish article 301 of the Penal Code, used repeatedly to prosecute writers and journalists for "insulting Turkishness".
That law was used to prosecute Nobel prize winning author Orhan Pamuk and to convict Turkish-Armenian editor Hrant Dink, later murdered, for expressing peaceful views on the mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks in 1915.
A long-stalled law on religious foundations giving more rights to Christian and other minorities and better treatment to the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul is another priority, Lagendijk said.
Turkish political commentators say Erdogan will face resistance from a nationalist opposition, whose acquiescence he needs to get his candidate for president chosen by parliament. The presidency, though armed with few executive powers, is a potent symbol of secularism for a conservative establishment that suspects Erdogan of harbouring a secret Islamist agenda.
The prime minister must also tread carefully with a military suspicious of his Islamist past and nervous about some EU-driven reforms. The AK party has cut back the generals' formal state powers under these reforms, but they remain a force on the political stage.
Erdogan could win more European goodwill by withdrawing some troops from northern Cyprus, making a concession on trade with Cyprus or opening Turkey's border with Armenia, but such moves seem unlikely as they would inflame nationalist sentiment.
Diplomats said Cyprus and France would likely jump on a critical European Commission report to demand further sanctions against Turkey or a rethink of its candidacy.
That too could provoke a nationalist backlash among Turks.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has repeatedly said Turkey is in Asia Minor, not Europe, and has no place in the EU.
His foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, said on Monday that Paris had a problem with five of the 35 "chapters" or policy areas into which the accession talks are divided, because in French eyes they assumed the outcome of full membership. But it was willing to allow the rest of the negotiations to proceed.
Another senior French official, Jean-Pierre Jouyet, has suggested Sarkozy could be satisfied in December with a summit agreement to appoint a committee to study the future of enlargement and the capacity to absorb new members.
That might kick the problem into touch for a year, but the panel would report back under France's presidency of the EU in the second half of 2008, possibly fuelling Sarkozy's drive to move the goalposts on Turkey's talks.

After 'wasted year,' Turkey turns attention back to economic reform

2008-01-04T07:33:00.000+01:00

By Selcuk Gokoluk Reuters Published: January 3, 2008

ANKARA: Turkey hopes to increase its growth rate while reining in inflation in 2008, but economists say that the government's plans are insufficient during a time of tighter credit in global markets.
As part of its plan, the government led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has vowed to raise the retirement age, shake up the labor market and increase aid for research and development. But such changes will have a positive fiscal effect on a slowing economy only in the long term, according to some analysts.
Drought, high energy prices and political wrangling prior to parliamentary elections in July - won again by Erdogan's pro-business AK Party - trimmed the growth rate for Turkey's gross national product to just 2 percent in the third quarter. Economic growth averaged a gung-ho 7.4 percent in the years 2002 to 2006, but was expected to come in well below that for 2007.
"Growth will be the most important economic indicator in the next five years instead of public finances," said Pelin Yenigun Dilek, chief economist at Garanti Bank, a midsize Turkish bank. "Growth of 4 percent will worsen unemployment and stoke social and even ethnic tensions."
Turkey needs to keep creating jobs for a fast-growing, young population. Its big cities are also surrounded by large shanty towns occupied by rural migrants, often from the impoverished, mainly Kurdish southeast.
Faruk Celik, the labor and social security minister, recently called 2007 a "wasted year" because of political opposition that stalled much of the government's agenda in Parliament.
At the same time, inflation for the year came in at 8.39 percent - double the target set by the central bank, which cut rates four times since September to try to head off a slowdown amid global economic turbulence.
The government is expecting a 5 percent growth rate for GNP for 2007 and has set a 5.5 percent target for GNP growth in 2008, and is counting on pushing through its legislative agenda to underpin that target.
The draft bills are still in Parliament and subject to change, but they currently call for gradually raising the country's retirement age to 68. Now there is no standard age, but it can be as low as 40.
The government proposals include a program of general health care for all citizens to help head off protests. It also plans to cut social security contributions paid by employers as a way to encourage hiring.
The economy minister, Mehmet Simsek, also is planning to accelerate the pace of privatizations during 2008 and 2009, aiming to sell enterprises like Halkbank, the cigarette company Tekel, and energy production and distribution companies as well as highways and bridges.
Business groups and economists are not entirely convinced about the efficacy of long-term, gradual transitions.
"This is a 15-year plan and it will not have a serious positive impact in the short term," said Gulay Elif Girgin, an economist at Oyak Investment, a unit of Oyak Bank. "General health insurance will create an extra burden on the budget in the coming three to five years."
Business groups also fret that the deterioration in economic indicators might worsen as global liquidity becomes more scarce.
"Improvements in inflation, the budget deficit, the current account deficit and debt dynamics have stopped," Erdal Karamercan, a member of the leading Turkish business forum TUSIAD, said last month. "The improvements have gone into reverse in some areas."
Turkey could have difficulty financing its growth because of scarce liquidity in international markets, he said.
A government official said there were no plans yet to revise the economic targets, because the final data on the last quarter of 2007 could still change the overall picture.
"There was uncertainty and worries due to elections but now these have disappeared and the economy has started to recover," the official said on the customary condition of anonymity. "Our growth targets are certainly within reach."
Economists agree that more privatizations in 2008 could help. Turkey was aiming to attract $25 billion in foreign direct investment in 2007, but likely missed that target.
"Even if prices are not as high as in past privatizations, there will be interest," Girgin said. "There is serious money in the Middle East and Turkey is one of the markets" Arab investors like.

Turkey Inches Toward EU, Clouded by French Objections

2007-12-20T20:18:00.001+01:00

By James G. Neuger

Dec. 19 (Bloomberg) -- Turkey inched ahead with its bid to enter the European Union, in talks increasingly clouded by French President Nicolas Sarkozy's determination to make sure the country never gets in.
Negotiations started today over aligning Turkey's regulations with the EU in the areas of consumer protection and transport and energy networks. Turkey has now started talks in six of the bloc's 35 policy areas and completed one.
Under French pressure, the EU has shifted the negotiations into a lower gear, a sign of rising opposition in the heart of Europe to letting in a predominantly Muslim country with a standard of living less than a third of the EU level.
``Certain member states are trying to erode our political and judicial position,'' Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan told a Brussels press conference. ``Such attitudes are not proper and do not reflect a responsible approach.''
Turkey has made scant progress toward joining since embarking on the EU entry marathon in 2005. The bloc froze negotiations in eight policy areas last year to punish Turkey for refusing to trade with the Greek-speaking Republic of Cyprus, part of the EU since 2004.
Negotiations in two or three more areas might get under way in the first half of next year, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said.
Alternative Union
Sarkozy, elected in May on a wave of French anti-Turkey sentiment, says Turkey's place is in an alternative ``Mediterranean Union'' and has vetoed talks in policy areas that would lead directly to EU membership.
``Must Europe enlarge indefinitely and, if yes, what will the consequences be?'' Sarkozy said last week after persuading the EU to set up a blue-ribbon study group that he expects to challenge Turkey's fitness to join.
Only 21 percent of Europeans want Turkey to become a member, according to a September poll by the German Marshall Fund. European attitudes have darkened the anti-EU mood in Turkey, where only 40 percent of Turks think membership would be a ``good thing,'' down from 54 percent last year and 73 percent in 2004, the poll found.
Even Turkish schoolchildren are hearing of the broadsides by Sarkozy and other anti-Turkey politicians in Europe, making it harder for the government to amass support to modernize the economy along EU lines, Babacan said.
`Negative Impact'
Such ``provocations'' stir feelings among Turks ``that they are unwanted, and that in turn has a negative impact on their position toward the EU,'' Babacan said.
Babacan, Rehn and Portuguese Foreign Minister Luis Amado, the chairman of today's meeting, all backed the ``accession'' process, using the jargon that France forced the EU to strip from the preparatory documents.
Diverging public opinion in Turkey and Europe threatens to breed a ``dangerous situation,'' Amado said.
Rehn, the EU commissioner shepherding the talks, voiced concern that the ``political atmospherics'' between Turkey and EU capitals are damaging the entry process and said the EU needs to be fair to Turkey.
``At the same time, we need to be firm and emphasize conditionality and that's why we encourage Turkey to relaunch the reform process in full,'' Rehn said. As a sign of support for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's EU strategy, the European Commission's president, Jose Barroso, will visit Turkey early next year, he said.
Hammering home a point he often makes in Brussels, Babacan said the Turkish government's plans to upgrade the economy and enhance civil rights won't be blown off course by the souring mood.
EU Subsidies
For example, Babacan said, today's start of talks on linking Turkey's transport and energy networks to the European grid makes Turkey eligible for EU subsidies to upgrade its infrastructure.
Babacan gave no timetable for meeting the EU's demand that Turkey rewrite a section of the penal code that has been used to prosecute authors who challenged the Turkish orthodoxy that that the World War I massacre of Armenians by Ottoman Turks was not genocide. One journalist convicted under the law, Hrant Dink, was later murdered by a teenage nationalist.
Divided Cyprus
The status of Cyprus also remains an obstacle for Turkey. Turkey's military has occupied the northern part of the Mediterranean island since a 1974 invasion in response to a Greek-backed coup.
The dividing line hardened in 2004, when Greek-speaking Cypriots rejected a unification proposal that had the backing of the Turkish side. As a result, Cyprus joined the EU without the Turkish-speaking north of the island, which remains fenced off in the only disputed border in the EU.
Skirmishes between the Turkish army and Kurdish rebels operating out of northern Iraq played no role in today's talks. The conflict with the Kurds didn't come up and Babacan said Turkey isn't relying on military force alone to pacify the border.
An EU statement yesterday called on the Turkish military to exercise restraint, while acknowledging Turkey's right to combat terrorists.
To contact the reporter on this story: James G. Neuger in Brussels at jneuger@bloomberg.net .

EU hails progress in Turkey talks

2007-12-20T20:13:00.000+01:00

By Tony Barber in Brussels
Published: December 20 2007 02:41 Last updated: December 20 2007 02:41
Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union took a modest but measurable step forward on Wednesday when negotiations started on two more of the 35 policy areas that a candidate country must complete to gain membership.
The decision to open talks on consumer and health protection, and on trans-European transport, energy and telecommunications networks, was hailed by Olli Rehn, the EU enlargement commissioner. “The EU accession process of Turkey continues and it delivers results,” he said.
Turkey started formal EU membership talks in October 2005 but the EU froze negotiations on eight policy areas last December because of Turkey’s refusal to open its ports and airports to vessels and aircraft from Cyprus.
Turkey opened and provisionally closed one EU negotiating chapter, or policy area, in June 2006 – science and research. Talks on three other chapters – enterprise and industry, financial control, and statistics – were opened between March and June. Mr Rehn said it might be possible for talks in two or three more policy areas to start in the first half of 2008.
Mehmet Simsek, Turkey’s economy minister, said last month that Turkey could meet an essential requirement for EU membership by adopting the EU’s entire body of accumulated law – the so-called acquis – by 2014 “very comfortably”.
However, a new cloud gathered over EU-Turkish relations in May when Nicolas Sarkozy, an opponent of Turkey’s EU aspirations, was elected French president. Mr Sarkozy’s alternative proposal of a “Mediterranean Union”, which would combine various EU and non-EU countries around the Mediterranean Sea, has found few takers in Turkey.
Ali Babacan, Turkey’s foreign minister, took an implicit swipe at France’s stance on Wednesday, saying: “Certain member states are trying to erode our political and judicial position. Such attitudes are not proper and do not reflect a responsible approach.”
France agreed to let membership talks open on two new policy areas because it won approval from the EU’s other 26 countries last week for the creation of a “reflection group” to study the bloc’s long-term future. Although the panel does not have an explicit mandate to discuss the EU’s borders, Mr Sarkozy believes the question cannot be avoided.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007

Considering Greece and Armenia’s Support of Turkey’s EU Candidacy

2007-12-17T14:47:00.000+01:00

Aside from the ongoing drama between the PKK and the Turkish military, a great deal of Turkey’s most recent foreign affairs activity has been tied to its potential accession to the European Union (EU). Most observers of Turkey derive the majority of their analysis of Turkey’s potential EU membership from the stoic proclamations of President Gul or the anti-Turkish rhetoric of President Sarkozy. However, an additional angle from which one can develop further understanding of the EU issue is by exploring the perspective of Turkey’s traditional foes, Greece and Armenia.
This past week featured Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and Greek Foreign Minister Theodora Bakoyianni exchanging incredibly sugar-coated words concerning Turkey’s EU candidacy and also on the general subject of relations between their two countries. With Greece wholly behind Turkey’s EU bid, Turkey has gained a very valuable source of support given the fact that the relations between the two countries have been historically sour at best.
Some observers consider Greece’s strong support for Turkey’s bid as somewhat inevitable given the growing amount of humanitarian cooperation between the two countries since they were struck by the same earthquake several years ago. Cross-border investment is growing in both directions and young Turks certainly do not harbor the same acrimonious feelings about Greece that their grandparents possess. The recent inauguration of a gas pipeline between Greece and Turkey to serve European markets further highlights the growing strategic connections.
There is no question that the positive momentum that increasingly characterizes the relations of Turkey and Greece is real. While Turkey’s motivations are clear, it is nevertheless important to take a closer look at why Greece has chosen to extend its support. To understand Greece’s motivations in greater depth (and beyond their interest in seeing the Cyprus issue resolved at some point during this century), it is helpful to jump to Armenia in order to consult that nation’s conversation concerning Turkey and the EU. Whether due to the historical issue of the Armenian Genocide or the ongoing Turkish (and Azerbaijani) economic blockade, Armenia’s affairs and future are very much tied to those of Turkey.
While largely unnoticed by the Turkish media, there is a heated debate between Armenia’s long-time former president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, and the current president, Robert Kocharian, concerning Turkey’s future in Europe. While both are interested in greater normalization of ties with Turkey, Ter-Petrossian is much more aggressive about pursuing cooperation and dialog. Concerning Turkey’s candidacy for the EU, Ter-Petrossian’s views are quite logical as exhibited in the following article from armenialiberty.org.
“Isn’t it obvious that Turkey’s membership in the EU is beneficial for Armenia in the economic, political and security terms? he added. “What is more dangerous: an EU member Turkey or a Turkey rejected by the West and oriented to the East?“Or what is more preferable? An Armenia isolated from the West or an Armenia bordering the EU? Our country’s foreign policy should have clearly answered these questions a long time ago.”
Ter-Petrossian’s comments are just as applicable to Armenia as they are to understanding Greece’s interest in Turkey becoming a member of the EU. In addition to the regional economic benefits of Turkey joining the EU, both Armenia and Greece are very aware of the value of the horse-and-carrot strategy that the EU has used to prompt Turkey to pursue internal changes. This EU strategy has been implemented in order to force stubborn Turkey to pursue a path that is complimentary to the Western European system of political, economic and social values. Most Turks, in turn, have become embittered by what they see as a series of false promises, which have provoked a dizzying contortion of Turkey’s identity. Both Greece and Armenia could not be more pleased by this painful process and will rue the day that Turkey is no longer tempted to join the European fraternity.
It is of course irrelevant to either Greece or Armenia whether joining the EU is truly the best direction for Turkey. Both nations realize that Turkey would pose a bigger threat to their interests today if Turkey had not been under the EU microscope for roughly the past decade. As long as it continues to seek entrance, the EU will increasingly deny Turkey’s ability to pursue its traditional agendas. It therefore appears likely that Greece and Armenia are hoping to use Brussels as the means for realizing their own historic interests vis a vis their greatest rival.

Understanding both for EU and Turkey

2007-12-17T14:46:00.000+01:00

New methods should be undertaken by Turkey, with the help of its friends in the 27-nation bloc, if it is to overcome the obstacles it faces on its way to European Union membership, said participants of a forum over the weekend.
Old prejudices still prevail in modern times, said Italian ambassador to Ankara Carlo Marsili at the forum organized by the Union of Italian Turkish Friendship that brought together Italian and Turkish politicians, businesspeople and members of the press
Marsili said that some Europeans still see Turkey as the historical enemy of Europe. "In the common memory, Turks are seen as the unchangeable enemy of Europe, but while the EU was being founded, Turkey took its place within the partnership mechanisms, “ he said.
“The Ottoman Empire considered itself as European,” said Turkish State Minister Mehmet Aydın.
Aydın said that 80 percent of all the talks on Turkey are based on ignorance and added that those who speak more about Turkey are those who know the least about it.
He emphasized that even if Turkey never joins the 27-member bloc, it will continue to adopt European standards and criteria, and will carry on with the reforms.
Meanwhile Marsili said that eventual membership to the EU is an acquired right of Turkey and not an issue to be renegotiated. He added that the term “privileged partnership” is not acceptable

Turkey's economy

2007-12-14T15:04:00.000+01:00

A cloud no bigger than a hand
Dec 13th 2007 ANKARA AND ISTANBULFrom The Economist print edition
The Turkish economy is doing well, but it is also vulnerable

IN 2001 Turkey's president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, flung a copy of the constitution at the prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, helping to plunge the country into its worst financial crisis since the war. This year Turkey has lurched from one political mess to another. In April a top general threatened a coup; an early general election was held in July; in August Abdullah Gul, a former foreign minister whose wife wears an Islamic-style headscarf, became president over the army's objections; then Turkey threatened to invade northern Iraq. Yet, in contrast to 2001, the markets have barely blinked through all the turbulence.
In truth, the economy is far healthier than it was, thanks mainly to a rigid adherence to IMF-prescribed reforms on the part of the ruling Justice and Development (AK) party. Since AK came to power in 2002 GDP growth has averaged 6.6%, inflation has fallen to single digits and foreign direct investment (FDI) has soared. AK's economic record is one reason why it won a sharply increased share of the vote (although fewer seats) in July.
Yet Lorenzo Giorgianni, the IMF's top man for Turkey, rightly says that this strong economic performance should not be taken for granted. Year-on-year GDP growth in the third quarter was the lowest for six years, at just 1.5%. The credit crunch and fears of an American recession are curbing investors' appetites for emerging markets. Turkey, with a huge current-account deficit, is especially vulnerable. Negotiations for Turkish membership of the European Union, the prospect of which is an anchor for investor confidence, have soured. The IMF programme itself is due to expire next May and the government has yet to decide whether to renew it.
The current-account deficit is being boosted by a rising energy bill. As manufacturers shift to higher value-added goods, they need costlier inputs. Coupled with an overvalued Turkish lira, all this has served to push up the import bill. In previous years the deficit was financed by hot money, making the economy more vulnerable. Now nearly two-thirds of the deficit is covered by FDI, which may hit $22 billion this year. Metin Ar, president of Garanti Securities in Istanbul, predicts that, with the privatisation of motorways and plans for new energy-distribution networks, FDI could rise to $30 billion next year. “Foreigners are so keen to get a foot into the market that they are happy to pay double, triple the real value of assets.”
With their dizzyingly high profits and much untapped retail potential, Turkish banks look appealing targets. New regulations can require capital-adequacy ratios to be as high as 20%, against the international minimum of 8%. “We don't allow any bank to go below 12%,” says Mehmet Simsek, the economy minister. He adds that the state-owned Halkbank is soon to be put on the block.
Mr Simsek, who was snatched into the job from Merrill Lynch in London, agrees that “markets like external anchors” and concedes that Turkey is not immune to external shocks. Yet he sees no crisis on the horizon. His main task is to push through a social-security reform that is a test of the government's commitment to reform. His biggest bugbear is high labour costs. He provoked an outcry when he complained that Turkey had one of the highest wage burdens among OECD countries. High taxes on labour, plus onerous welfare benefits, are a big obstacle to the creation of new jobs. Unemployment hovers at around 10%.
There is little doubt that Mr Simsek has the will and the brains to do what is needed. Ercan Uygur, an economist who taught Mr Simsek at Ankara University, says he was “one of my best students”. Yet some political observers worry that Mr Simsek, who is only 40, may not have enough clout. Unlike his predecessor, Ali Babacan, now Turkey's foreign minister, Mr Simsek is a newcomer to AK politics. His swift rise has provoked some jealousy within the party.
In truth Mr Simsek cuts an unusual figure in the government, and not only as a former investment banker with an American wife. He was born into grinding poverty in the mainly Kurdish province of Batman. He did not even learn Turkish until he was six. By his own admission, he is more comfortable speaking English. A big Shakira fan, he provoked mirth at a recent cabinet meeting when he misused the word transparan, meaning see-through, while talking about the budget.
Yet for now, at least, Mr Simsek has the full confidence of his prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. And it is Mr Erdogan who calls the shots. The concern is whether it may be Mr Simsek who gets the blame should the economy slow further and foreign investors take fright.

EU urges Turkey to do more on path to membership

2007-12-11T18:09:00.001+01:00

BRUSSELS, Dec. 10 (Xinhua) -- Foreign ministers from the European Union (EU) on Monday urged Turkey to conduct further reforms on its path to earning membership of the 27-member bloc.
The ministers acknowledged the ongoing process of revising the Turkish constitution, but stressed that such process should not delay long awaited reforms, "in particular in the key areas of freedom of expression and freedom of religion where Turkey needs to proceed without delay."
During their meeting ahead of the EU summit on Dec. 14, the ministers also called on Turkey to make "significant further efforts" in other areas such as judicial reform, the fight against corruption, minority rights and the strengthening of cultural rights, women's and children's rights, trade union rights and civilian control of the military.
In a statement issued during the meeting, the ministers reaffirmed the need to promptly develop and implement a comprehensive strategy that will guarantee the economic, social and cultural development of Turkey's east and southeast region.
They urged Turkey to "unequivocally" commit to good-neighborly relations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter.
"In this context, any threat or action which could negatively affect good-neighborly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes should be avoided," said the statement.
Meanwhile, the ministers expressed their regret that Turkey has not made progress toward the normalization of relations with the Republic of Cyprus.
They urged Turkey to actively support efforts to implement the July 8, 2006 agreement reached between the two sides in Cyprus, in the presence of UN Undersecretary for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari, which is aimed at a comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework.
The ministers condemned all terrorist attacks and violence in Turkish territory and expressed their solidarity with the Turkish people as well as their support for Turkey's efforts to protect its population and fight terrorism.
In the statement, the ministers regretted the limited progress achieved in political reforms in Turkey, but welcomed the Turkish government's declared intention and renewed commitment in continuing the reform process and addressing the existing shortcomings.
"It (the EU) looks forward to seeing these commitments soon translated into real and tangible actions," said the statement.
"Next year is crucial to further consolidate and implement the EU's enlargement strategy and support the transition process in the Western Balkans," it added.

Turkey's ambitions for EU membership suffer setback

2007-12-11T18:08:00.000+01:00

Brussels - Turkey's ambitions to join the European Union suffered a setback Monday after EU foreign ministers, under pressure from France, dropped the term "accession" from a text referring to next week's talks with Ankara. Unlike a similar text approved a year ago, the "Council conclusions on enlargement" text approved by ministers on Monday refers to this month's "Intergovernmental Conferences with Turkey and Croatia" and omits the term "accession" when referring to such talks.
Council sources said the final draft of the text was amended to appease France, whose President Nicolas Sarkozy has emerged as one of the strongest opponents of Turkey's entry into the EU.
Britain and Sweden, which both want Turkey to join the 27-member bloc, are believed to have expressed strong reservations over the approved text.
In their conclusions, ministers also regretted "the limited progress achieved in political reform in Turkey in 2007."
"Significant further efforts are also needed in other areas such as judicial reform, the fight against corruption, minority rights and the strengthening of cultural rights, women's rights, children's rights, trade union rights and the civilian control of the military," the statement said.
Ministers also expressed disappointment over Turkey's failure to make "progress towards normalization of relations with the Republic of Cyprus" and called on Ankara "to unequivocally commit to good neighbourly relations and to the peaceful settlement of disputes" - a reference to the current problems it is facing with Kurdish rebels on its southern border with Iraq.
While ministers also dropped the term "accession" when referring to forthcoming talks with Croatia, the text commended the country "for the overall progress it continued to make in the past year," saying negotiations between Brussels and Zagreb were "on the right track."

Turkish reform seen tied to progress in EU talks

2007-12-08T09:31:00.000+01:00

By Evren Mesci
ANKARA (Reuters) - Turkey will reform a law the European Union says unfairly restricts freedom of speech when the EU allows its stalled membership talks to resume, Turkish officials said on Friday.
Turkey has been under heavy EU pressure to amend or scrap article 301 of the penal code which makes it a crime to insult "Turkishness", but Ankara is frustrated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy's efforts to block the negotiation process.
Sarkozy opposes allowing Turkey, a large, relatively poor, Muslim country, to join the 27-nation bloc. German Chancellor Angela Merkel this week also reiterated her opposition to Turkey's membership.
"There is full political will to change article 301, that has been decided on, but the details and timing depend on the EU taking certain steps," said a senior government official, speaking on condition of anonymity.
"It will be difficult to press the button on new reforms (if no new chapters are opened)."
French diplomats have been fighting backroom skirmishes in Brussels to keep any reference to "accession" or "membership" in connection with Turkey out of an EU foreign ministers' statement next Monday on enlargement policy, EU sources said.
EU ambassadors met for several hours on Friday to try to resolve that drafting dispute but failed to reach agreement, meaning ministers will have to take up the issue on Monday.
Turkey hopes to open talks on at least two more chapters, or policy areas, under Portugal's EU presidency, which ends on December 31.
A meeting to launch negotiations on health and consumer affairs policy and trans-European networks is set for December 18, diplomats said, provided EU leaders agree next week on creating a "reflection group" to study the bloc's long-term future.
The ambassadors provisionally agreed on the bloc's mandate, which does not mention either enlargement, Turkey or the question of where Europe's final borders might lie.
"WIDER REGION"
Sarkozy initially wanted the group to debate the final borders of Europe, but the draft mandate likely to be adopted at a summit next Friday speaks of examining "how the stability and prosperity both of the Union and of the wider region might best be served in the longer term".
In French eyes, it does not prejudge whether Turkey will be in the Union or the "wider region" in 2020-30. Ankara's friends in the EU are fighting to include a reference to "commitments entered into", to underline the bloc has given its word to Turkey that the objective of the talks is full membership.
Brussels says Turkey should press on with reforms regardless of negative comments by Sarkozy and others in Europe. They say progress on reforms will be Ankara's best argument in trying to overcome opposition to its bid.
But France has been blocking the opening of chapters, diplomats say. Some other EU member states, notably Britain, Spain and Sweden, strongly support Turkey's EU drive. Ankara is not seen joining the bloc before 2015 at the earliest.
A Turkish diplomatic source said Ankara may push through another reform sought by the EU before an expected visit to Turkey by Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis in January.
But he said the reform, which would ease property restrictions on non-Muslim religious minorities in Turkey such as the Greek Orthodox community, could hinge on Greece's steps to bolster rights of its own Turkish-speaking Muslim community in the western Thrace region of northern Greece.
In another reform move, Turkey's ruling AK Party signalled on Friday it plans to ease a ban on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf under a new draft constitution.
"This (new) constitution will solve the headscarf problem in a more libertarian spirit," Dengir Firat, a deputy chairman of the AK Party, told CNN Turk television.
The AK party has hinted many times that it wants to modify or if possible remove the headscarf ban, which also applies to government offices.
Turkey's secularists view the headscarf as a symbol of political Islam and a challenge to the country's separation of religion and state.
(Writing by Gareth Jones; Editing by Michael Winfrey)

Turkey flexes diplomatic muscle as economy booms

2007-12-07T11:44:00.000+01:00

By Gareth Jones
REUTERS
6:14 a.m. December 6, 2007
ANKARA – The frenetic travel of President Abdullah Gul highlights Turkey's new self-confidence on the global stage as its economy booms and foreign investment pours into the European Union candidate nation.
Gul's election to the presidency in August has reinforced a growing commercial and diplomatic trend to reach out beyond traditional Western partners to Turkic Central Asia, Russia, Iran, the Arab world and east Asia.
Turkey's expanding ties with these regions, often driven by energy needs, should be seen as complementing, not replacing, its decades-old drive to join the EU, analysts say.
Gul, who as foreign minister helped start EU accession talks, has been in Pakistan and Turkmenistan this week, he goes to Kazakhstan next week. He was in France last week and before that in Georgia.
'This new multi-dimensional foreign policy does not come at the expense of our European vocation, but our place in the world is changing,' said Suat Kiniklioglu, a member of parliament for Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's ruling centre-right AK Party.
'We lack the clout to broker big international deals, but we are getting to a point where Turkey is recognised as a player in places like the Middle East and Central Asia,' he said.
Muslim, secular and democratic Turkey – a NATO member that for decades tended to box well below its diplomatic weight – clearly has much to offer, and the world seems increasingly interested in its perspective.
Almost uniquely in its region, Turkey has good relations with both Iran and Israel, for example, and its peacekeepers are active from Kosovo and Lebanon to Afghanistan.
In the past month alone, the foreign ministers of Iran and the United States have rubbed shoulders at a conference of Iraq's neighbours in Istanbul and the Israeli and Palestinian presidents have jointly addressed Turkey's parliament in Ankara.
Erdogan has also cleverly and confidently used threats to send troops into northern Iraq to fight Kurdish rebels hiding there to push President George W. Bush into sharing intelligence with Turkey to help combat the rebels.
Aware of Turkey's strategic importance as an ally in a difficult region, the United States – and the EU – have turned a blind eye to Turkish cross-border strikes against the rebels.
PRAGMATISM
'Turkey is not a prime mover, it is in the second division, but it is being increasingly listened to across the region,' said Hugh Pope, author of books on Turkey including 'Sons of the Conquerors' about the Turks and Central Asia.
'Turkey has shed some of the former arrogance it showed in its dealings with the Middle East and Central Asia,' he said, emphasising the pragmatism and entrepreneurial spirit displayed by Turkish businessmen, engineers and educators in the region.
Ottoman Turks ruled the Middle East, the Balkans and north Africa for centuries from Istanbul.
Turkey's more active diplomacy is not without its problems. The United States, in particular, is vexed by Turkey's growing energy links with Iran, though Ankara has made clear it shares Washington's opposition to Tehran building nuclear weapons.
The Islamist-rooted AK Party is also respected perhaps more in the Arab world than previous Turkish governments because of its Muslim piety as well as its success in overseeing annual economic growth in Turkey of around 7 percent. Gulf Arab money has been pouring into Istanbul. Analysts say Ahmet Davutoglu, Erdogan's chief foreign policy adviser, is the mastermind behind Turkey's growing diplomatic dynamism during the past five years of AK Party rule.
Like Gul, Davutoglu hails from piously conservative central Anatolia but sees no contradiction between Islam and democracy, between Turkey's EU bid and building closer Middle East ties.
EU STILL KEY
Gul's own approach stands in stark contrast to that of his predecessor, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a shy, ascetic former judge, who rarely left Ankara and had no interest in foreign affairs.
'Gul really wants to make up for lost time and re-engage, especially in Central Asia,' said Kiniklioglu.
Turkey aims to become an energy hub for Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas exports transiting to Western markets. Existing and planned pipelines across Turkish territory, the West hopes, will reduce its reliance on Russian energy exports.
Analysts said Turkey's central foreign policy goal would remain its EU accession negotiations, launched in 2005.
'Europe is still number one priority, there can be no substitutes... More than 50 percent of Turkey's trade is still with the EU,' said Pope.
'Turkey's higher profile on the world stage is directly linked to its EU candidacy... If Turkey repudiated the EU connection, it would frankly lose much of its prestige with other countries. And Gul understands this very well.'

Merkel Says German Christian Democrats Oppose Turkey's EU Bid

2007-12-04T09:30:00.001+01:00

By Andreas Cremer
Dec. 3 (Bloomberg) -- German Chancellor Angela Merkel said her Christian Democratic Union opposes Turkey's bid to become a full member of the European Union, the first time she has articulated outright opposition to Turkish EU membership.
``We are, have been and will remain in favor of a privileged partnership with Turkey, but we're against full membership in the European Union,'' Merkel said in a speech to the Christian Democrats' annual convention in Hanover today.
Merkel's CDU party has until now said that accession talks between the EU and Turkey mustn't rob Turkey of the eventual possibility of becoming a full member. The CDU is now ``right to clarify'' its opposition, Merkel said.
Turkey has made little headway toward joining the EU since it started membership talks in October 2005. Rising European opposition to admitting the predominantly Muslim nation has triggered a backlash against the 27-nation EU in Turkey. Sixty- eight percent of Germans oppose Turkey's EU entry, according to a Forsa poll on Aug. 10.

Debating Turkey and the EU

2007-12-04T09:28:00.000+01:00

ANKARA, Turkey. -- In the past two years, the suburbs of Paris have twice witnessed violent clashes between non-native French citizens and the police. Whether religious and cultural differences or poverty, unemployment and racial discrimination are the root causes of these incidents is open to debate. But what's interesting is that in September 2006, before he was elected president, Nicolas Sarkozy visited Washington and argued that then the first French riot stood as one of the reasons he opposes Turkey's European Union membership.
"[I] have often been asked about the place of Muslims in France, because of concern in the United States," Mr. Sarkozy said at an event organized by the French-American Foundation. "My dear friends, let's be consistent. What's the point of worrying about our ability to integrate Muslims in France or in Europe if at the same time, and just as forcefully, the United States asks us to accept Turkey in Europe? Even if you consider that we have a problem with Islam, in which case, you have to give us time to find the ways and means to create a European Islam and reject an Islam in Europe. But don't then give equal support to the integration of a country like Turkey, with 75 million inhabitants. Consistency is part of the relations between Europe and the United States." Indeed, Mr. Sarkozy's point of view is shared by many Europeans.
It's true that Turkey is becoming more Muslim than European — particularly since the Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in 2002. Since then, 2006 the Pew Global Attitudes poll found out that 51 percent of Turks define themselves first as Muslim. Being religious is not the problem, but there is a lack of sincere debate about what exactly scares people when they are faced with Islamic practices taking a role in governmental life. If freedom of religion is measured by allowing headscarves in governmental buildings, would it also consider new interpretations of those practices by others? Or whether AKP's understanding of secular government is consistent with European secular rule?
Mr. Sarkozy is right to say that he needs time to "find the ways and means to create a European Islam." But it is also a fact that Europeans allowed political Islam in Turkey to make headscarves the one and only problem with freedom of religion; now, it's time they look deeper into the issue. Turkey's most trusted public opinion survey group, KONDA, led by Tarhan Erdem, yesterday announced the results of a new survey that shows a significant rise in numbers of covered women. According to this survey, in the last four years, there are a million more Turkish women wearing headscarfwhile the ones with turban, which is a sign of political Islam has quadrupled.
Unfortunately, Turkey's secular and liberal elites have denied the role of religion in public life in such a way that they have created a huge mess by not investing in theological education to allow an open-minded approach to matters — understanding what Islam means in the modern world, rather than a strictly literal interpretation. There are a limited number of those theologians, but they are not enough to change a traditionalist mindset.
AKP's insistence on traditionalist practices like the headscarf stands as proof that it refuses to allow open debate on religious interpretations. Mr. Sarkozy may have strange bedfellows with respect to his concerns about Turkey's EU membership; secular Turks may also be worried about their future.
If the AKP is proud that Turkey has opened accession talks with EU on its watch, it is now disinterested in moving forward with reforms of governmental institutions. The European Commission reported "limited progress" in Turkey's political reform process.
According to the Pew Global Attitudes poll, the EU's favorability rating in Turkey dropped from 58 percent in 2004 to 27 percent in 2007. There are a number of thorny issues in Turkey's relations with the EU — including Cyprus, the Armenian genocide allegations and the Kurdish dilemma. Yet not all of the EU's issues are related to those matters. And while the AKP is determined to keep Turkey on track to join the EU, it is sending a number of paradoxical signals. These raise concerns, as the AKP is a relatively new party and it is almost impossible to judge how its rule will affect Turkey. The Turkish scenery, however, looks in absolute chaos for the time being.
Against all the odds it seems that Mr. Sarkozy understands that Turkey's Westernization process is not only limited to its borders and its politicians' responses; it is very much a European project. Yet he may take a more constructive approach in dealing with Turkey. Still, although Mr. Sarkozy said he would end Turkey's accession talks with the EU when he was elected, he has done no such thing. Yet he continues to express his opposition loud and clear, which is only fair it represents the sincere opinion of some of the European population. But the outgoing and the incoming EU presidents, Portugal and Slovenia, continue to express full support to Turkey's membership.
Tulin Daloglu is a freelance writer.

Turkey warns on 'dilution' of EU goal

2007-11-08T07:01:00.000+01:00

By Tony Barber in Brussels

Turkey warned France on Wednesday against trying to bury its aspirations to European Union membership by manipulating a "wise men's committee" that is expected to pronounce on Europe's long-term future.
Mehmet Simsek, Turkey's economy minister, also reaffirmed his government's promise to remove an obstacle to Turkish entry by changing a much-criticised article of the penal code that makes it a crime to insult Turkish national identity.
Mr Simsek's remarks amounted to a forceful assertion of Turkey's rights as an official candidate for EU membership and of its readiness to take politically difficult measures to achieve its goal.
"Purely technically, in terms of adopting the acquis [the EU's body of accumulated law], I think Turkey can do this by 2014 very comfortably," Mr Simsek said. "But we don't really have an entry date in mind, and what is importantis that we keep the process alive. We hope that common sense will prevail."
Mr Sarkozy's proposal for a "wise men's committee" of 10 to 12 people to study the EU's future up to 2020 or 2030 is expected to win approval from fellow EU leaders at a summit in Brussels next month.
Some EU states, such as Austria and France, oppose Turkey's entry, even though accession talks started in October 2005. Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany, the EU's biggest country, says she would prefer a "privileged relationship" with Turkey to full membership.
EU countries sympathetic to Turkey, such as Sweden and the UK, want the committee's members to be carefully chosen and its mandate to be precise, so that it does not turn into a vehicle for critics of Turkey.
Mr Simsek made clear in no uncertain terms that Turkey would accept no recommendation from the "wise men" involving a privileged EU relationship, partnership in a French-proposed Mediterranean Union, or anything else short of full EU membership.
"We cannot accept dilution of the commitment to Turkey. Dilution sends an extremely poor message," Mr Simsek told a meeting of the European Policy Centre think-tank.
Referring to the association agreement that Turkey signed in 1963 with the European Economic Community, the EU's forerunner, Mr Simsek said: "We waited in the anteroom for 40 years. Trying to find a way to dilute the commitment doesn't serve French interests."
Mr Simsek said the ruling Justice and Development party was strong enough after its comfortable election victory in July to amend Article 301 of the penal code, a step that the European Commission said this week should be a precondition of Turkish entry into the EU.
"My government would like to amend it, and we will. But I'd like to highlight that it's easy to change legislation but it takes a long time to digest the changes and to change the mentality," he said.
"More importantly, we'd like to make fundamental changes that would secure these freedoms in a more fundamental way. Things don't happen overnight," he added.
Discussing a recent spate of attacks on Turkish targets by the separatist Kurdish PKK movement, Mr Simsek said Turkey preferred not to launch a military incursion into northern Iraq, but stressed that it remained an option.
"If there is a military incursion, it will be aimed purely at rooting out terrorists on Iraqi soil. It will be limited in scope," he said.
Copyright The Financial Times Ltd. All rights reserved

Ban on free speech keeping Turkey out of EU

2007-11-08T07:00:00.000+01:00

David Charter in Brussels
A growing number of prosecutions against writers and academics is damaging Turkey’s case to become a fully fledged member of the European Union, an annual assessment report said yesterday.
The country has made little progress in the past year and its failure to end torture, improve minority rights or guarantee freedom of expression were all highlighted as significant stumbling blocks to EU membership.
Britain joined the European Commission in arguing that only the offer of full membership would bring real reform inside Turkey, but President Sarkozy Sarkozy of France, has led calls for the Muslim nation of 71 million to be offered only associate membership.
Olli Rehn, the Enlargement Commissioner, signalled a battle with those who want to end Turkey’s hopes of membership, however, declaring: “Conditionality only works if the EU respects its own commitment to the prospect of accession. Without this, we can always demand reforms but this would be as if we were speaking to the wall.”
Population growth would probably make Turkey the EU’s largest member if it joins, as it hopes, by 2020, and give the Community borders with Syria, Iran and Iraq. But there are many hurdles yet to overcome, the European Commission’s progress check said.
One of the key demands was for the repeal of Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which makes it a crime to insult Turkish identity. The article has been used to prosecute the Nobel prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk and the murdered journalist Hrant Dink for commenting on the killings of Armenians by Turks in the early 20th century.
The report cautioned: “The prosecution and conviction for the expression of non-violent opinions under certain provisions of the Turkish criminal code are a cause of serious concern. The number of persons almost doubled in 2006 compared with 2005 and there was a further increase in 2007. The Turkish legal system does not fully guarantee freedom of expression in line with European standards.”
Mr Rehn added: “It is not acceptable that writers, journalists, academics and other intellectuals . . . are prosecuted for simply expressing a critical but completely non-violent opinion.”
Yielding to pressure from the EU Mehmet Ali Sahin, the Turkish Justice Minister, said last night that a new Bill repealing Article 301 would be put before Parliament in the coming days.
“Several drafts have been prepared in line with proposals by civic groups. The Cabinet will discuss them at first opportunity, select one and submit it to parliament,” Mr Sahin told Anatolia news agency. Other issues remain outstanding, however. The EU repeated demands that Ankara normalise relations with Cyprus and honour a 2005 agreement to open its ports and airports to the EU member.
The pace of reforms had slowed since Turkey’s membership negotiations opened two years ago. “Cases of torture and ill-treatment are still being reported, especially during arrest and outside detention centres,” it added.
It commended the Turkish Government for solving a constitutional crisis before President Gül was elected this year, but said that the military still exerted “significant political influence”.
In the southeast of the country: “Turkey needs to create the conditions for the predominantly Kurdish population there to enjoy full rights and freedoms.”
Mr Rehn would not be drawn on the consequences for Turkey’s membership ambitions if it invaded Iraq to quash Kurdish separatists.
Wider community
EU enlargement candidate countries Croatia The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Turkey
Potential candidates Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro Serbia Kosovo (under United Nations Interim Administration Mission)
Source: European Commission

Pace of Turkey's reforms slowing down, EU progress report says

2007-11-06T07:04:00.000+01:00

BRUSSELS, Belgium: The European Union will urge Turkey on Tuesday to press ahead with reforms crucial for its bid to join the bloc, singling out freedom of expression, democratic oversight of the military and rights for Kurds as key areas where more progress is needed.
In an annual report on the progress in Turkey's membership bid, the EU's executive Commission will also repeat that Ankara must normalize its relations with Cyprus and honor a 2005 pact to open its ports and airports to the island republic.
The pace of reforms "has slowed down" since Turkey's membership negotiations opened two years ago, and "significant further efforts are needed" in the crucial areas, said a draft of the report seen by The Associated Press.
The talks stalled last year when the EU froze negotiations on eight out of 35 policy areas, because of Turkey's refusal to open its ports to trade with Cyprus, an EU member since 2004. But EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn said last month that negotiations in two new areas could be opened "in the coming weeks."
On Tuesday, Rehn planned also to present reports on the efforts of six Balkan nations to join the EU.
The draft report on Turkey commends the country's government on solving a constitutional crisis earlier this year, but says the military — which has vowed to safeguard Turkish secularism — still exerts "significant political influence." The draft report calls for a better civilian oversight of the armed forces.
Abdulah Gul, a former foreign minister in Turkey's Islamic-oriented government, was elected president in July after months of confrontation with the secular establishment, with the military threatening to intervene when Gul was first nominated for the post.
The draft report says serious concerns remain over freedom of speech restrictions, particularly Article 301 of the Turkish penal code that make it a crime to insult Turkish identity or the country's institutions.
Nobel Prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk and slain ethnic Armenian journalist Hrant Dink are among those who have been prosecuted under the controversial article.
The report also mentions the need to improve religious and cultural rights for non-Muslims, but it lauds Turkey's economic reforms.
The 27-nation EU is divided over whether Turkey, a mainly Muslim country of 71 million, should one day join the EU. The prospect faces opposition from some member states, such as France or Austria, and the accession talks are expected to last at least a decade.
Turkey is under intense pressure from the EU to allow Greek Cypriot planes and vessels to use Turkish ports and airports, but Ankara has said it would not agree to any concessions on Cyprus until the EU keeps to a promise to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriots.
Cyprus has been divided between a Greek Cypriot south and a Turkish-occupied north since 1974, when Turkey invaded after an abortive Athens-backed coup by supporters of union with Greece
The European Parliament said last month that Turkey's refusal to comply with the commitments made when it opened its accession talks with the EU would seriously affect the negotiations.

Why Turkey Matters

2007-10-27T09:27:00.001+02:00

Turkey’s increasing significance is arresting the world’s attention. Here’s why it should arrest yours. By Joel Hilliker

Suddenly, Turkey is all over the headlines.
Most Americans would tend to underestimate its significance. But why, in the midst of October, did an outburst of public discussion center on whether to call the World War i-era Turkish killing of Armenians a “genocide”? Why did Congress raise the issue, and why did the White House scramble to squelch it?
The crux of debate rested on the potential for losing Turkey’s help in the war in Iraq. Its role as vital supply route for U.S. troops took center stage. In fact, some analysts suggested that the Democrat-led Congress pushed the “genocide” issue to alienate Turkey in an underhanded effort to spite the president and torpedo the Iraq war.
Is it really possible that this nation—about which few Americans concern themselves—could make the difference between victory and defeat in Iraq?
Who knew Turkey was so important?
At the Crossroads
The instant clamor surrounding that single issue is a meaningful symbol of just how much this historically pivotal nation is rising again to prominence in modern geopolitics.
Turkey sits right at the crossroads of a developing clash of civilizations. Its population is almost wholly Muslim, but its constitution is staunchly secular. It is a democracy and a constitutional republic, yet since 1960 its military leaders have overthrown four duly elected governments for being too religious. It is anchored to the Middle East as a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, yet welded to the West within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On top of that, a pillar in its foreign policy for a generation has been its bid for membership in the European Union.
The U.S. is not alone in trying to come to grips with this complex geopolitical puzzle. Nations across the globe are coming to see that, for all its contradictions, and after decades of quiet since the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of World War i, Turkey is shaping up to be an extremely significant global player. As the world increasingly fractures into regional blocs—the United States, the Middle East, Europe, Asia—Turkey remains a distinct entity whose value to all of these powers is rapidly rising.
This exceptional position, which we can witness developing right before us, appears to be setting Turkey up perfectly for the unique role it plays in end-time biblical prophecy.
Why the World Is Taking Note
Turkey is attracting interest for a number of reasons.
First, its economy is on fire—it is one of the fastest-growing on Earth. Since 2002, under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (akp), the economy has transformed. It is now the largest Muslim economy, and the largest in the region. Turkey is a member of the G-20, a gathering of the world’s 20 largest economies. It is playing its cards wisely, reducing restrictions on trade with Muslim states while simultaneously cultivating relationships with European and other nations.
As Dr. George Friedman put it, “The ability of Greece, Armenia, Syria, Iraq and Iran to remain hostile to Turkey decreases as the Turkish economy grows. Ideology and history are very real things, but so is the economic power of a dynamic economy” (Stratfor, July 31).
Of course, a large Turkish economy means a large Turkish military. Already it is nato’s second-largest armed force after the U.S., with over 1 million uniformed personnel. This reality has several ramifications regarding the balance of power in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Second, Turkey is comfortably stepping into a ready-made role as a vital energy hub linking Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia.
This is one of the most geographically strategic countries in the world—a literal bridge between continents. On its west, Turkey borders Greece and Bulgaria—EU nations; on its south, Syria, Iraq and Iran—Middle Eastern Muslim states; and on its east, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan—former Soviet republics. It connects to the Mediterranean, Black and Aegean seas, and encompasses the vital Bosporus and Dardanelles sea gates, linking Central Asia to the Mediterranean. In a world increasingly driven by energy politics, its unique location translates into valuable energy transit routes for more and more nations.
With Russia aggressively taking over global oil and natural gas markets, uncomfortable customers, particularly those in Europe, are actively seeking energy from other sources. Turkey is in the right place at the right time, with major oil pipelines being built across its soil, circumventing Russian territory altogether. It is proving itself a worthy middleman for energy from not only former Soviet republics Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, but also Iraq and Iran. In addition, Turkey, in conjunction with foreign investors and companies, is building new oil refineries that will increase its worth even more. Analysts say the nation’s refining capacity should double within only a few years.
This reality seems tailor-made to suit Ankara’s foreign-policy interests, because the entity hungriest for non-Russian energy happens to be the very one Turkey has been working so hard to pretty itself up for: Europe.
Naturally, the whole situation also deeply concerns Russia, whose monopolistic energy tendencies are undercut by Turkey’s activities. On top of that, Russia is robustly fighting a strong Islamist incursion on its southwestern border, particularly against Muslim separatists in Chechnya—and it possesses proof that Turkey has financially supported and trained Chechen terrorists in their struggle for independence.
A third reason for Turkey’s growing relevance—as became abundantly evident in October—is its role in the unfolding drama surrounding the future of Iraq.
A Strained Alliance
The Iraq war has created bad blood between the U.S. and Turkey. The Turks have long struggled with a restive Kurdish population in their southeast region, driven by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (pkk). This terrorist group seeks to carve an independent Kurdish state out of territory in southeast Turkey, as well as parts of Syria, Iraq and Iran. Whatever differences these four nations have, they are united in their determination to stop Kurdistan from materializing.
The fact that the U.S. empowered the Iraqi Kurds by eliminating Saddam Hussein rocked the American-Turkish alliance. In 2003, Ankara simply refused to let the U.S. invade Iraq from Turkish territory—a major snub from a nato ally. Add to that a turning of the historic tables: With a growing economy and military, Turkey simply isn’t as dependent on the U.S. as it once was. In fact, since the U.S. has gotten entrenched in Iraq, it has come to depend deeply on Turkey: 70 percent of its Iraq-bound air cargo and 33 percent of its fuel passes through Turkey, and it heavily uses the Incirlik Air Base for refueling operations and cargo flights to both Iraq and Afghanistan.
The upshot is, Turkey feels very comfortable with ignoring Washington’s wishes and doing what it feels it must to protect its own interests.
Recent events highlight just how monumental this change is.
In an October attack, pkk rebels killed 13 Turkish soldiers; the people of Turkey angrily demanded retaliation. The government bombed and shelled northern Iraq, and then the parliament approved plans to launch a ground invasion.
All this fuss puts the U.S. in an awkward spot. The Kurdish north has been the most stable part of Iraq since Saddam Hussein’s ouster in 2003, and Washington would rather nothing upset that. Supporting Turkey could well alienate the Kurdish allies the U.S. has built there, and the whole situation may further destabilize Iraq—something U.S. and Iraqi leaders are desperate to avoid.
But the amazing thing is, the Turks just don’t care. “We don’t need anyone’s advice on northern Iraq and the operation to be carried out there,” Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said. Reuters reported that the crowd in Istanbul cheered this pronouncement, and cheered again when he said that the U.S. “came tens of thousands of kilometers and attacked Iraq without asking anyone’s permission.”
Amid these developments, the timing couldn’t have been worse for the U.S. congressional committee’s “genocide” resolution. Turkey bristled at the news, recalling its ambassador in the U.S. and threatening to close its doors to American troops. Anti-American demonstrations spilled into the streets, according to the Jerusalem Post. “All prospects look bad … and relations with the U.S. have already gone down the drain,” Turkish foreign policy expert Semih Idiz said.
The White House responded by going into full damage control mode: It issued public statements condemning the measure, it essentially apologized to Turkey’s leaders, and it finally convinced Congress to kill the resolution. The fervor of the response revealed just how desperately the U.S. needs Turkey’s cooperation in order to resolve the crisis in Iraq in a manner suited to its own national interests. But the U.S. isn’t the only country in that situation. So is the other primary external player in this theater: Iran.
An Islamic Shift
In practical terms, as Washington contemplates reducing its presence in Iraq, its primary concern is to try to prevent Iran from simply taking over—not just Iraq but virtually the entire Middle East. In Turkey, it sees the closest thing it has to a regional counterbalance to Iran.
Unfortunately, it so happens that all this friction between Ankara and Washington has strengthened Turkey’s historically wary relationship with Iran.
Something else that could strengthen this relationship—and markedly change the balance within several of the precarious situations in which Turkey plays a role—occurred on August 28, when Turkish parliamentarians elected a former Islamist as president.
The new president, Abdullah Gül, is a bit of a puzzle. He was a cabinet member in one of the Islamic governments the military ousted in the 1990s—yet he has been a leading supporter of his nation’s EU membership bid. His devotion to Europe certainly placates the nation’s generals and military commanders, but his religion still chafes against their fierce loyalty to the secularist ideals institutionalized in 1923 by the nation’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. His political party, the akp, has an Islamist pedigree and maintains pan-Islamic ties throughout the region. Turkey’s secularist military suspects that it retains a masked Islamist agenda.
Stratfor noted that, because the president chooses judges and hence dominates the judiciary, having Gül as president means that “for the first time since the founding of the Turkish republic more than 80 years ago, a political force rooted in Islamism essentially controls all of the key civilian institutions of the state” (August 29, emphasis mine). Stratfor expects the akp to seek to use its new power as a beachhead to move the nation away from secularism and toward the freer expression of religion in public life; it anticipates drama ahead as the akp is forced “to balance pan-Islamic issues with Turkish nationalist objectives” (ibid.). Though this analysis probably overstates how much Turkey will change under President Gül, we would not be surprised to see the nation proceed with a more sympathetic economic and foreign policy toward the leading Arab and Muslim energy producers in the region.
Any shift within Turkey away from secularism and toward Islam could help alter the balance of power in the Middle East—most notably, in favor of Iran.
A Nightmare for Israel?
In 1996, Turkey inked a mutual defense deal with Israel that, for years, analysts credited with contributing to the relative stability of the region. The Islamic Affairs Analyst went so far as to say that Israel’s enemies respected Turkey enough that the Jewish state’s national survival was all but assured as long as the deal stood.
Events in the past couple of years, however, have shown that whatever deterrent effect Turkey once had has already weakened to some degree: Iran and Syria have unleashed forces in Lebanon and within Israel against the Jewish state with few qualms. But, given Turkey’s new Islamic leadership, this trend could get worse.
Any further weakening of Turkey’s restraining influence on Iranian power is a nightmare for Israel, which Iran has committed itself to eliminating.
Tensions between Washington and Ankara over Iraq have already opened a door for the Islamic Republic. Suspicion between Turkey and Iran has thawed in recent years, and ties have improved. The fact that Turkey is now ruled by a Muslim—albeit Sunni—rather than a secularist certainly doesn’t hurt.
The more cooperative these two nations are, the more latitude the Turks are likely to give Iran without feeling directly threatened as Tehran pursues its regional ambitions.
Watch for that cooperation to increase—and for Iran to become even more brazen.
Unrequited Love
What does Turkey get out of the deal? If nothing else, it gets Iranian energy—energy it can pass on to Europe.
The two countries have just completed an oil pipeline that will pump 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil a day into Turkey. And the Turkish Petroleum Corp. has announced plans to invest $3.5 billion in Iran’s South Pars natural gas field. This project would include building the means to transport Iranian gas through Turkey to Europe. The U.S., though flatly opposed to the deal, can do little to stop it.
Ultimately, even under an Islamic president, it appears Europe is who Turkey most wants to please. Ankara simply sees Iran as a workable partner in increasingly procuring the energy that Europe desperately wants. Radio Free Europe reports that for decades to come, Iranian gas may be Europe’s most viable source of non-Russian gas. Nothing Turkey could do would strengthen its value to the EU more than its growth as an energy hub.
Even the slippage in Turkey’s relationship with the United States is driving it more toward Europe, according to Semih Idiz. Speaking of the Iraq crisis, Idiz said, “Having its relations with the U.S. ‘electrified,’ Ankara will be more and more eager to grab hold of the EU anchor” (Turkish Weekly, September 1).
President Gül has strongly emphasized his intent to forge ahead with plans to join the European Union, plans that will require further economic reforms and constitutional amendments. His ally, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also from the Justice and Development Party, has outlined a five-year program to increase individual freedoms, further boost the economy, and, above all, strengthen the nation’s case for EU membership.
Biblical prophecy indicates, however, that although Turkey will remain committed to its romance with Europe, all these efforts are doomed to fail—just as they always have.
Turkey’s Image Problem
From the time Atatürk himself famously admonished his countrymen to “turn toward Europe,” Turkey has labored, to varying degrees, to cast itself in the image of the West. For the past decade, it has worked overtime.
Still, for every obstacle Turkey hurdles, the EU throws up another. Since 1987, when Turkey applied for full membership, 15 other states have cut to the front of the line and been accepted: Austria, Finland, Sweden, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. The Turks have watched the Union swell from 12 states to 27, while they remain peering through the window from the outside.
Now, the prospect of becoming an energy bridge to the Continent has inflamed Turkey’s hopes of finally convincing the EU to return the love.
Those hopes are wasted. Try as it may to overcome it, Turkey clearly has an image problem among Europe’s decision makers—and even its voters. Just this year, France elected a president—Nicolas Sarkozy—who campaigned on opposition to Turkish EU membership.
Why? Why is Europe so opposed to considering Turks European citizens? Only one major issue separates Turkey from all the other nations being granted their pass into the Union: religion.
The fundamentally Roman Catholic continent simply has no intention of incorporating 70 million Muslims in one swoop. And Turkey—with its Ottoman history, which at one time threatened Catholicism’s very existence—has particularly negative associations in European minds. As Bernard Lewis expresses it, “[T]here is still a reserve of mistrust, and even at times of hostility [toward Turks], with roots deep in the European Christian past” (From Babel to Dragomans).
The election of an openly Islamic president has only solidified Europe’s unspoken yet inflexible resistance to embracing Turkey. Still, given this nation’s growing strategic value to Europe, watch for the EU to continue to dangle carrots and incentives to keep the Turks onside. And as Europe grows in power in the time ahead, Ankara’s devotion to the European cause will only grow along with it.
Thus, Turkey is destined to remain suspended between worlds—always searching, ever more desperate to please.
A Shocking Betrayal
These trends become far more significant in light of the Bible’s description of Turkey’s place in end-time events. It is only with the revelation of God’s Word that we can understand why Turkey truly matters.
The biblical prophecies regarding events in the Middle East are clear: A Muslim-Jewish war is about to erupt—initiated by Islamic forces clearly unrestrained by Turkey or anything else. That conflagration will trigger a series of events leading to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ.
When the Muslims move to sack Jerusalem, it will provoke a united European bloc of nations to intervene. This bloc will set up armies around Jerusalem—appearing like a “peacekeeping force”—but quickly transforming into a deadly war machine (Luke 21:20). It won’t be just Arabs or Muslims that suffer at their hands; this European power will turn its full force on the nations of Israel—including America and Britain. This horrifying double-cross is discussed in Ezekiel 23. Many in the Jerusalem area will be trapped!
The Prophet Obadiah recorded an extraordinary prophecy about “Edom,” whose modern descendants are the Turks. (Request a free copy of the Trumpet’s December 1997 article “Turkey: An Act of Revenge!” for a detailed explanation of this prophecy.) It shows how Turkey, possessing the escape route via land—the Cilician Gates mountain pass—will actually betray those Israelis, Americans and British who are trying to escape, delivering them into the hands of their conquerors. This is one last act, true to present form, of Turkey attempting to curry favor with Europe!
The description of these events reveals several things that illuminate the meaning of present-day headlines.
One, the fact that those escapees look to Turkey strongly indicates that Turkey’s alliances with the U.S. and with Israel will remain, at least in name.
Two, the betrayal may mean we can expect still more friction to develop within these alliances, like that which has arisen over the “genocide” question and the Kurd condition in Iraq. Though the U.S. still enjoys the support of Turkey’s secularist military, anti-Americanism is rampant and growing within Turkish media and among the Turkish people—a fact that the U.S., as desperate as it is to retain Turkey’s help, is willing to overlook.
Three, for Turkey, relations with Europe will continue to trump all other foreign-policy considerations.
Thus, based on biblical prophecy, in the end the Trumpet expects recent events that have thrust Turkey into the headlines only to cement the unique position this nation already occupies in modern geopolitics. They may tax Turkey’s agreements with the U.S. and Israel, but will not destroy them. They may increase Turkey’s cooperation with Muslim states, shifting the balance of power in favor of Iran, but that cooperation will fall short of a full-scale alliance. And most importantly, they will strengthen Europe’s resolve to keep Turkey at arm’s length, but do nothing to diminish Turkey’s undying resolve to get into Europe’s bed.
And as Obadiah’s prophecy reveals, that nation’s willingness to do anything to serve this ambition—including betrayal—will lead to its ruin.

EU easing tone with Turkey, while still seeking reforms

2007-10-27T09:26:00.001+02:00

STRASBOURG (AFP) -- The European Commission and parliament signaled a new more positive strategy for EU-hopeful Turkey, swapping threats for encouragement, while still seeking political reforms.
""The Commission shares the basic approach of the parliament, which is to identify challenges and to encourage Turkey to meet these challenges,"" EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said during a debate in the Strasbourg chamber. The new mood was exemplified when members of the European Parliament decided not to explicitly call on Ankara to recognize the Armenian genocide of 1915, merely calling on both sides to engage in ""a process of reconciliation"". Rehn indicated that his annual report on Turkey's progress towards the EU, to be delivered on November 6, would be ""objective and fair"". Last year's very critical version led to the freezing of eight of the 35 policy chapters which EU candidate nations must successfully negotiate prior to membership. Since Ankara began talks with the European Union in October 2005, the talks have been severely hampered by Ankara's refusal to deal normally with EU member Cyprus -- which is split into Greek and Turkish sectors. Turkey has managed to open just four accession chapters, only one of which has been satisfactorily completed. That figure pales next to the 14 chapters opened with Croatia, which began its EU talks at the same time as Turkey. However, in keeping with the encouraging tone, Rehn announced that ""at least two chapters could be open in the coming weeks,"" despite French President Nicolas Sarkozy's repeated suggestion that Turkey does not culturally belong in the European Union. Rehn said both the EU and Turkey had ""to do what they've got to do"". ""That means when we are firm we also must be fair, we have to keep our word and stick to accession perspective,"" he said. The EU change of tone follows a popular vote in Turkey on Sunday which approved sweeping constitutional reforms. The reforms provide for the head of state to be elected by popular suffrage for a once-renewable five-year term, instead of being chosen by parliament for a single seven-year mandate. It also sets legislative elections every four years instead of the current five. ""The Commission welcomes the fact that the government has put the constitutional reform at the top of its agenda with a view to improving democracy and expanding individual freedoms,"" said Rehn. ""However this should not result in any postponement of reforms that are urgently needed today,"" he added. High on the EU's reform wish list is the infamous Article 301 of Turkey's penal code. This outlaws insults on ""Turkish identity"" and has led to criminal charges against dozens of intellectuals. The EU's executive arm also insists on improvements on religious freedoms, military control of civil authorities and the fight against corruption. Turning to more urgent matters, the EU's Portuguese presidency urged Turkey to think twice before launching military action in northern Iraq, following deadly attacks on Turkish troops from Kurdish rebels in the region. ""It's important that the international community supports Turkey in its efforts to counter terrorism, in respect of the law, without risking the stability of the region and the whole continent,"" Portuguese European Affairs Minister Manuel Lobo Antunes told the European parliament in Strasbourg. However for the EU, Cyprus remains the elephant in the room and no matter how far Turkey comes along the membership road it won't be able to join the club until that problem is sorted. So far Ankara refuses to respect the protocol which extended Turkey's customs union with the EU to the 10 nations which joined the bloc in May 2004 -- including the divided island of Cyprus.

Black Turks on the offensive —Ijaz Hussain

2007-09-12T08:33:00.000+02:00

Many analysts believe that the real reason for the Turkish army’s unrelenting hostility towards the AKP lies less in its desire to protect secular values and more to guard its own powers and privileges, which it sees under attackThe newly elected Turkish President Abdullah Gul is persona non-grata for the Turkish army whose chiefs refused to extend him the protocol he deserved as commander-in-chief of the armed forces or as president of the Republic. For example, they were absent from his swearing in ceremony in the Parliament and failed to greet him at the Victory Day parade. They treated his wife and that of the prime minister no differently as they refused to invite them to the state functions. Analysts explain the snub in terms of the army’s suspicion of the AKP leaders’ commitment to secular values on which the Turkish Republic is founded and its belief that the AKP is working on the Islamist agenda. What does this tug of war portend for Turkey?The Turkish army that claims to be the guardian of the constitution has always suspected the Islamists of promoting their political agenda. It has a long history of overthrowing such governments, the last being that of Necmettin Erbakan in 1997. The army has not forgotten that President Gul was a minister in the Islamist government of Erbakan and supposedly made statements in the past against secularism and in favour of political Islam. This is compounded by the fact that his wife wears a headscarf, which symbolises Islamist outlook. According to the Turkish army, the case of Gul’s former boss and the head of the AKP Prime Minister Erdogan is no different; he, too, was an ardent follower of Erbakan, whose hands he would kiss with reverence. The army also blames Erdogan for making statements critical of secularism and favourable to political Islam. It cites, in particular, the poem in which he compared minarets with bayonets, domes with helmets, mosques with barracks and believers with soldiers and for which he received a prison sentence in addition to being banned from active politics.The AKP leaders now claim that they have changed; that they have renounced their Islamist past and are now firmly committed to the secular orientation of the Republic. The Turkish army is, however, not convinced of their claims. It believes that the leopard has not changed its spots and that the AKP leadership is merely engaged in the well-known Islamic practice of dissimulation (takiyye), hiding its true intentions and would show its true colours at an appropriate time. It refuses to consider the fact that, unlike Erbakan, the AKP leadership has worked for Turkey’s entry into the EU which would never accept an Islamist country; and that a section of the liberal electorate that voted for the AKP in the recent general elections accepts the party’s credentials. Many analysts believe that the real reason for the Turkish army’s unrelenting hostility towards the AKP lies less in its desire to protect secular values and more to guard its own powers and privileges, which it sees under attack. They cite in this regard the example of the National Security Council (NSC) through which the army used to impose its will on the Parliament and the government; the AKP leadership in its earlier stint in office successfully ensured that the NSC was transformed into a toothless body. They also cite the AKP’s reported intention to get the army-imposed 1982 constitution, which is the source of most of the powers and privileges that the army currently enjoys, replaced by a “civilian” constitution.The AKP has not yet revealed details of the proposed constitution as it is still working on it. However, the salient features that have appeared in the press are sufficient to scare secularists including the pashas (read: the army) as it puts their vested interests in jeopardy. For example, the proposed constitution envisages reforming the judiciary and the universities the secularists dominate. Similarly, it would require the head of the armed forces to report to the defence minister rather than the prime minister, which is the case presently. Again, it proposes to remove the exemption that rulings of the high military board currently enjoy from judicial review. The AKP intends to submit the final document to public for referendum, which it can only win if it enjoys support across the board including that from the liberals. How are secularists including the army likely to respond to the challenge?It is undeniable that secularist forces are terribly upset with the new development. This is evident from the fact that even before the ‘draft constitution’ sees the light of the day they are up in arms against it. For example, the Turkish daily Radikal rhetorically asks, “why is the “civilian” constitution being hidden from the civilians?” The Republican People’s Party, the main opposition secular party, has equated the move as a conspiracy to dismantle the secular principles of the Republic and has therefore pledged to resist it. Given the deep divisions within the Turkish society, it appears as if the coming battle on the constitution may be nothing short of an Armageddon. Though the army must be terribly upset with the AKP move, it would be hard for it to intervene for two reasons. First, the AKP enjoys popular support of 47% of the electorate that voted for it in the general elections (including a large section of liberals. With this kind of support, the pashas would think twice before moving. Secondly, the AKP enjoys unwavering EU support for the proposed change as the latter has been suggesting repeal or amendment of a large number of articles of the constitution to bring them in conformity with its own standards. The army knows that any action against the Erdogan government would not go down well with Brussels and would spell disaster for Turkey.Does the adoption of the “civilian” constitution augur well for Turkey? The secularists including the army do not think so because, in their opinion, it would erode the principle of the separation of state and religion, downgrade the army and foment ethnic divisions, particularly in the Kurdish southeast. These fears are largely unfounded because the real reason for the army’s opposition is its desire to perpetuate its hold on power through scare tactics. Nor is the fear of the Islamists dismantling secularism and introducing the Sharia rule warranted because the ever-vigilant Western world and domestic public opinion would never allow it to happen. Already the prediction that the Islamists’ first election is the last one has proved wrong, as the AKP has held second general elections. Whereas the incubus of Islamist threat is largely unfounded, the proposed change promises to be immensely beneficial for Turkey. The Kemalists have very little knowledge of the West or the true meaning of secularism. Their secularism is essentially anti-religion and imitates external Western forms while refusing to incorporate the core Western values of tolerance, liberalism and democracy in their worldview. The militant secularism they profess has divided the Turkish society into “white” and “black Turks”: the former have appropriated most of the powers and privileges while the latter have been left disenfranchised. The “civilian” constitution promises to bring about a paradigm shift in the power structure and rectify this imbalance by providing a level playing field to the both. The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com

Islamists won't follow Turkey's lead

2007-09-12T08:31:00.000+02:00

Can Turkey's Justice and Development Party become a model for the ideal marriage between Islam and democracy that could be replicated in the Middle East?
Some Muslim intellectuals, politically correct commentators in the West and officials from the European Union seem to think so. They argue that the recent election of Abdullah Gul as president of Turkey and the success in parliamentary polls last July of his AK Party (as it is known in Turkey) are sound reasons to believe that a party comprised of Islamists can hold free elections, win at the polls and then run a state that is democratic and secular.
This presumption, however, rests upon the false belief that Turkey is much like the rest of the Islamic world and that all Islamists are similar to the leaders of the AK Party. For one thing, AK Party leaders should not be identified as "Islamists." As Gul declared during his acceptance speech: "Secularism, one of the basic principles of our republic, is a rule of social peace."
Islamists in most Muslim societies do not favor a secular state. In Jordan and Egypt, for example, unofficial Islamist parties and movements are fighting for Shariah, Islamic law, to be the guiding light for governing. Shariah-based governance, in fact, has been one of the foundations of opposition movements against authoritarian rulers in the Arab world for the last 30 years.
And it is not only the Islamists who are advocating Islamic law. The majority of Muslims surveyed in Arab countries, and in other Muslims societies, say they prefer that Islamic law be either a source, or the sole source, of legislation. By contrast, according to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, support for Islamic law in Turkey has never exceeded 20 percent.
As far back as 1981, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt tried to appease his country's Islamists by revising the Constitution to mandate Shariah as the primary source of legislation. Islamic law has never been enforced, however, and today this has become one of main battle cries of the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition to Egypt's governing National Democratic Party.
Although many moderate Islamists in the Middle East admire the AK Party's success, the way ahead for them is far more difficult. The vast historical differences between Turkey and the region's other countries also have to be taken into account.
The AK Party was born out of the more ideological Welfare Party, but then evolved to become more in line with Turkey's secular tradition. By contrast, secularism in the Arab world peaked in the 1950s and 60s, then came to a halt with the Six Day War of 1967. The Arabs' humiliating defeat by Israel inspired the rise of political Islam, which has grown in influence since then.
If Islamists came to power in many Arab states they would likely ban alcohol, homosexuality and pornographic images on the Internet and in film. For years, Islamists have complained about the millions of bikini-clad foreign tourists who frequent beach resorts in Arab countries, even though tourism helps keep their beleaguered economies afloat.
In addition, Arab societies have transformed over the last 30 years and are far more religious than Turkish society, even though an increasing number of Turks are embracing Islam in ways unseen since the Ottoman Empire.
Even if the Islamists in the Arab world had every intention of emulating Turkey's secular-style of government, they still would have to answer to the growing influence of religious authorities. These range from the scholars at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the 1,100-year-old seat of learning for Sunni Islam, to respected clerics in mosques and institutions stretching from Saudi Arabia to Qatar who have followers across the Arab world.
Religious authority in Turkey has always been part of the state structure, unlike in the Arab world, where religious scholars and imams have been free to interpret Islamic doctrine at will. Sheiks at Al-Azhar and religious scholars in the Gulf have been at odds over a range of fatwas, from whether the 9/11 attacks on the United States were justified to whether female circumcision is an Islamic duty or simply a cultural tradition that began in Africa and was adopted in Arab society.
By contrast, the state's control over Islamic interpretation has a long history in Turkey, one that continues today.
In forging his country into a secular state, Kemal Ataturk did not allow Islam to become a basis for opposition movements, as happened in the Arab world after the Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1928. Instead, the Turkish state institutionalized Islam by controlling the message and the messenger - only imams licensed by the state are allowed to preach in mosques - making interpretations of the faith subject to state approval.
Policy makers and pundits in the United States and Europe should not rush to judgment by assuming that the Turkish model can be applied elsewhere. Just as the Islamic world is not monolithic, so too will Islamic-style democracy vary in each country, should it develop at all.
Geneive Abdo, a fellow at The Century Foundation, is the author of several books on contemporary Islam, most recently "Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America After 9/11."

A new Turkey?

2007-09-07T13:25:00.001+02:00

The no-alternative secular ideology of Ataturk appears shattered at last in Turkey, writes Hassan Nafaa*
Current political developments in Turkey are significant in more than one way. On Thursday 28 August, Abdullah Gul walked into the presidential palace. He did not do so as a guest who, by secular laws, cannot bring his veiled wife along, but rather as president of the state. Army commanders refused to give him the due military salute for a new president, but this hardly dampened his victory. For the first time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has an Islamic-leaning president.
The "secular" regime established by Ataturk following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was unusual in that it didn't evolve from a democratic process. Secularism in Turkey was a tool of denigrating and expunging religion, not just enforcing a separation between church and state. Initially, Ataturk contemplated keeping the caliphate as a religious institution with Vatican-style status, but the power struggle that developed during the liberation stage finally prompted him to dissolve the caliphate and its affiliate institutions, ban Sufi chapters, and strike out the constitutional provision stating that Islam was the official religion of the state.
Because such measures were taken in the absence of political pluralism and under a one party system, Turkish secularism became imbued with a tyrannical streak and got more obstinate as time went by. But despite the initial insistence of the ruling party on uprooting religion altogether, Islamic traditions managed to creep back for cultural as well as political reasons.
A few years before he died, Ataturk formed the Academy of History and Social Science in order to promote nationalist ideas. But this research institution soon found itself delving into an Ottoman past that cannot be examined in isolation from Islam, eventually becoming a bastion for the preservation of Islamic culture. When Ataturk died, the political system allowed some restricted pluralism to develop, and that provided a chance for the expression of Islamic sentiments. When a liberal group led by Adnan Menderes split from the ruling party, it advocated an end to anti-Islamic measures and to all legal restrictions on Muslim rituals.
The authoritarian implementation of secular slogans lasted in Turkey for a long time, creating a mood of cultural alienation as well as an identity crisis among various social groups, especially the middle and working classes. Public pressure for greater religious freedom encouraged the creation of Islamic- leaning political parties. The first such party was Necmeddin Erbakan's National Order Party, established in 1970.
Political Islam is more recent in Turkey than in other Arab and Islamic countries and yet more successful. Why is that? One can think of a few reasons. First, the harshness with which the army dealt with Islamists boosted their popularity. The army, which acts as a guardian of secular values, carried out four military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. The first coup brought down the government of Menderes, who was then executed for violation of secular laws. In 1997, the army deposed the government of Erbakan and disbanded his Refah Party. This excessive use of force, along with the ineptness and corruption of secular parties, increased public sympathy for the Islamists.
Second, Turkey's Islamists exhibited credible moderation, refusing to resort to violence or impose their opinion on others. The political and intellectual discourse of the Islamists became more moderate with time, and with every crisis the Islamists came out stronger. The policies of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) are a case in point. The JDP made a serious attempt to reconcile the Islamic heritage of Turkey with its European affiliations. Internally, the JDP adopted a modernist approach that accommodated religious sentiments. Externally, it maintained an independent approach without antagonising anyone. So although Turkey is a NATO member, the JDP refused to let US troops go into Iraq from Turkish territories in 2003. The strategic cooperation agreement Turkey has with Israel didn't prevent the JDP from forging close relations with Palestinian and Arab parties. And while defending Turkey's vital interests in Cyprus, the JDP pressed for membership in the EU.
Third, Turkey's Islamists maintained their unity in the face of hardship. Each time their parties awere banned, they created new ones. So the National Order Party became the Salvation Party, then Refah, then Virtue, and finally Justice and Development. Those constant changes didn't lead to a split within the ranks of the Islamists. Add to this the decay of secular parties due to corruption or stagnation and you'll see why the Islamists grew in popularity over time. In the 1973 election, Erbakan won 12 per cent of the vote with his Salvation Party. In 2002, Erdogan won 34 per cent of the vote with his JDP, then 47 per cent in the recent elections. Now the JDP is the main party in Turkey and for the first time ever it controls both the legislative and executive branches.
Can the JDP use its current political and constitutional power to rebuild Turkey's political and social life? Can the JDP make Turkey a solid and modern democracy? Can it help Turkey come to terms with its history and get over the political schizophrenia of the past? Or will its adversaries, especially the army, succeed in turning back the clock?
I believe that the JDP has a fair chance of succeeding, for the following reasons. First, the army has lost much of its credibility and is therefore unable to intervene in politics in the same way it did before. A reform process that started under Ecevit and continued under Erbakan saw the National Security Council (NSC) restructured and its power curbed. The NSC is now made up of nine civilians (instead of four) and five officers. Its secretary-general is a civilian who answers to the prime minister. NSC decisions are no longer binding on the government and can be challenged by parliament.
Second, secular Turkish parties, including leftist ones, have lost much of their popularity due to their opportunism and flagrant support for despotism and fascist nationalism. Ironically, the JDP seems to be the one political power that can be trusted to defend both liberal democracy and social justice in Turkey.
Third, there is a growing need, both regionally and internationally, to build up the Turkish model of Islamic moderation as an alternative to Iranian fundamentalism and so-called Sunni extremism. Many in Europe and the US believe that an assault on the Turkish model would ignite Islamic militancy in the region. Look at how France's Sarkozy changed his mind about Turkey's joining the EU after the recent Turkish elections.
This doesn't mean that a new, modern, stable and democratic Turkey is around the corner. There are many external factors that can change the situation drastically in Turkey, including President Bush ordering a strike on Iran. Should this happen, the Turkish army may regroup and try to reclaim its lost power, throwing the entire country into the realm of the unknown.
* The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.

LOOK BEYOND 9/11 TO FIND MIDDLE EAST ANSWERS

2007-09-07T13:23:00.000+02:00

WASHINGTON -- As the sixth anniversary of the tragic attacks of 9/11 approach next week, we need to move beyond grieving, hating -- and fighting -- and look for deeper answers to the profound cultural, political and economic reasons behind those attacks. I think we may find some of them in the surprise election to the Turkish presidency last week of a man described by the nation's secular traditionalists as one of the "Islamists" the West so fears.

There are few who would congratulate me on such an insight. In fact, among many Europeans and the many Turks who follow the historic road of the great Kemal Ataturk, who first made a modern country out of Turkey by isolating politics from religion in the 1920s, the election of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as president is a frightening event.
Gul's party, the Islamist Justice and Development Party, with its threatening Islamic roots that it has largely risen beyond, still deeply worries many who cannot get past the idea that the party REALLY wants to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state. Now, with the prime ministership held for nearly five years by the party's cosmopolitan Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the presidency held by Gul, they fear anything can happen. And if it could happen in modernized Turkey, well, then it could happen anywhere in the Middle East!
But let me go out on that proverbial limb and suggest that it is, to the contrary, likely that the changes in Turkey offer some answers to the deeper problems of the Middle East. Essentially these are problems of governance, which in practice means balancing and resolving the demands of political power and religious power. They happen also to be the problems -- whether in Saudi Arabia or Egypt or elsewhere -- that led to 9/11 and that haunt us daily in Iraq.
The newly elected Gul, to start with, is no cave-dwelling Muslim fundamentalist. He is an attractive man in Western dress with a doctorate in economics, and with study in London and Exeter and work with the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia behind him. As foreign minister, he became known for pushing for Turkey to join the European Union, for changes in a law that punished writers for "insulting Turkishness," and for devising a set of democratic reforms.
But most important, Gul's party, under Erdogan's leadership, has brought the country to an impressive new prosperity with an Islamic entrepreneurial class that springs from the formerly rigidly conservative hinterlands. It is centered around the new industries of the city of Kayseri, where, amazingly, an Islamic middle class has been created for the first time in Turkish history.
When a small group of us met with Prime Minister Erdogan last May, he said with passion: "This is a very different country today. It has become an open society. To use an Internet expression, it's a state on a 24-hour basis, an online country, an island of prosperity and stability. Our GNP has gone from $182 billion in 2002 to $400 billion by 2006, and the per capita income has risen in those four years from $2,600 to $5,500.
"Turkey is determined to become a full member of the European Union. ... In Europe, we find the harbinger of the possibility of the alliance of civilizations. Our goal is to become a responsible modern society, and we are a people who have totally internalized democracy."
There has been little reason over the last five years to doubt such statements. But now the Justice Party holds both the prime ministership and the presidency, and that gives it extraordinary powers that it did not have before -- and no one can be absolutely sure how its officials will use those powers.
Before, the cities of Turkey were filled with secular cosmopolites who would be at home anywhere in the world, while the poor and benighted of the countryside dragged hopelessly behind. But today, the formerly isolated and fearful countryside is taking part in that entrepreneurial progress -- and not only in Turkey.
In progressive Tunisia, for instance, development is moving so rapidly (again, across class and religious lines) that poverty is now below 2 percent.
In troubled Pakistan, as The Wall Street Journal just reported, "a clear demonstration of confidence in the country's future is coming from an emerging economic force: entrepreneurs." Americans hear little about Syria except for its support of terrorism, but in fact, entrepreneurship is also thriving in Syria. Even Iran, which the White House sees as unidimensionally bad, is in the middle of a profound struggle between the past and a progressive modernism favored overwhelmingly by the young.
America sees little in the Middle East except the war in Iraq. Yet it is in these other countries that we pinpoint the true and ultimately decisive struggles: bringing the traditionally conservative countryside of the past peacefully into the modern world of the cities, blending the world of religion peacefully with the secular world, and building equity for all in societies formerly dominated by the few.
And so, six years after 9/11, even while we fight a war in Iraq that fails to address these issues, at least we should understand the contours of the crucial question: Can you be modern and Muslim? Turkey may again provide some answers.

Turkish politics The next battle

2007-09-01T10:29:00.000+02:00

Abdullah Gul has been elected president. But the ruling AK party faces more conflict with the generals over a new constitution

“IT'S the final nail in the army's coffin.” That is how one pro-secular government official summed up the elevation of Abdullah Gul, a former Islamist, to the presidency on August 28th in the teeth of opposition from the country's generals. Others saw it as a moral victory for the pious masses over an overweening secular elite that has long concentrated power and wealth in its hands.

Either way, Mr Gul's journey from a working class family in the Anatolian heartland to the pinnacle of secular power will transform Turkish politics. The new era may promise greater liberties, but also more meddling from the army. As president, Mr Gul, until this month Turkey's respected foreign minister, will have the power to veto legislation and a say in the appointment of senior officials. Most discomfiting of all for the generals, Mr Gul is now their commander-in-chief.

The top brass refused to salute him during his first official engagement, and stayed away from his oath-taking ceremony this week. So too did Mr Gul's wife, whose Islamic-style headscarf came to embody the political crisis of the past four months, since Mr Gul first announced his candidacy. The head covering is banned in all government buildings and schools and, until this week, in the presidential compound where Ataturk, founder of the republic, once lived.

In his inaugural address, Mr Gul sought to ease the fears of his critics, insisting that he would abide by the secular principles of Ataturk's republic. He also showered praise on the generals and pledged to keep up Turkey's attempt to join the EU.

Yet the 56-year-old former economist hinted at a looser interpretation of Turkey's unique brand of secularism. Until now this has been defined by Ataturk's renunciation of Islamic symbols and rigid state control over all aspects of religious life. Secularism, said Mr Gul, was a precondition for “social peace” but also offered a model “for different lifestyles”. Some seized on his words as proof that he will support loosening restrictions on the headscarf and religious education.

Much will depend on his former boss, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Justice and Development (AK) Party was swept back into office in July's elections. These were called after a prolonged trial of strength that began when the army, backed by the pro-secular judiciary, tried to stop Mr Gul's attempt to become president. The generals, who have toppled four governments since 1960, threatened to intervene again but have so far stayed their hand.

As Mr Gul approved a new pro-EU cabinet this week, another clash loomed over a “civilian” constitution that Mr Erdogan proposes to adopt next year to replace the current text, written by the generals after their last coup in 1980. Draft clauses leaked to the media are nothing short of revolutionary: senior officers will no longer be immune from prosecution in civilian courts, military appeals courts will be scrapped, Kurdish will be taught as a second language in government schools and the definition of Turkishness will be expanded to embrace citizens from different backgrounds and creeds.

The army is unnerved. Pundits reckon Yasar Buyukanit, the chief of general staff, was alluding to the new constitution when he spoke of “centres of evil” bent on eroding secularism in a statement this week. Some expect that the generals may now to try to drive a wedge between the president and Mr Erdogan. There has long been an undercurrent of rivalry in their political alliance. Moreover, the new constitution also calls for a significant trimming of presidential powers. Might Mr Gul be tempted to block it? This may be wishful thinking by the humbled generals.

Turkey and Iran Too energetic a friendship

2007-08-23T22:39:00.000+02:00

An attempt to bypass Russia annoys the United States

COCKING a snook at America seems an odd way to launch a second term in office for a government eager to prove its pro-Western credentials. Yet that is what Turkey's mildly Islamist Justice and Development party (AK) appears to be doing, just weeks after its landslide victory in the July 22nd parliamentary election.

Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, dispatched his energy minister, Hilmi Guler, to Iran last week where he concluded a raft of deals. They include the establishment of a joint company to carry up to 35 billion cubic metres of Iranian natural gas via Turkey to Europe, and the construction of three thermal power plants by Turkish companies in Iran.

America swiftly complained. “If you ask our opinion, do we think it's the right moment to be making investments in the Iranian oil and gas sector, no we don't,” sniffed a State Department spokesman. There were mutterings about possible sanctions. But Turkey insists it has the right to pursue its interests. And Iran is delighted. “Nobody can come between Iran and Turkey,” Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, crowed recently.

Mr Erdogan's critics have seized on his dealings with Iran as proof that he is trying to steer Turkey away from the West. In fact, they have just the opposite aim: to boost Turkey's chances of joining the European Union by making it a vital energy corridor for oil and gas flowing between the energy-rich former Soviet states, the Middle East and Europe.

This is not as far-fetched as it sounds. EU countries import half their energy, with around a fifth of their oil and gas coming from Russia's state monopoly, Gazprom. The need to diversify sources was driven home in 2005 when Gazprom arbitrarily increased the price of gas it supplies to Ukraine by pipeline. Russia's use of its energy riches to flex its muscles on the world stage is one reason why America is lobbying so hard for the creation of an east-west energy corridor—a network of oil and gas pipelines running from former Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan via Turkey, and on to European markets.

The first big step towards weakening Russia's grip was the inauguration in 2005 of a multi-billion-dollar pipeline carrying Azerbaijani oil from offshore Caspian fields to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, in the southern Mediterranean. This provocation, from the Russian point of view, was compounded by the launch of a parallel line carrying natural gas from Azerbaijan (and eventually, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan), which was completed last year. But Gazprom hit back by raising the price of the gas it sells to the Azerbaijanis, who rely on Russia for nearly half their supply.

This, in turn, forced them to use more of their own gas, leaving them unable to fill the Turkish pipeline, which lay idle until last month.

In a further blow, Gazprom announced a venture with Italy's Eni in June to build a line across the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria. All this makes it less likely that Turkey will, by 2011, achieve its dream of extending a recently completed pipeline to Greece as far as southern central Europe.

That is why Turkey has turned to Iran, according to Necdet Pamir, a veteran Turkish energy analyst. Iranian gas would not only help to fill the Nabucco pipeline, another mooted conduit from the Middle East or Central Asia, bypassing Russia, but would also reduce Turkey's own dependence on Russian supplies: over half of Turkey's natural-gas demand is met by Gazprom. Unlike the former Soviet producers, Iran controls several shipping lanes and borders Turkey. “The paradox for America is that Iran is the only country other than Iraq that can truly undermine Russia's [energy] supremacy,” observes Mr Pamir.

TURKEY AND ISLAM Tolerance and tradition in Turkey

2007-08-23T22:35:00.000+02:00

Turkey, the first secular republic with a majority Muslim population, is expected to soon have a president who prays in public and whose wife wears a headscarf as a manifestation of her religious convictions. Anti-religious secularists in the Muslim world see this development as a threat to Turkey's laicism. But it could also be an opportunity to define secularism in the Muslim world as a political system ensuring separation of theology and state rather than as an anti-religious ideology.

For almost a century, secular elites in Muslim countries have equated secularization with renunciation of Islamic symbols and practices. This rejection of traditional religion was initially a reaction to the efforts of Muslim clerics to enforce Islam by law. But the radical secularism of authoritarian regimes, such as that of the shah of Iran, has contributed to the rise and expansion of Islamist radicalism. Islamists portray their religion as being in danger; the exclusion of practicing Muslims from the power structure in majority Muslim states helps the Islamists build that argument.

The threat to secularism in the Muslim world comes from religious intolerance, not from individual acts of piety. Turkey's election of a conservative Muslim president need not be seen as a deviation from its secular ideals. It is a much-needed embrace of a path different from that of radical Islam as well as radical secularism.

The Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish initials, AK), led by Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan, won parliamentary polls in July with 47 percent of the popular vote and a clear majority of seats in the Grand National Assembly. This was a significant improvement over the 34 percent share of the vote it won in 2002 - an election that first brought the conservative party with Islamist roots to power.

The elections last month were called earlier than scheduled because of an inconclusive presidential vote in April, when, the AK Party's nominee for president, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, faced severe opposition from Turkey's secular establishment led by the military. Gul's election was blocked by technical maneuvers backed by the outgoing president and top army generals, notwithstanding the AK Party's majority in Parliament.

This time around, the party has again nominated Gul for president and, given the recent resounding popular mandate for AK Party, the army might not be able to block his election short of an improbable military coup.

Although the AK Party grew out of a succession of Islamist parties banned by Turkish courts, it describes itself as a moderate conservative party rather than an Islamist one. It does not seek the enforcement of Shariah law, and its performance in office during its first term confirms its claims.

Although both Erdogan and Gul are practicing Muslims who were once active in the Islamist movement, their first stint in office reflected an effort to distance themselves from Islamist politics. Under Erdogan, Turkey pursued European Union membership, maintained close ties with the United States and Israel, and attained new levels of economic prosperity.

The AK Party government has not curtailed civil liberties and continues to observe the basic tenets of secularism by keeping religion out of its political decisions. In the post-9/11 world, Islamist parties and leaders in several countries have become instant converts to moderation. The AK Party's critics insist that it has changed only strategically and that it would revert to demanding Shariah rule if and when it gets a chance.

Such fears must be weighed only in light of available evidence, and so far the evidence favors AK Party's credentials as a religiously conservative party willing to operate within the broad principles of secularism.

For too long, the Muslim world has been polarized between secularists who want all public manifestations of Islamic religion banished from their countries and Islamists who insist on reverting to obscurantist theocracy.

This polarization cannot come to an end without secularists tolerating the practice of religion and Islamists moving away from radical Islam to a middle where individuals can be Islamic even though the state is secular.

As in the West, Muslims need to be able to fuse faith and enlightenment while also accepting the rights of unbelievers.

Under a Gul presidency, Turkey will hopefully continue to combine tolerance with tradition. This would open the way for secularism in the Islamic world that concerns itself with protecting individual freedom and pluralism instead of being preoccupied with debates over issues such as headscarves.

Turkey Ready to take office

2007-08-21T19:48:00.000+02:00

Turkey's Abdullah Gul will soon become president. Then what?

ABDULLAH GUL, Turkey's foreign minister, took another step towards the presidency on Monday August 20th as parliamentarians held a first round of voting for the post. Mr Gul, a pious Muslim whose earlier bid for the job sparked political turmoil, won 341 votes in the 550-member chamber. He fell short of the two-thirds of ballots needed to win the presidency outright in the first round, though he is all but assured of eventual victory. His closest rival, Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, a former defence minister fielded by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), got just 70 votes.

Mr Gul is expected to become president after a third round of voting on August 28th, when a simple majority will suffice. He is backed by his ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party, which won 341 seats in snap parliamentary polls last month. The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) boycotted Monday's session and claimed that Mr Gul's earlier involvement in Islamist politics posed a threat to the secular system laid down by the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk.

The job of president is partly ceremonial, but the incumbent has influence over politics through his right to block legislation. He may also name judges and veto appointments to the government and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Mr Gul’s first go at the presidency in April was greeted with mass anti-government rallies called by secularists, including many women who voiced concern that their liberal lifestyles might be threatened. Tensions escalated when the army, which has toppled four governments since 1960, threatened to intervene. His effort came to an end when the constitutional court upheld a claim by the CHP that the parliament lacked a quorum in a first round of balloting. The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then called an early general election.

In the event, the AK Party romped back for a second term with nearly 47% of the vote. Four years of robust economic growth, political calm and democratic reforms have kept the public happy. Voters may also have been offering a mandate for Mr Gul’s attempt on the presidency. Fearful of a fresh dust-up with the army, Mr Erdogan at first balked at his colleague's continued presidential ambitions. But Mr Gul persisted and won the backing of the AK's conservative rump led by Bulent Arinc, a former speaker of parliament, forcing Mr Erdogan’s hand. As important, the MHP announced after the elections that its parliamentarians would take part in the vote for president, ensuring there would be a quorum.

Mr Gul says that, as president, he will reach out to all Turks and that he will remain loyal to the secular tenets of the constitution. His four years as foreign minister leave little room for doubt. He was the driving force behind the many reforms that persuaded European Union leaders to open long delayed membership talks with Turkey in 2005. And it was Mr Gul who engineered the defection of fellow moderates from the overtly Islamist Welfare Party which was bullied out of office by the generals in 1997.

His sole handicap appears to be his wife, Hayrunnisa. She wears the Islamic style headscarf that is banned in all government buildings and schools. In a sop to the secularists she is expected to tie it in a more fashionable style. Over time they should grow accustomed to her headgear just as they eventually accepted Mr Erdogan's wife, Emine, who became the first ever prime ministerial spouse to cover her head.

As for relations with the army, there remains scope for more tensions with the ruling politicians. Mr Erdogan is promising to write a new “civilian” constitution to replace the one that was imposed by the generals after their last direct coup in 1980. But Mr Gul is, for now, playing down the prospects of confrontation. It is rumoured that he has already met the chief of general staff, Yasar Buyukanit, in recent days to offer personal assurances that he will not stray from Ataturk’s path, although Mr Buyukanit denies any meeting has taken place. It would seem to be in nobody’s interest to spark fresh political upheaval once again.

The A.K.P.'s Complex Victory in Turkey

2007-08-18T10:00:00.000+02:00

The A.K.P.'s Complex Victory in Turkey
Drafted By: Dario Cristiani
http://www.pinr.com

On July 22, 2007, the Turkish public voted in early parliamentary elections called after the parliament failed to appoint a new president. The election of a new chief of state was the reason for the political stalemate in April and May and of the harsh split between the Kemalist military establishment of the Turkish Armed Forces (T.S.K.) and the Justice and Development Party (A.K.P.), the Islamic-rooted party led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The attempt at appointing an important Islamic political personality, such as Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, as the new president was the last straw between the T.S.K. and the A.K.P.

The military perceived the appointment of Gul as a presidential candidate (the president is also the commander-in-chief of the T.S.K.) as a direct menace for Turkey and its secular character. It also saw the act as one that would further weaken the power of the military. In light of these developments, the Republican People's Party (C.H.P.), the leftist party created by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and whose ideology is based on a strict observance of the principles of Ataturk, moved to block the election of Gul as president and, after the second failed vote, Gul withdrew his candidacy.

The results of the July 22 elections were as follows: the A.K.P. came in first with about 46.5 percent of the vote and will have 341 seats in the next Turkish unicameral parliament, which is made up of 550 seats. The C.H.P. came in second with about 21 percent of the vote, giving it 112 seats in the new parliament. The ultra-nationalist and right-oriented Nationalist Movement Party (M.H.P.) came in third with 14.3 percent of the vote, giving it 70 seats. The independents took 26 seats and a large part of them were from the Party for a Democratic Society (D.T.P.), the Kurdish party.

The Structural Roots of A.K.P. Consensus

The elections have represented a sort of paradox for the A.K.P.: they have demonstrated how the party has strongly increased its popular support but, at the same time, has fewer seats than before the elections. That is because the M.H.P. has exceeded the electoral threshold of ten percent. Hence, while the A.K.P. has received an autonomous parliamentary majority, it does not have the capability to elect the president on its own.

The elections, however, have demonstrated again the electoral power and the consensus that the A.K.P. has among the Turkish electorate. This consensus is rooted in a series of structural and contingent factors, which explain how the A.K.P. has strengthened its popular support during the past few years.

From a structural viewpoint, the first factor that must be taken into account is the progressive Islamization of the public and political space in Turkey. Such a development, even though abhorred by the military and secularist elites, has allowed Islam, its symbols and its cultural and social values to play a stronger role in the public discourse and to be a fully recognized part, by the largest component of the population, of the Turkish political mainstream.

Certainly, the presence in power of the A.K.P. since 2002 has reinforced such a trend, with Islam and Islamic values becoming the core of the political discourse. However, the process began before the A.K.P. took power and its increasing consensus is partly a result of the resurgence of Islam in the political sphere.

The second structural factor is the presence of a new, different middle class, characterized for its Islamic roots, in search of political representation. The so-called "green capitalists," united under the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD), promote an Islamic, conservative vision of society associated with a liberal and market-oriented vision of the economy. The emergence of such a social and political actor is one of the more durable results of the economic liberalization process and the market-oriented reforms implemented by the Turgut Ozal-led government in the 1980s.

The appearance of such a group has created a new economic power faction, whose creation has had several important political implications. It has represented not only an economic concurrent for the secular state elite, but a political one too. This new middle class has weakened the concept of a "strong state," a stronghold of Turkey since its foundation, and one of the consequences of such a weakening has been the end of the hegemony of secularism and nationalism as the main political narratives within the Turkish political scene.

Unlike its predecessors, the A.K.P. has repudiated the Welfare Party and Virtue Party legacy, in order to avoid a new "February 28, 1997" -- the day in which the T.S.K. ousted the Welfare Party from power -- with the aim of demonstrating the clear discontinuity between these experiences and its full acceptance of the modern lifestyle, the secular nature of the Turkish republic and the parliamentary confrontation, managing, at the same time, to keep intact its credentials as an Islamic-oriented party.

Moreover, the A.K.P. has an impressive and branched party machine and a strong network of local administrators. These two elements give the party a rooted and deeper presence in the country, which is a tool for building and consolidating its consensus. The presence of many A.K.P. mayors and the control over the local administrations, strengthened after the local elections in 2004, give the party a fundamental instrument for creating several consensus networks using welfare and local services in order to reinforce the clientele networks based on the lavishing of jobs in the public sector or the redistributing of wealth, above all in the less developed areas of the country.

Contingent Factors of the A.K.P. Affirmation and the Weakness of Nationalist Responses

In the affirmation of the A.K.P. in the latest election, an important role has been played by those factors closely linked to the political and economic situation in the country. For example, the economic growth rate of the country, close to 5.5 percent in 2006, and the overall economic record of the A.K.P. government in the past five years are elements that have had a fundamental role in its victory.

Moreover, the performance of the A.K.P. as a reformist party during its first mandate in the way of European Union membership, even though such an attitude has been weakened in the past two years, has caused liberal sectors of the society to look with interest to the A.K.P.

The run toward the European Union is an important goal for Turkey; however, Erdogan and his party have used the European Union also as an instrument for changing the domestic political and institutional panorama and the internal balance of power. The power of the military establishment has been weakened by the reforms implemented with the aim of fulfilling the so-called "Copenhagen Criteria."

A clear example of such an attitude has been the popular response to the April 27 Military Memorandum, which has not been as strong as it has been in the past for a similar event. Erdogan has also used as a propaganda instrument military interference within the political arena. He has tried to show that the A.K.P. is a genuine democratic force concerned about the future of democracy in Turkey and that the party wants to "normalize" the democratic life of the country, avoiding direct interference by the army in the political sphere. Hence, it has been a tool to acquire leverage and influence over the more liberal sectors of Turkish society that do not agree with an active role of the military in politics.

Finally, the lack of electoral depth of the political adversaries was the final factor. The concern, that still exists in some sectors of Turkish society, over the possible existence of a hidden, radical Islamist agenda of the A.K.P., expressed by the military and the nationalist parties, has not been as strong as in the largest part of the electorate. The main adversaries of the A.K.P. -- the C.H.P. and the M.H.P. -- have only played the nationalist card. Such a move has been useful for securing their targeted electorate, but this has prevented them from gaining influence over the part of the electoral body farther from their positions. By choosing the card of a harsh nationalist response to the moves of the Erdogan-led party, they have polarized the electorate: on one side, there are the nationalist and secular electors, while on the other there are the rest, consisting of the conservatives, the Islamic-oriented population, the lower middle-class, the liberals and the part of the left that does not agree with the aggressive nationalist turn of the C.H.P.

Conclusion

The impressive victory of the A.K.P. in a country in which the ruling party has had historic difficulty being reelected is rooted in many structural factors. However, while this victory has reinforced the government's party from a political viewpoint, from a strictly numerical point of view the A.K.P. does not have the necessary numbers to appoint a party's candidate as chief of state. It will need the support of other parliamentarians in order to reach the threshold of 367 members.

In the end, the situation is complex and unclear. The candidature of Gul will bring further tension within the Turkish political scene. The military will try to move in to avoid an election of an Islamic-oriented president, even though they are weaker than before. The political problem correlated to the election of the chief of state could also bring some problems to the tenure of Erdogan's position within the party.

The A.K.P. clearly won the latest elections, but the problems that it is going to face are more difficult and complex than they were prior to the elections.

Report Drafted By:
Dario Cristiani

Ataturk’s Turkey: A Model For the Greater Middle East?

2007-08-18T09:12:00.000+02:00

Sedat Laciner

Friday , 17 August 2007

Recently, there is a hot debate on Turkey’s importance as model for Iraq, Pakistan or any Muslim country among the American thinkers. ‘Turkish model prescription’ is very important for the US who has confronted with difficulties in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq. US decision-makers have no hope for Muslim democratization or liberalization, they think that Muslims can not become democrats, Muslims can not develop liberal economy and Muslims can not be integrated to the global political and economic system. The Western World has lost its all hopes about Iran and Arabs. For them, Arab means poverty, war, terrorism, backwardness, uneducated children and humiliated women. Iranians are similarly perceived as barbarian, militarist people who want to destroy Israel and the West. The US’ post 9/11 measures against terrorism and extremism nourished religionist terrorism and extreme movements in Muslim world instead of moderate groups. Despite of this simple fact, the fresh republican prescriptions for international terrorism and relations with the Muslims are not different and/or better than Bush policies. For example, one of the republican presidential nominees affirmed “If there is a need, we will bomb Mecca and Medina, two holiest Muslim cities.” Proposal of the Democrats is not much different than the Republicans’. Even Democrat presidential candidate Barrack Obama, who is pacifist and anti-militarist, affirmed that the US may occupy Pakistani territories and overthrow Musharraf’s government in order to fight terrorists. Similarly in Netherlands, which is considered the most liberal European country, there are some discussions about forbidding Koran, Islam’s holly book.

In such an atmosphere, Turkey appears as a different example compared with the rest of the Muslim world. Even tough Turkey has no natural energy resources; it is the biggest economy among the Muslim countries. Turkish economy is the 5th largest economy of Europe and 17th of the world. By courtesy of economic reforms realized within last years, Turkish economy became industrial and service economy instead of agrarian economy. Level of education, use of internet and other educational indicators are closer to European countries than Muslim countries. During last 5 years, thanks to the legal reforms important clauses of Turkish law (including penalty of death) were changed. As a result of the economic, political and legal reforms, the European Union (EU) accepted that Turkish democracy, human rights records and Turkish economy fulfilled the criteria for full membership to European Union and negotiations for full membership started on 3 October 2005. It means that Turkey’s membership to the European Union is a matter of time.

This awkward Muslim country, Turkey, attracts specially US’s attention and the American intellectuals and experts try to understand secret of this success. For them, reason of this success is Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his up-to-down policies of modernization. In other words, Americans and some Europeans do the same mistake again; they simplify cases, explain the causes as they want to see (wishful thinking). But Turkey’s story can not be reduced only to Ataturk or anyone in spite of Ataturk’s undeniable contribution to Turkish development. Moreover, the model that Ataturk formed can not be evaluated as dictatorship or “aggressive reforms” under the military protection. A society can not be changed only by the efforts of a man; democracy, human rights and liberalism can not nourish under any army’s pressure. Secret of Turkey’s success story is more complex than the Western experts think.

First of all, ‘Turkish Islam’ concept has always been different than other Muslim nations’ religious understanding. Ghaznavid Empire (Gazneliler), Karakhanids (Karahanlar), Seljuk Empire (Selcuklular), Ottoman Empire (Osmanlilar) and other Turkish states in the past saw expanding Islamic borders as ultimate aim as French, Italian states who had seen increasing Christianity as state politics. But these Turkish states at the same time were never been administered by solely religious rules contrarily to modern Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although Turkish Sultans were caliph, they did not act as the highest ecclesiastic, thus the religious rules didn’t dominate the society. Ottoman sultans acted as a secular political power and Sheyhülislam (the chief religious official in the Ottoman Empire) represented religious authority. However, when Sultan’s and Sheyhülislam’s point of view were in contradiction in any issue, the Sheyhülislam lost his post and ‘secular’ Sultan’s decisions were implemented. Although the Ottoman Empire is defined as modern Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan or Iran in some books published in Western countries, in reality, the Ottoman case was so different. There were pubs in 19th century Ottoman Empire, people wore whatever they wanted with no official pressure and religious and sectional minorities executed their religious exercises without restriction. Chief rabbi, Armenian, Bulgarian, and Greek Patriarchs were deputies for the Sultan, and Jewish and Christian minorities were autonomous in their internal affairs, including legal issues and taxation.

It could be argued that Turkish people and statesmen acknowledged their mistakes about politics, religion and economics earlier than other Muslim peoples. As early as the end of the 18th century the Ottomans started to discuss why European countries were relatively more developed than the Ottoman Empire and they started to introduce reforms. In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was part of the European system and balance of power and Europeanization in diplomacy, politics, social life and economy continued during the 19th century. The Ottoman State even applied some of the fundamental concepts of modern liberal democracy such as democracy, decentralization, liberal economy, liberty, civic rights, constitution and fundamental rights to its very values and principles in 19th century. The Ottomans had parliamentary system almost more than one century ago. At the end of 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was a parliamentary kingdom as most of the European states. At this period of time, the Ottoman Empire had elections, a constitution, an elected parliament, a lively press and an opposition who criticized even the Sultan and the government. Minority rights were also under statutory protection. If we compare Ottoman Empire and other European States by this point of view, we see no substantial difference between them. At the beginning of the 20th century, Sultan’s competences were reduced and governments formed by the Committee of Union and Progress party were more powerful than the Sultan. At this period of time, the Sultanate was a more symbolical position. Reforms executed by Ataturk after the foundation of Turkish Republic had been proposed and even started to implant at this period of time. For example, use of Latin letters, change of weekend holidays, costume reform, reforms in educational system, support to modern arts, etc. were all Ottoman ideas. Modern educational system for instance wasn’t fully formed after foundation of Turkish Republic. II. Abdulhamit had made great contribution to establish fundamentals of modern educational system in Turkey. Primary, secondary and high schools were built not only in the city centers but also in the remote towns during the Hamidian period.

Another important factor which makes Turkey different than other Muslim states is that Turkey had never been colony of any other Western countries. Except for the short occupation period which was after First World War, more than 1000 years, Turkish people have been independent. In addition to independence, they could stand puissant against the Western World for a long time. The self-confidence and self-reliance of the Turks continued during the 20th century and Turkey has been one of the rare countries who could debate the problems with the Western countries equally. For example, Turkish war of independence was against the western countries, Turkish army’s detachment to Cyprus came true in spite of the US’s USSR’s and European Communities’ (EU’s) strong objections. And also, although Turkey has disagreements with western countries on Armenian issue, Cyprus issue and even on combating terrorism issue, sometimes Turkey can execute its policies without asking the West’s permission or support. When we compare Turkish attitude before the West with Arab Governments’ submissive attitudes, Turkey’s difference could easily be understood. That’s why after the Iraq War one of the Lebanese newspaper called Turkey ‘more Arab than the Arab states’.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk Model

In brief, Ataturk was one of the best Ottoman generals and he succeeded to realize the transformation at Turkish Republic that Sultans and the CUP at Ottoman Empire tried to perform. Unfortunately, the number of articles at which Ataturk is defined as a ‘dictator’ or militarist has increased recently. At these articles Ataturk is compared to Hitler and Saddam Hussein and only difference between Ataturk and them is explained by Ataturk’s success and the others’ failure. All these claims are not true and not.

Although Ataturk was a soldier, reforms that he executed didn’t aim to form a militarist country. Even when the country was surrounded by conflicts, Ataturk and his friends didn’t delay the elections and Mustafa Kemal defined the parliament as the uppermost authority over any power. Deputies had ardent discussions while deciding to ratify Mustafa Kemal’s supreme military commend though the enemy armies were just 90 km away from the Parliament. In a phrase, Ataturk refused to abjure the will of people even at war. While organizing resistance, he lost his military ranks and continued organizing the war of salvation as a civilian. After the foundation of Turkish Republic, he preferred to define himself as a civilian. He might declare himself general or the super-general as the leaders in many Third World countries did, but he did not follow such a way. Ataturk even forced his friend to leave their military posts when they applied for general elections. ‘Ataturk laws’ prevented the soldiers to make politics. The generals had to chooce military post or MP seat in the parliament. It was obligatory to choose to become a civilian to be a candidate at elections. In this frame, some of Ataturk’s friends abdicated and became politicians while the others chose to continue their work as soldiers. In most of militarist, authoritarian countries, politicians prefer to call themselves by military appellations although they had never been soldiers in the past.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk told that continuity of republic is depended on education and developed economy instead of military instruments. That’s why he gave more importance to education which makes Turkey different than many other Muslim countries. Unlike Saddam-like leaders in the Muslim world, Mustafa Kemal did not try to create a one-leader country. Republican educational system aimed to create a pluralistic youth, because Kemal had no doubt that pluralism and free minds are the only way to save Turkey’s future. Mustafa Kemal’s ideal country was United Kingdom, United States or revolutionary France, not the Soviet Union or Hitler’s Germany

People who affirm that Mustafa Kemal was a dictator show the number of political parties at that time and ineffectiveness of opposition as proofs. This is an anachronistic approach. At that period of time, Turkey was as liberal and democrat as many other European countries. We should remember that the Czech Republic was the only liberal state at continental Europe at this period. Ataturk made efforts to pass to multiparty system but because of international crisis and conjectural depressions in Turkey, he couldn’t succeed. But after Ataturk’s presidency, Ismet Inonu, one of his closest friends, succeeded to pass to a multiparty system. And in 1950, multiparty system started to be carried out without pressure of Western countries and Turkey took part between the prestigious countries of Europe by the courtesy of its relatively liberal and democratic structure.

Defining Ataturk as a dictator, whose power depends only on army, and offering such a model for countries like Pakistan and Iraq is a capital mistake. Unfortunately, the Western World misunderstands Ataturk’s policies and Turkish model just like they misunderstand the Middle East in general.

17 August 2007

Translated by Jale Aktug and Meral Tuzce

Ruffling feathers - will Turkey invade northern Iraq?

2007-08-18T09:11:00.000+02:00

Turkey is once again undergoing preparations for a possible invasion of northern Iraq to disrupt the activities of the Workers' Party of Kurdistan (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan: PKK). On 7 August, Iraqi and Turkish Prime Ministers Nouri al-Maliki and Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed a Memorandum of Understanding to jointly work towards ending the PKK presence in Iraq. The decision followed Turkey's July general election, won by the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi: AKP), which saw the opposition parties, the Republican People's Party and the National Action Party, running on nationalist platforms.

Such a cross-border operation against the PKK would not be unprecendented. Turkish soldiers have been fighting the PKK in Iraqi Kurdish regions since the mid-1990s, usually just across the border from Turkey. Every few years the fight against the guerrilla movement reaches a minor crescendo, with the Turkish military weighing the option of swooping into the Kandil mountains to completely destroy the PKK's camps. Four significant incursions were launched in the 1990s and 2001.

So far, Turkish deployments inside Iraq have been modest. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani (nephew of KRG President Massoud Barzani) confirmed in early August that Turkish troops had already begun operating in Iraqi territory. However, their main activity has consisted of preparatory work on the Turkish side of the border, in particular the establishment of 'temporary security zones' in the border provinces of Hakkari, Siirt, and Sirnak. These zones involve tighter controls on civilian movement and could be a prelude to cross-border action.

As these zones and the election demonstrate, attacking the PKK camps is once again being considered seriously in Ankara. Perhaps the most significant reason for this is that the PKK's insurgency has shown surprising resilience by sustaining itself since ending its unilateral ceasefire in May 2004, and there are signs it has taken lethal new tactical turns. In addition, given the PKK's strategic reliance on static camps, the military is confident that it could deal a substantial blow to the organisation in a cross-border operation.

Domestic factors also provide a favourable climate for an invasion in 2007, particularly the ruling AKP's desire to demonstrate its Kemalist credentials. The party narrowly failed to win the two thirds of parliamentary seats necessary to act unilaterally in appointing a president, and so it needs to pander to nationalists such as the National Action Party. Also, a stand-off between the military and the government in May, when the armed forces all but threatened a coup if the AKP's preferred presidential candidate was appointed, demonstrated that the AKP must also take into account the military's wishes in its appointments and policies. An invasion to tackle the PKK is supported within the military and could be seen as a concession to the armed forces from the AKP.

Drought in Ankara Praying for water

2007-08-16T19:55:00.001+02:00

Aug 16th 2007 | ANKARA
From The Economist print edition
A water shortage that may reflect bad management as much as drought

THE Vatican's ambassador to Turkey, Monsignor Antonio Lucibello, sees building bridges between Islam and Christianity as one of his duties. Last week, he was on a different mission: imploring God for rain, before a congregation of fellow diplomats.

His pleas, echoed by imams in sermons throughout the capital, have yet to be heard. Ankara is experiencing one of the worst droughts in recent history. The city's 4m residents have suffered protracted water rationing: some have had no running water for ten days. Nerves are stretched, as temperatures hover around 40°C. “My wife stinks, my children stink, I stink,” complained Nezih Tatlici, an accountant who said he hadn't had a bath in over a week.

The city's mayor, Melih Gokcek, faces calls to resign after advising citizens to “take a holiday” and, like him, “wash your hair, not your bodies.” What incenses them is that Mr Gokcek blames the water shortage on climate change, even though Turkey's biggest city, Istanbul, is largely unaffected. There is a drought, but Turkey is a mountainous country with lots of water. Reservoirs feeding Ankara have been allowed to fall to only 4% of capacity.

Critics point to mismanagement of resources and poor planning as the real problem. Mr Gokcek has lavished millions on parks and fountains the city can no longer keep going. In Gaziosmanpasa, an upper-class enclave, rows of grass lawns have been burnt dark brown after municipal bans on the watering of gardens. Stray dogs are dropping dead. Hygiene has become such a concern that hospitals are delaying non-critical surgery. Some embassies have rented hotel rooms so that their staff can have a bath; others have postponed official functions. This week Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, summoned Mr Gokcek to demand an explanation.

The mayor insists that a project to divert water from the nearby Kizilirmak river, supposed to be finished by November, will do the trick. Meanwhile he says the “only solution” is that “the Almighty gives us rain or snow.” A growing number of residents have a better idea: getting rid of Mr Gokcek.

Turkey Presidential troubles, again

2007-08-16T19:53:00.001+02:00

Aug 16th 2007 | ANKARA
From The Economist print edition
This time round, Abdullah Gul will surely become Turkey's president—to the annoyance of the army and the secular establishment

THERE was an ineluctable sense of déjà vu this week when Turkey's foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, declared his intention to stand for president. When Mr Gul, a former Islamist, was first nominated for the post by the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party in April, a political crisis ensued. The army threatened to intervene because of serious risks to Turkey's secular republic. Days later, the constitutional court upheld a case brought by Deniz Baykal, leader of the secular Republican People's Party (CHP), arguing that a first round of parliamentary voting to elect the president was invalid because of the lack of a quorum. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister and AK Party leader, was forced to withdraw Mr Gul's candidacy and call an early election on July 22nd, ahead of the scheduled date of November 4th.

In the event AK won almost 47% of the vote, a big jump from the 34% that first took it to single-party rule in 2002. This was a crushing defeat for the generals, who refuse to believe Mr Erdogan's repeated assertions that he and his party no longer mix politics with Islam. Magnanimous in victory, Mr Erdogan was swift to assure Turkey's shell-shocked secular elite that he was sensitive to their concerns. He even pledged to seek consensus when nominating a new president. Many took this to mean that he would choose an AK man with a tamer Islamist past—and one whose wife, unlike Hayrunnisa Gul, does not wear the Islamic-style headscarf, which is banned in all government buildings and schools.

For the army and its backers, the headscarf is an unequivocal symbol of Islamic militancy. To them, a veiled first lady would not only spell the end of Ataturk's cherished republic but also seal the ascendancy of a new, pious bourgeoisie from Turkey's Anatolian hinterland. The army also frets that a President Gul might approve several AK laws that were rejected as unconstitutional by the incumbent, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a fiercely secular judge. As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Mr Gul would also have a big say in military and other appointments.

Wary of provoking a fresh confrontation with the generals, Mr Erdogan has tried since the election to douse Mr Gul's presidential ambitions—but he has failed. The question, given his unrivalled authority over AK and his big election win, is why. The other question is how the generals, who have dislodged four elected governments since 1960, will react.

The answer to the first question is now becoming clearer. As Mr Gul himself keeps pointing out, in handing the AK such a big mandate voters were also endorsing his presidential candidacy. Indeed, “Gul for president” was a common refrain at election rallies. The AK has a moral obligation to stand by him, the Gul camp insists.

Several AK bigwigs, notably a former parliamentary speaker, Bulent Arinc, who supported Mr Gul's earlier bid, duly did so again. More important, Devlet Bahceli, leader of the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which won 71 seats, said his party would take part in a first round of balloting, giving the AK its prized quorum. With 20 Kurdish nationalist members also pledging to show up, Mr Gul is set to become president, if not in the first or second rounds of balloting, which require a two-thirds majority, then in a third round in late August, when a simple majority will be sufficient.

Few doubt that the affable Mr Gul will make a good president. Unlike the reclusive Mr Sezer, Mr Gul is a sophisticated man who speaks fluent English and has lived abroad. As foreign minister, he was the driving force behind the sweeping reforms that prodded European Union leaders into opening membership talks with Turkey in 2005. Even as he has reached out to Turkey's Arab neighbours and to Iran, Mr Gul has worked hard to restore a friendship with America that was bruised by the Iraq war. “Condi [Rice] likes him and trusts him,” says a senior American official.

Mr Gul also promises that defending secularism will be one of his “basic principles”. He has even hinted at a concession: his wife might soon knot the silk scarf that she winds tightly around her head and neck in a hipper style. Atil Kutoglu, a Vienna-based Turkish fashion designer, has been asked to come up with ideas.

If Turkey is really going Islamic, Mr Gul's supporters wonder, why did Saadet, the only overtly Islamist party, scrape a measly 2% of the vote? Nowadays, the Islamic intelligentsia seems less preoccupied with the veil than with whether it is appropriate for pious female Muslims to wear G-string knickers—because, as one luminary has opined, “they keep women in a permanent state of sexual arousal.”

None of this is likely to impress the generals, who say their views on the presidency remain unchanged. Yet “short of an outright coup there is little they can do [to stop Gul],” observes Soli Ozel, a political scientist at Istanbul's Bilgi University. Mehmet Ali Kislali, one of the rare Turkish journalists with good connections in the general staff, disagrees. “They have other means to make their weight felt,” he has argued in Radikal, a liberal daily. They could boycott presidential functions, as Mr Baykal's CHP has vowed to do. They could scale down their presence in the presidential palace. More drastically still, they could galvanise the courts into launching a case to close down the AK.

Zafer Uskul, a constitutional lawyer (and one of 150 new deputies recruited by Mr Erdogan to replace more militant party members) may have provided them with ammunition. He has opined that Kemalism (Ataturk's ideology) needs to be “expunged” from a new constitution being drafted by AK to replace the one produced by the generals after their most recent direct coup in 1980. This provoked uproar, and Mr Uskul swiftly declared that his words had been “misunderstood”.

Most commentators concur that, given the scale of AK's victory, the courts cannot touch it without leaving their own credibility in tatters. For the same reason it is hard to see the army stepping in directly. So a more likely outcome is that the generals will be forced to lick their wounds and take Mr Gul on his merits. His record suggests they have nothing to fear—if, that is, they truly believe in democracy.

Turkey Presidential troubles, again

2007-08-16T19:53:00.000+02:00

Turkey set for clashes over presidency

2007-08-14T08:52:00.000+02:00

Turkey was on Monday night facing the prospect of a renewed clash between the government and the country's powerful secular and military elite after media reports that Abdullah Gul, foreign minister, had been selected as the government's candidate for the presidency.

An official announcement of Mr Gul's candidacy was expected on Tuesday.

He is due to meet the leader of a nationalist opposition party on Tuesday to try to win enough support to secure his election by MPs when the process of appointing the new president begins in parliament next week.

The announcement of Mr Gul's candidacy for the presidency in April initiated Turkey's most serious political crisis in a decade after the powerful military, which has ousted four elected governments since 1960, accused the government of trying to undermine the country's secular political and constitutional system.

Mr Gul's wife, Hayrunisa, wears the Muslim headscarf, which is regarded as a controversial political symbol in Turkey and is banned in public and state buildings, including the presidential palace.

But the foreign minister is an immensely popular figure among the rank and file in the ruling Justice and Development party (AKP). The party has its roots in political Islam and won a huge re-election victory last month, which has given it a commanding though not decisive majority in parliament.

Turkey's president, who is elected by parliament for a seven-year term, is regarded as the embodiment of the secular republic, founded in 1923 by the soldier-statesman Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The post has usually been occupied by either a retired general or a representative of the secular parties, which governed the country for decades until the rise of the centre-right, socially conservative, pro-business AKP at the end of the 1990s.

The current president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, is a retired judge and former head of the constitutional court. He is an arch-secularist who has often vetoed legislation by the government that he considered a threat to the secular ideals of the republic. His term expired in mid-May but he has remained in the post until his successor has been chosen.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, badly wanted to avoid another clash with the military over the presidency and had hinted that there might be more than one AKP candidate for the post. But it appeared last night that pressure from the party's grassroots and from MPs close to Mr Gul ruled out that option.

There was no immediate reaction last night to Mr Gul's re-nomination. In a television interview early on Monday, Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main secular opposition Republican People's party, accused the foreign minister of being ideologically unsuited to the presidency.

Copyright The Financial Times Ltd. All rights reserved.

After Turkey's election General displeasure

2007-08-04T09:09:00.000+02:00

The army refuses to retreat

LESS than a fortnight ago, Sebahat Tuncel, a 32-year-old former nurse, was locked in an Istanbul jail, charged with membership of the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). But she jubilantly walked out after being elected to parliament on July 22nd along with 18 fellow members of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party. Ms Tuncel's newly-acquired parliamentary immunity protects her from further prosecution in a case that rested on her frequent trips to PKK camps in northern Iraq. Ms Tuncel says she was trying to find a missing brother.

It is the first time since the early 1990s that overtly nationalist Kurds have been represented in the 550-member legislature. Their presence incenses the far-right Nationalist Action Party, which took 71 seats (and whose campaign pledges include a promise to execute the captive PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan).

The Kurdish politicians, some of them lawyers who defended Mr Ocalan in court, have promised to behave. They say they will not address the inaugural session in Kurdish (their predecessors who dared to do so landed in jail). Yet some listed Turkish under “foreign languages” in résumés they submitted to parliament. Worse, none is ready publicly to condemn the PKK, even as the group intensifies its violent campaign in the predominantly Kurdish south-eastern provinces.

Turkey's meddlesome generals, who insist that those who refuse to call themselves Turks are “enemies of the state”, are not happy. Yet, the Kurdish MPs are only a minor irritant compared with the 341 members of the mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) Party who romped back to power. Indeed the generals' public accusation that the country was descending towards religious rule—and the implied threat of a coup—probably helped AK increase its share of the vote to 46.7%.

The generals' ire was provoked when the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, nominated his foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, to replace the strongly secular president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was supposed to have stepped down in May. This sparked a wave of demonstrations by millions of secular Turks, who shared the army's aversion to Mr Gul's earlier flirtation with political Islam. Many also took issue with his wife's headscarf; the garment is banned in all government buildings and schools.

Mr Gul withdrew his candidacy, and Mr Erdogan called early elections, after the constitutional court upheld opposition claims that a first round of balloting for the presidency had been invalid because parliament lacked a quorum.

Parliament reconvenes on August 4th and must choose a new president by mid-September, or fresh elections will be held. Mr Gul is campaigning for the top post once again, backed by AK's Islamist rump. Mr Erdogan is in a bind. Endorsing Mr Gul puts his government back on a collision course with the army; General Yasar Buyukanit, the chief of general staff, said the army stood by its views (and thus its opposition to Mr Gul) “with conviction”. Yet, if Mr Erdogan bows to the army's demands, he risks splitting his own party.

“Erdogan can block Gul and lose a few MPs, or back him and lose power altogether,” says a seasoned Turkey-watcher. That is, unless Mr Gul bows out.

Turkey: A litmus test for the future of democracy

2007-08-01T09:01:00.000+02:00

It was the largest support a Turkish party had gained since the 1969 legislative elections.
Erdogan faced the worst crisis of his career in April when the opposition boycotted a parliamentary vote in which his right-hand man, Foreign Minister Abdallah Gül, was almost certain to be elected president.
The crisis climaxed as the influential army warned in a stiff statement that it stood ready to step in to protect the secular system and millions of Turks took to the streets to demonstrate against the prospect of an AKP president.
The army has toppled four governments since 1960.
“The result shows that the people do not blame political tensions on the AKP”, political commentator Taha Akyol said. “The people have now authorized the AKP to elect the next president”.
The vote is “the people’s memorandum” to the army to stay out of politics, veteran journalist Hasan Cemal commented.
The AKP has disowned its roots, pledged commitment to secularism and carried out far-reaching economic and democracy reforms that ensured the start of Turkey’s European Union membership talks in 2005.
It has dismissed the opposition’s accusations that it has a secret Islamist agenda as “scare-mongering” to curb the party’s rising popularity.
Erdogan’s campaign focused on his party’s impressive economic achievements.
His government has drastically reduced inflation, maintained strong growth and attracted record foreign investment with a strong privatization drive.
It has also won credibility for easing access to medical care, providing free textbooks for schoolchildren and building cheap lodgings for the poor.
“The AKP’s economic success was the key factor in its victory”, commented economist Eser Karakas. “The army’s warning [that the secular system was under threat] was not taken seriously”.
The support the AKP garnered should translate into 339 seats in the 550-member Parliament, enough for it to once again form a government on its own.
The party had 352 members in the outgoing house and even though support for it increased by 12 percentage points compared to 2002, the number of its seats will decline because more parties will be represented in the legislature.
The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), a secularist party, finished second with 20.9 percent of vote and an estimated 112 seats, according to unofficial results. The right-wing Nationalist Action Party (MHP) was third with 14.2 percent and 71 seats.
No other party passed the 10-percent national threshold needed to enter Parliament, but 28 independent candidates won seats, 24 of them Kurds campaigning for broader rights for their sizeable community.
As soon as the new Parliament opens, its first task will be to elect a new president.
Erdogan has said he will seek a compromise in the presidential election, but insists that the candidate must be from his party.

The ‘evolution’ of ex-Islamists
Erdogan’s stunning victory in the polls has firmly placed his party at the center of Turkish politics -- a rare example of a radical Islamist movement evolving into a democratic force, analysts say.
“Rather than Islamization, we saw an Islamist-rooted party entrenching itself in the democratic tradition of the right”, commented Nilufer Gole, a professor of sociology and an expert on Islamist movements.
“This is a success for Turkey’s pluralist parliamentary system. This could well be an example of the evolution of a radical Islamist movement”.
Turkish newspapers said Erdogan’s success also signalled a public backlash against the military, which threatened the government in April over the AKP’s intention to install one of its members as president.
Erdogan was forced to bring elections forward from November after the opposition boycotted the parliamentary vote to elect the next head of state and the army told the government it would intervene to preserve secularism if need be.
But unlike past leaders who bowed to military pressure, Erdogan faced up to the generals, firmly reminding them that they remain under the orders of the prime minister.
“The first message from the ballot boxes is that the people stood by their democratic choice”, the daily Milliyet said.
“The nation has had the last word”, the moderate Islamist Zaman said.
Erdogan was once a religious firebrand who, as mayor of Istanbul, banned alcohol at municipal cafes, urged Turks to choose between Islam and secularism and served jail time for religious sedition.
But in a dramatic turnaround in 2001, the charismatic 53-year-old and his dissident colleagues in a now-banned Islamist party created the AKP, describing themselves as conservative democrats and pledging allegiance to secularism.
The AKP rode to office on its own as an untested party in the 2002 elections, when voters punished center-right and center-left parties for the country’s worst recession since World War II.
Since then, the AKP government has won kudos from the business community for reducing chronic inflation, maintaining high growth and enacting several democracy reforms that allowed it launch membership talks with the European Union in 2005.
“The AKP has embraced all sections of society. Business leaders are voting for the AKP, but so are their workers”, the political commentator Fatih Altayli said.
That kind of support differs largely from past Islamist parties, which relied mainly on pious voters in rural areas and ignored the urban educated classes.
Unofficial results show that one of two voters chose the AKP, allowing it to win even in constituencies that are traditionally seen as center-left or nationalist strongholds, analysts say.
“Since the 1950s, people have voted for change and renovation, not the status quo. There is nothing more to say in the light of what the AKP has achieved in the past five years”, former Parliament Speaker Hikmet Cetin said.

Pledge of reform
“Our democracy has successfully passed a test.... Our unity, democracy and the republic have emerged stronger from the ballot box”, Erdogan told cheering supporters outside party headquarters under a shower of fireworks.
“We will never make concessions from the basic principles of the republic. We will pursue economic and democracy reforms with determination”, Erdogan said, pledging also commitment to the secular system and Turkey’s EU membership bid.
That reform program was also stressed by the European Union, with officials holding out the carrot of membership if it was pursued.
But French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who has vocally opposed Turkey joining the EU, showed no indication of changing position, even as he telephoned Erdogan to welcome “his remarkable victory”.
He hoped “our relations of trust will continue despite the divergences France and Turkey may have”, according to a spokesman.
The prospect of a new government with a strong mandate for its business- and EU-friendly policies sent Turkish shares to a record high, closing five percent up.
The polls were largely seen as a litmus test for the future of democracy in the country after the abortive presidential election.
Turkish newspapers were nearly unanimous in ascribing the AKP’s success in large part to a public rejection of military meddling in democratic politics.
“The people do not like governments that quarrel with the soldiers, but the people also do not like military intervention”, the mass-circulation Hurriyet said.

EU leaders urge redoubling of reform efforts
European Union officials welcomed the AKP’s resounding electoral win and urged the country to push ahead with reforms that could lead to EU membership.
European newspapers called the result of the vote a sharp rebuke to the secular military and a turning point for the nation’s democracy.
EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn urged Turkey to redouble its efforts on European Union-oriented reform.
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said the vote came “at an important moment for the people of Turkey as the country moves forward with political and economic reforms”.
The commission’s vice president, Franco Frattini, told Italian newspapers there was an “equilibrium” in the vote results that staved off “the risk of an extremist drift”.
Turkey was made an official candidate to join the European Union in October 2005 but its long quest to join Europe’s 27-country club has been dogged by problems.
The EU froze talks in December with Turkey on eight of the 35 policy areas, or chapters, that all aspiring members must complete because of Ankara’s ongoing trade dispute with Cyprus.
Some chapters have since been reopened.
The Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant called the election “a clear no to the military”, commenting that “Turkish voters have grown weary of the old political class that has proclaimed itself guardian of the country”.
In France, the right-wing Le Figaro said the vote was “a turning point in modern Turkish history. The country can now look for new ways to try to reconcile the un-reconcilable: secularism and religion”.
The center-left daily Der Tagesspiegel in Germany, which has a large Turkish population, said Erdogan had won a clear mandate to press forward with his drive to bring Turkey closer to the European Union.
“Despite the increased Europe-scepticism of the Turks, it is a clear signal”, it wrote in a front-page editorial. “Europe must get prepared for the Turks to knock harder on the door of the EU soon”.
Sweden’s Dagens Nyheter daily agreed, saying Erdogan “can now follow through on his prudent political reforms” leading Turkey toward the European Union.
In neighboring Greece, newspapers spoke of changes in relations between the two rivals.
“The new Turkish political scene hides traps that demand we adapt our policies”, the left-leaning Ta Nea wrote in an editorial.
Greek Prime Minister Constantin Caramanlis congratulated Erdogan on his election victory and, in a clear reference to Cyprus, said he hoped it would contribute to Turkey “fulfilling all the obligations” for EU membership.
Dutch Foreign Ministry spokesman Robert Dekker told reporters he hoped the new government would continue with reforms “important for the development of democracy and membership of the European Union”.
In Israel, foreign ministry spokesman Mark Regev said: “Israel looks forward to continue expanding our relationship of cooperation and friendship with Turkey.”
Turkey has been a key ally of Israel since 1996 when the two countries signed a military cooperation deal, much to the anger of Arab countries and Iran.

Gül looks towards the Presidency
Gul hinted strongly last week that he could run for president again after his party’s victory.
Asked whether he would be a candidate again when the new Parliament meets next month for a fresh presidential vote, he told reporters that his decision was “very clear”, but declined to elaborate.
“I cannot be expected to ignore the will of the people... the signs given at the rallies,” he said, referring to supporters who cheered him as a future president at election campaign rallies.
But he stressed that “there is no need to rush things,” saying the process must continue “with great political maturity in the direction indicated by the results” of the election.
“We have a period of evaluation ahead of us... I believe the other parties in parliament will carefully consider the nearly 50 percent of the vote that we obtained”.
The main opposition Republican People’s Party, a key player in the April crisis, quickly responded that Gul’s Islamist past remained an insurmountable obstacle to his election as head of state.
“We will not support a person who comes from [a radical Islamist] tradition and who has not embraced Ataturk’s principles”, said CHP deputy chairman Mustafa Ozyurek, referring to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey.
Secularists take special exception to the fact that Gül’s wife always wears a headscarf in public, which she would presumably continue to do if her husband was elected. They complain that the presence in the presidential palace of someone wearing a religious symbol would be in flagrant contradiction to the country secular tradition.
If Gül is again put up as a candidate, Ozyurek said his party would again boycott the presidential vote.
The third party that entered Parliament, the Nationalist Action Party, as well as 28 independents, had not yet said whether they will support Gül.
Opponents charge that with Gul in the presidential palace, the AKP will have a free hand to advance what some see as the party’s hidden policy of eroding the separation between state and religion.
Outgoing President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a hard-line secularist, often vetoed laws he deemed anti-secular and blocked the appointment of senior officials he saw as Islamist government cronies.
And lingering suspicions about the party have been fuelled by its opposition to a headscarf ban in universities and public offices, its encouragement of religious schools and failed attempts to restrict alcohol sales and make adultery a jailable offense.

http://www.mmorning.com

POORER, LESS EDUCATED VOTERS PREFER TURKEY’S AK PARTY

2007-08-01T08:59:00.000+02:00

By Gareth Jenkins

Tuesday, July 31, 2007

A close look at voting patterns in the July 22 Turkish general election suggests that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has broadened its electoral base while retaining its grassroots support among lower-income groups and the more conservative sections of society.

Yesterday, July 30, the Turkish Supreme Electoral Board announced the official results of the July 22 election. The AK Party finished first with 46.5% of the vote and 341 seats in Turkey’s 550-member unicameral parliament, ahead of the Republican Populist Party (CHP) with 20.8% and 112 seats and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) with 14.3% and 70 seats. Another 26 seats were won by independents, including 23 former members of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP). One seat remains vacant following the death of a deputy from the MHP on July 26 (NTV, July 30).

In the run up to the elections the AK Party repeatedly attempted to shake off its Islamist image and portray itself as a party of the center-right (Today’s Zaman, July 18). Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan refused to allow 20 hard-line Islamist MPs who had won seats in the 2002 elections to run as AK Party candidates in the July 22 elections. He also included a number of prominent liberals, and even former leftists, in the party’s candidate list. Most were elected on July 22 and several are expected to be named as ministers when the new AK Party government is announced in early August (Turkish Daily News, July 24).

However, most of the hard-line Islamist MPs excluded from the AK Party’s slate had publicly criticized what they regarded as Erdogan’s “authoritarian” style of leadership, Many other equally hard-line AK Party deputies who chose not to criticize Erdogan were allowed to stand for reelection (Milliyet, June 7). Most decisions within the AK Party are taken by Erdogan himself in consultation with an inner court of advisors and prominent ministers. The expectation is that, even if there are new faces in the Council of Ministers, the decision-making core of the AK Party will remain unchanged (Milliyet, July 25).

Public opinion polls conducted in the run-up to the July 22 election suggest that the AK Party retained its traditional grassroots support while also attracting new supporters who had previously voted for nationalist or center-right parties, primarily as a result of the party’s record since winning the November 2002 election (Radikal, July 26). In a survey conducted by the A&G research company on July 7-8, 75.8% of those who said that they would vote for the AK Party cited its record in power as one of the main reasons, compared with 51.4% who said it was because they felt an ideological affinity with the party (Milliyet, July 27).

The surveys also underlined the demographic factors behind the AK Party’s electoral success. Some 57.7% of respondents with only elementary school education indicated that they would vote for the AK Party, compared with 45.2% of those with high school education and 31.6% of university graduates. In contrast, 39.8% percent of university graduates indicated that they would vote for the CHP, compared with 22.1% of high school graduates and 13.6% of those with only elementary school education.

The disparities were even more striking when voting preferences were analyzed on the basis of income. Approximately 55% of those who earned less than $250 a month said that they would vote for the AK Party, falling to 23% for those who earned more than $2,500 a month. The CHP secured the support of just 8% of those earning less $250 a month but of 50% of those who earned more than $2,500 (Radikal, July 26).

Although the AK Party has tried to shake off its Islamist image, it appears to have retained the support of Islamists who voted for it in 2002. The only other party in Turkey that is perceived as having an Islamist agenda is the Felicity Party (SP), which is led by former prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. According to the official results of the July 22 elections, the SP won 2.3% of the vote, down from 2.5% in November 2002.

Although there is no reason to suspect that it is preparing to introduce a radical Islamist agenda, since its landslide election victory the AK Party has been less circumspect when it comes to playing down its Islamist credentials. On July 30, Kursad Tuzmen, the current state minister responsible for Foreign Trade, who is expected to retain his position in the new Council of Ministers, told a meeting of Turkish exporters that Turkey would soon sign preferential trade agreements with what he described as “18 Islamic countries” (Milliyet, July 31). Tuzmen said that Turkish officials had been working on the agreements for five years and expected them to be signed in September (Turkish Daily News, July 31). Not only would the agreements appear to be ideologically motivated, but they would also violate the terms of Turkey’s 1995 Customs Union Agreement with the EU, which came into force on January 1, 1996, and forbids Turkey from extending preferential trading status to any country with which the EU does not have a similar agreement.

Turning point for Turkey

2007-07-31T08:59:00.000+02:00

Pran Chopra July 30, 2007

Writing on this page in the middle of May this year, I had suggested that “far from being too far away to worry about” the situation that was then developing in Turkey, should “concern everyone”. The core of that situation was the elections that were impending in the country. Now, the results have burst upon the scene with such energy that they will not only impact Turkey, but also the whole of West Asia, the European Union, Russia and the United States. In fact, it will affect anyone with a stake in democracy and in the future of secular politics, whether democratic or not.

As in May, so now, the future of Turkey and its role in the region rest upon what happens to the legacy left behind by Kemal Ataturk, one of the country’s most daringly inventive leaders. He set Turkey firmly on the path to becoming a secular society, which would also aim to become democratic. Since then, the domestic polity of Turkey has rested upon a balance between secular values and democratic practices.

But in recent years, democracy has thrown up some political parties, including the present ruling party, the AKP, whose secular credentials have begun to be questioned. This has become more insistent since last week’s elections, as some of the smaller parties are trying to make up for their electoral deficit with a more strident display of secular credentials.

So, on the one hand, there is the AKP, which is still a bit short of absolute majority on its own, but whose electoral credentials are now stronger than after the preceding elections in 2002. On the other hand, there is the main opposition party, which claims to be as democratic but is seen as more secular. Between, behind and above these rivals stands another inheritor of Ataturk Turk’s legacy — the army. It used to be able to pull any party back if it thought that in the name of democracy, the party was straying too far from Ataturk’s standards of secularism. It did that even to the AKP, and that too as recently as in 2003, when that party tried to elect Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as President. The army stepped in because it suspected his secularism.

But can the army intervene now, in the face of a much stronger electoral performance by the AKP? The political party certainly has the numbers in the legislature to override the army’s intervention. Provisions in the Constitution can come in the way of an intervention by the army, or even in the way of the AKP if it turns upon the army.

But then, what will the defeat of democracy at the hands of the army do to the AKP’s claim that Turkey is now democratic enough to be admitted to the EU? And will Turkey still be accepted by the EU if its secular credentials are dented by what the AKP might do in domestic politics — for example, by electing Abdullah Gul as President?

These are contradictory issues to be weighed in the scales by Turkey as it decides in the coming weeks whether to obey the electoral mandate and change domestic polity the way the AKP may want, or to look over its shoulders at European secularists. But the consequences of what it chooses to do will go far beyond Turkey so long as the country is driven in one direction by its longing to join the EU and in the opposite by the powerful non-secular thrust that the latest elections have given to the country’s emerging politics.

The burden of choosing falls upon Turkey at a time when contrary impulses are making marriages of convenience in parts

of West Asia and the Mediterranean. For example, Palestine has already caused ripples in Arab politics by putting the crown of democracy upon the ultra-radical Hamas. What ambitions will that kindle in the breast of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, where the Islamic streak in democratic politics has been held in check only by corruption in Cairo and the power of US patronage? Or in much of north-eastern Africa, where democracy is trying to find its feet in the wake of rebel armies? Or in Iraq, where it is sure already that democracy will not sell if it is secular? Or, above all, in Iran, and in its neighbour Afghanistan, whose own neighbour is Pakistan?

What paths will Europe, the US and Russia choose in wooing possible friends and allies in this increasingly complex market? All three are in an expanding mood, and will happily jettison some of their own values to expand their respective zones of influence. But who will buy what, and in which currency, when the bazaar itself is vacillating between democracy and secularism?

Pran Chopra is a political analyst and former Chief Editor, The Statesman.

Islam and democracy The lesson from Turkey

2007-07-28T10:25:00.000+02:00

Jul 26th 2007
From The Economist print edition
Islamist parties that follow the rules should be allowed to win elections

THE decisive victory by Turkey's ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party in the general election of July 22nd shows every sign so far of having been an excellent result. Big political rows, threats of military intervention, talk of invading northern Iraq, resurgent nationalism and discouraging relations with Europe and America: all that plus a mildly Islamist government in a fiercely secular republic could have been a recipe for trouble, coups, internal strife, you name it. But in fact Turkey has seen a thoroughly democratic election, not too much violence, a big turnout and a clear result (see article).

Among other things this seems a strong rebuke by voters to the army, which had hinted at interfering in the AK's choice of a presidential candidate. Though Turks still respect their army, most do not feel it should intervene in politics. They are also rewarding a government that has delivered good results and punishing opposition parties that offered incoherent and unconvincing policies. That is exactly how democracy should work. The army has absolutely no cause to intervene, though if the government is wise it will continue to be cautious about an Islamist agenda. Many Turkish voters may want to end the ban on the veil, but they show little appetite for more radical moves away from secularism.

Is there a lesson in Turkey for the future of democracy in the wider Muslim world? Yes, but approach with care. There are many paths to democracy, and the right choice varies from place to place. Turkey has an exceptional history. Simplifying mightily, its bumpy path to democratisation goes roughly as follows: set up an empire; inherit a caliphate; fight on the losing side in a world war; in desperation dissolve the caliphate and submit to the autocratic rule of a moderniser who pushes Islam ruthlessly to the margins; then wait the better half of a century for the emergence of an Islamist party that looks mild and moderate enough to be trusted with the reins of government. In short, squeeze Islam out of political life for decades before gingerly allowing a tamed version back in.
Learning from calamity

The trouble with this approach (apart from the long wait) is that things can go calamitously wrong both at the squeezing-out stage and at the letting-in stage. For an example of the first, look at Iran, Turkey's neighbour. From the 1920s on Reza Shah strove consciously to imitate the secular reforms of Kemal Ataturk by modernising his own country's economy and society at a furious rate and forcibly reducing the role of Islam. Iranians did not take kindly to this force-fed modernisation. The ironic upshot, one less effectual shah later, was the Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, in which the clerics the shahs had tried to squeeze out of the picture seized ultimate power for themselves, and have kept it ever since.

For an example of how things can go wrong at the letting-in stage, remember Algeria in 1992. In this case a secular leadership lost its nerve at the point when it had to decide whether the opposition Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was in fact moderate enough to be allowed to take office after a landslide win in parliamentary elections. In the end the ruling party and army decided against. They cancelled the second round of elections, with catastrophic consequences. In the ensuing decade-long civil war some 200,000 Algerians were killed.

At the time, Algeria's decision to bar the Islamists from power was supported by leaders throughout the Arab world. Their argument was that parties such as the FIS were not true democrats. Once in power, it was alleged, they would never let it go: it would be “one man, one vote, one time”. In the case of the FIS, Algerians were prevented from putting the party's intentions to the test. But it is striking that precisely the same accusation has long been levelled at the AK in Turkey. Its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, did indeed once say that democracy was a train, from which you could alight once you reached your destination. As prime minister, however, he and his party appear to have got the gist of what democracy really means. There is now no serious doubt that the AK would surrender power if it were to be defeated at the ballot box.

Why so? Some will say that the answer resides in Turkey's secular constitution and the presence of a fiercely secular army that is ready to step into politics the moment politicians threaten to cross the line. That may be too cynical. Another real and arguably stronger discipline on the AK arises from the experience of democracy itself. Mr Erdogan's party knows that its continuing political success and underlying legitimacy depend on listening closely to the desires of voters, which in turn requires it to moderate its Islamist ambitions and obey the rules of the democratic game.

If there is a broader lesson the Islamic world can draw from Turkey's success, it therefore lies in this. Islamist parties that declare themselves willing to abide by the rules ought to be allowed to participate fully in electoral politics. Though this prescription may sound obvious, it has yet to be swallowed in the places where it is needed most. In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood remains squeezed out of formal politics despite its growing popularity. High time now to let it in.

Elections in Turkey The burden of victory

2007-07-26T19:16:00.001+02:00

EVEN fans of Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, were surprised by the scale of his success. His mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party won 47% of the vote on July 22nd, a 12-point increase in the vote that swept him to office in 2002. During the campaign those who had predicted the success, such as Taha Erdem, a respected pollster, were accused of taking sides. “A fat lie,” declared Mine Kirikkanat, a pro-secular commentator, who has since had to eat her words. Others who have been soundly rebuked by the voters include the army, which helped to precipitate the early elections by trying to block AK's choice of candidate as Turkey's new president.

Mr Erdogan's gamble in going to the voters paid off. Turnout was a record 85%, with millions of Turks cutting short beach holidays to cast their ballots. AK secured 341 of the 550 seats in the parliament, allowing it once again to form a government on its own, but short of the two-thirds needed to force through its choice of president. Mr Erdogan may be strengthened, but he will still need all of the political deftness that has got him this far.

The breadth of Mr Erdogan's success is best illustrated by the new political map: nearly all of Turkey's 81 provinces, including seven mainly Kurdish ones, are painted in the AK party's yellow hue. Female representation in parliament doubled with some 50 women winning seats—more than ever before. The party's liberalising political reforms, which persuaded EU leaders to begin long-delayed membership talks with Turkey in 2005, played a part in the victory. But above all it was the government's economic performance—7.3% average annual growth, record foreign investment and lower inflation—that won the day.

AK draws much of its support from poorer Turks. “I don't have to stand in line for hours to see a doctor and electricity prices have not gone up,” explained Necla Evin, a cleaning lady. But the markets also responded enthusiastically, pushing the Turkish lira to its highest level against the American dollar in over two years. Share prices soared on the main index of Istanbul's stock exchange.

Accepting victory at his party's headquarters in Ankara, Mr Erdogan told the crowd that democracy had triumphed, and quickly pledged to keep up efforts to join the European Union (despite nay-saying from France and other EU countries). Mr Erdogan also tried to soothe the many urban and middle-class Turks who fear his party is bent on unravelling decades of secularism established under the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk. “No matter who you voted for, I respect your choice,” Mr Erdogan said. “Your differences are our country's richness.”

However, his promise to seek consensus on a new president was being tested within days as Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister whose presidential nomination had provoked the crisis, hinted that he would make a fresh run. “I cannot ignore the signal from the streets,” said Mr Gul, referring to his supporters' frenzied chants of “Gul for president” during the campaign.

The attempt to elevate Mr Gul to the powerful presidency had prompted millions of pro-secular Turks, wary of Mr Gul's earlier flirtation with political Islam, to take to the streets. Their fears were symbolised by the Islamic headscarf, banned in all government buildings and schools, worn by the wives of both Mr Gul and Mr Erdogan. Tensions grew sharply after the army, claiming to detect a dangerous slide to Islamism, threatened to intervene. The constitutional court upheld opposition arguments that a first round of balloting to elect Mr Gul had been invalid, on the ground that parliament lacked a quorum, forcing Mr Erdogan to call fresh elections four months ahead of schedule.

Turkey's friends agree that as a seasoned diplomat with determinedly pro-Western views, Mr Gul would make a fine head of state. Yet, having vetoed him once, will the generals back down? Their hand has been weakened by the poor showing of the Republican People's Party (CHP), founded by Ataturk, which failed to capitalise on the anxieties of pro-secular Turks, winning just 21% of the vote. Turkey's secular elite feels more vulnerable than ever before. “The dominant feeling among secularists is one of shock, impotence, fury and despair,” wrote Meral Tamer in the pro-establishment daily, Milliyet.

Mr Erdogan will have to move carefully. The CHP's leader, Deniz Baykal, is ignoring calls to step down and is certain to keep up his opposition if Mr Gul is nominated again. Lacking the two-thirds of parliamentary seats needed to form a quorum for a presidential vote, Mr Erdogan will have to turn for support to the far-right National Action Party (MHP), which took 71 seats (after winning none the last time round). The inscrutable MHP leader, Devlet Bahceli, has suggested he will co-operate, but he is likely to keep up pressure on Mr Erdogan to allow the army to enter northern Iraq in response to an upsurge in attacks by separatist rebels of the Kurdistan Workers' Party. Mr Erdogan may also have to lobby some 20 independents, most of them nationalist Kurds, who made it into the parliament.

Mr Erdogan has only cautiously endorsed a fresh candidacy by Mr Gul, perhaps because he does not want to pick a new fight with the generals. It was in deference to their sensitivities that Mr Erdogan dropped some 150 AK deputies, many of them Islamist ideologues, in favour of milder, more cosmopolitan candidates. This shift to the centre was also tailored to attract votes from Turks who never considered voting for AK before, notes Peter Van Praagh, senior director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Now that AK has support from mainstream Turks, he argues, the party will have to respond to their needs.

The party's conservative core supporters, however, may have other ideas. They see the party slipping out of their hands and may push Mr Erdogan to return to the issues dear to their hearts, but which Mr Erdogan has postponed during his four years in office: repealing the ban on Islamic headscarves, restricting further the influence of the army and lifting more of the restrictions on ethnic Kurds. As Mr Erdogan noted in his victory speech, “The burden of responsibility on our party is much bigger than before.” It may prove bigger than he wished for.

2007-07-25T13:45:00.001+02:00

LARA EN ESTAMBUL (10)

2007-07-25T13:38:00.000+02:00

Turkey's election A battle for the future

2007-07-21T10:46:00.001+02:00

Jul 19th 2007 | ANKARA, DIYARBAKIR AND ISTANBUL
From The Economist print edition
The importance of this weekend's election goes well beyond Turkey itself

ON JULY 22nd Turkey, still an adolescent democracy, goes to the polls. The event is being followed carefully far from its own borders. For one thing, the country is of huge strategic importance. It borders the European Union to the west and the Caucasus, Iran, Iraq and Syria to the east and south. Iraq is especially crucial, as Turkey's army is threatening to invade its northern region to root out Kurdish terrorists there. Outsiders are also monitoring Turkey as one of the Muslim world's rare examples of a working democracy.

The election contest has been joyless if feverish, marked by huge rallies and demonstrations that suggest there will be a big voter turnout. Only this week an independent candidate was shot dead as he was being driven away from a TV studio in Istanbul. But underlying the tensions is a battle over which way Turkey's democracy will go.

The first fusillade in this battle was fired on April 27th when the army, claiming to detect a dangerous slide towards Islamic radicalism, threatened to intervene against the government. In a late-night statement posted on the general staff's website, it spoke ominously of risks to Ataturk's secular republic. In a country with a history of military coups, the so-called “e-coup” promptly sparked a political crisis that led to the early election. Since then, it has cast a pall over the entire campaign.

The proximate trigger for the army's threat was the decision by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister and leader of the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party, to nominate his foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, to replace President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a former judge who was due to step down on May 16th. Like Mr Erdogan, Mr Gul once dabbled in political Islam. More to the point, both men's wives wear the Muslim headscarf, which in accordance with Ataturk's secular tradition is banned in all public buildings.

The army, always suspicious of the AK Party because of its Islamist roots, deemed the prospect of such a president a threat to the secular republic. Despite the government's big parliamentary majority, Deniz Baykal, the leader of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), managed to stop Mr Gul's election by dubiously claiming in the constitutional court that parliament lacked a quorum of 367 deputies in its first round of balloting. Egged on by the generals, the court came down on Mr Baykal's side. Meanwhile, millions of secular Turks took to the streets to protest against the government. Many were urban middle-class women, plainly fearing that their carefree lifestyles were at stake.

The combined pressure proved too strong: Mr Erdogan withdrew Mr Gul's candidacy and called a general election before the scheduled date of November 4th. But in a burst of defiance, he also rammed through a constitutional change to let the people elect the next president themselves. Mr Sezer, who has continued in office as a caretaker, vetoed this. Mr Baykal, who has built a career on trashing rivals without producing ideas of his own, lodged a fresh complaint with the constitutional court. Unexpectedly, however—or perhaps because it wished to salvage its reputation—the court this time backed the government.

The new parliament must now decide whether to go for a direct election of the president or to stick with the present rules. Under these, if parliament fails to agree on a president within 45 days, it will have to dissolve itself and call yet another election. Thanks to Mr Baykal, a quorum is now needed, a complication that may allow opposition parties to paralyse the whole process. Mr Gul has hinted that he will re-present himself as a presidential candidate, but Mr Erdogan has also talked of putting together a possible list of nominees in consultation with the opposition.
Checking the record

To most Turkish voters, however, the election is about much more than the presidency and secularism. It is, in effect, a referendum on the AK Party's record in office, which is strikingly good (see chart 1). Never previously in power at national level, Mr Erdogan and his fellow Islamists have done more to transform and modernise Turkey than any of their secular predecessors except Ataturk and perhaps Turgut Ozal, a visionary prime minister in the 1980s. From the hardscrabble Kurdish provinces to the shiny new suburbs of Istanbul, the effects of AK's “silent revolution” are evident everywhere.

In the Kurds' unofficial capital, Diyarbakir, Kurdish women were recently ululating appreciatively as Mehdi Eker, the farm minister, reeled off the government's achievements and goals: average annual growth of 7.3% (nearly four times the EU figure), a record $20 billion in foreign direct investment, $40 billion in tourism earnings by 2013. “We gave your children free textbooks, brought the internet to their schools, and water to all your villages,” said Mr Eker. He was speaking the most common Kurdish dialect, Kurmanji. Until the AK Party passed a raft of constitutional and judicial changes, he might have been jailed on separatism charges for doing so.

It was largely thanks to these constitutional changes, as well as to an improving economy, that the EU agreed to open membership talks with Turkey in 2005, a goal that most previous Turkish governments aspired to but none came close to achieving. Many European and American diplomats agree that Mr Erdogan is the man most fit to lead Turkey. Their views are plainly shared by millions of Turkish voters, who recall the protracted squabbles, economic mismanagement and massive corruption of the string of secular coalitions that crippled Turkey before AK.

Indeed, opinion polls suggest that the voters may give AK quite a bit more than the 34% that catapulted it to single-party rule in the November 2002 election (when only one other party, the CHP, got above the 10% threshold for parliamentary representation). The polls suggest that at least one other party, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), will enter parliament this time, along with some 30 candidates from the Kurdish Democratic Turkey Party (DTP), who are running as independents to get round the 10% threshold.

Thus, even if AK gets a bigger share of the vote than in 2002, it will probably have a smaller majority and it might even be unable to rule alone. On the other hand, if it were to win a sufficiently big majority (two-thirds of the 550 parliamentary seats) to change the constitution and force through its own choice of president, the army might well step in. “This [election] is a stick with shit at both ends,” says one AK bigwig. “The choice is between a weak government or a military coup.”

That may be an exaggeration. Yet, looking back, some AK officials concede that they could have handled the row over the presidency better. As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has considerable power. He can approve the expulsion of overtly pious officers, and he appoints judges and university rectors. He can also veto legislation deemed to violate the secular constitution. To the generals, as to the millions of secular demonstrators, no AK man can be trusted in this role. They argue that Mr Erdogan (who originally wanted the job for himself) should have reached out to the opposition and agreed on a candidate outside his own party.

Secular suspicions of the AK government had already been fanned, not least by the controversial education minister, Huseyin Celik. Mr Celik, who is said to have close links to the powerful Islamic Nur fraternity, has been accused of injecting Islam by stealth. He has overseen a revision of textbooks to promote creationism and the recruitment, as teachers, of hundreds of graduates of imam hatip, Islamic clerical-training schools. There has also been “an explosion in enrolment at Koran lessons, especially among girls,” says Alattin Dincer, president of Turkey's largest teachers' union. No wonder Mr Celik had to explain himself in a meeting with the chief of the general staff, Yasar Buyukanit, shortly after the army's e-coup.

Attempts by a few AK mayors to create booze-free zones, as well as Mr Erdogan's own failed effort in 2005 to outlaw adultery, have not helped the party's image with secularists. Yet none of this amounts to a tilt towards sharia law. Indeed, even the AK's fiercest critics are hard-pressed to point to a single act that violates secularism. If anything, most pundits reckon that the army's salvoes may have boosted Mr Erdogan's support. Banking on continued stability under a second term of AK government, foreign investors have been propelling the Istanbul stock exchange to record highs.

In truth, many AK reforms have upset the party's own conservative constituents—especially the scrapping of a law that put husbands in charge of their households. Plenty are disgruntled by the government's failure to loosen restrictions on the headscarf. All 62 female candidates fielded by AK are bareheaded. “We can't put our democracy at risk just for the headscarf, so we've frozen the issue for now,” explains Ayse Bohurler, an Erdogan party chief who sports a tightly wound scarf.

What is more, Mr Erdogan has dropped some 150 deputies, many of them Islamist firebrands who in March 2003 voted against letting American troops invade Iraq through Turkey. He has replaced them with an array of new faces, among them a high-flying Kurdish investment banker, a writer from the liberal Muslim Alevi faith and a famous cartoonist's wife. Ever the pragmatist, “Erdogan drew the right lesson from those [pro-secular] rallies,” asserts a senior Bush administration official.
Unimpressed in Istanbul

Behind the walled privacy of Istanbul's oldest social club, the scions of Turkey's moneyed class are unimpressed. They cling to the spectre of a battle between Islamic radicals and Ataturk's disciples. “This election is about the survival of the republic. I will vote for Ataturk's party [the CHP],” squawks a septuagenarian socialite. Like fellow members of the Cercle d'Orient, her aversion to the Islamists is profoundly snobbish. The real worry is the shift of wealth from an old industrial elite towards a new bourgeoisie made up of pious Anatolian entrepreneurs, who have thrived since AK came to power.

The generals have different concerns. Among the reforms that earned Turkey its prized date to open membership talks with the EU were provisions to trim the influence of the army. The National Security Council, where the generals used to bark orders to the politicians, has been reduced to an advisory role. Civilians can no longer be tried in military courts. The generals' powers would be shorn further if Turkey ever joined the EU.

Yet that prospect seems to be receding. The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as France's president is a blow, because he is strongly against Turkey's EU membership. The French recently blocked the opening of a chapter in Turkey's negotiations with the EU on the ground that it was relevant only to full membership, not some form of looser association. French doubts are widely shared in Europe: only Britain and Sweden are now forthright in pressing the case for admitting Turkey. The impasse in Cyprus, to which Turkey refuses to extend its customs union with the EU so long as Turkish northern Cyprus is ostracised by the rest of the world, has become an excuse for all who want to slow down or stop Turkey's membership talks.

Not surprisingly, popular support in Turkey for the EU has fallen back from the highs of two years ago. Yet although the EU is one of Turkey's two big foreign-policy problems, it has hardly been mentioned during the election campaign. “The EU doesn't sell in Anatolia,” comments Murat Mercan, an AK deputy.

The EU's focus on issues such as free speech and minority rights has also helped to feed a dangerous nationalism. This was most chillingly demonstrated in January when a Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor, Hrant Dink, was shot dead by a 17-year-old because he had “insulted the Turks”. Three months later a group of youths in the eastern city of Malatya slit the throats of three Protestant missionaries after torturing them. This week the Istanbul-based Armenian patriarch, Mesrob Mutafyan II, said he had received threats to blow up his headquarters.

“Testosterone-driven nationalism is the biggest problem in Turkey,” says one foreign banker in Istanbul. Ali Babacan, the economy minister, agrees. “Our biggest failure has been to create jobs for around 700,000 Turks who enter the labour market every year,” he adds. Mr Babacan is also Turkey's top EU negotiator, and he still aims to be ready for membership by 2013. “Sarkozy will change,” he says. “The EU cannot violate its obligations.”
The Iraq conundrum

Renewed nationalism is also affecting Turkey's other big foreign-policy issue: northern Iraq. Sitting in his offices in Washington, DC, Qubad Talabani, the youthful representative of the Kurds' quasi-independent state in northern Iraq, says that he and his kin are “bracing for a storm”. Mr Talabani, who happens to be the son of the Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani, is talking about what may follow Turkey's election. For the new political landscape is likely to determine whether the army makes good on its repeated threats to attack separatist guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) who are based in northern Iraq.

An invasion by NATO's second-biggest army would not only destabilise the only fairly calm bit of Iraq. It would also wreck Turkey's relations with America and the EU. Worse, it might not succeed: the Turks, too, could easily end up bogged down and unable to defeat an insurgency.

An upsurge in PKK attacks has killed over 200 Turkish soldiers since the start of the year. Each new Turkish casualty is bringing votes to the MHP, which is led by an enigmatic former economics professor, Devlet Bahceli. Even his most avid supporters were unnerved when Mr Bahceli flung a hangman's noose at his audience during a rally in the eastern city of Erzurum. The MHP leader has vowed, if he becomes prime minister, to reintroduce the death penalty and execute the imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan.

Like the generals, Mr Bahceli is also keen to clobber some 3,500 PKK militants who are sheltering in northern Iraq. America's failure to do the job is the biggest cause of rampant anti-American feelings in Turkey. Support for America is now down to 9%, lower even than in the occupied Palestinian territories, according to a Pew Global Attitudes Survey (see chart 2).

Many Turks reckon that America is reluctant to attack the PKK because it secretly wants to establish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which would encompass the oil-rich province of Kirkuk and, possibly, chunks of south-eastern Turkey. Mr Gul has complained that PKK fighters are carrying American-made weapons. America has denied responsibility. Meanwhile, Turkish troops continue to mass along the Iraqi border. Iraqi Kurdish leaders say their fledgling entity, not the PKK, is Turkey's real target.

Turkish sensitivities are perhaps best explained by their imperial past. Between 1878 and 1918 the Ottoman empire lost 85% of its territory and 75% of its population. “The fear of obliteration was a constant presence throughout the empire's long demise,” notes an Ottoman historian, Taner Akcam. The belief that Western powers are bent on dismembering Turkey remains strong. Gunduz Aktan, a former ambassador who is running on the MHP ticket in Istanbul, argues that Turkey's very survival as a nation-state hinges on preventing a Kurdish one emerging. “If the Americans don't stop this, we will have to go in [to northern Iraq] ourselves,” he says.

Mr Erdogan, who has resisted the army's calls for a cross-border incursion, has a different view. Over the past two years he has been quietly testing the ground for what Henri Barkey, a Turkey follower at America's Lehigh University, calls a “grand bargain”. Turkey would recognise the Iraqi Kurds' semi-independent status; the Iraqi Kurds would coax PKK fighters to give up their guns and pledge to respect Turkey's borders. Relieved of the pressure of having to choose between its Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish allies, America would be delighted, as would Turkey's own Kurds.

But the generals refuse to play along. They still hope that, after the election, they will get the nod to stomp into northern Iraq. It is not only the future of Turkish democracy that is at stake this weekend; it may be the future of the whole region.

A turning point for Turkey? Why this weekend's general election matters for the whole region

2007-07-21T10:42:00.000+02:00

Jul 21st 2007 | ANKARA, DIYARBAKIR AND ISTANBUL
From Economist.com

ON JULY 22nd Turkey goes to the polls. The event is being followed carefully far from its own borders. For one thing, the country is of great strategic importance. Outsiders are also monitoring one of the Muslim world’s rare examples of a working democracy. But the election has been joyless if feverish, marked by huge rallies and demonstrations. Underlying the tensions is a battle over which way Turkey will go.

The army, claiming to detect a dangerous slide towards Islamic radicalism, had threatened to intervene against the government, casting a pall over the entire campaign. The trigger was the decision by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister and leader of the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party, to nominate his foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, to replace President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was due to step down on May 16th. Like Mr Erdogan, Mr Gul once dabbled in political Islam. And both men’s wives wear the Muslim headscarf, which in accordance with Ataturk’s secular tradition is banned in all public buildings.

The army, always suspicious of the AK Party because of its Islamist roots, deemed the prospect a threat to the secular republic. Meanwhile, millions of secular Turks protested against the government. The pressure proved too strong: Mr Erdogan withdrew Mr Gul’s candidacy and called an early general election.

To most Turkish voters the election is a referendum on the AK Party’s record, which is strikingly good. The effects of AK’s “silent revolution” are evident everywhere. Largely thanks to constitutional changes and an improving economy, the European Union agreed to open membership talks with Turkey in 2005. Many European and American diplomats agree that Mr Erdogan is the man most fit to lead Turkey. Their views are shared by millions of Turks, who recall the economic mismanagement and corruption of the string of secular coalitions that crippled Turkey before AK.

Indeed, opinion polls suggest that the voters may give AK quite a bit more than the 34% that catapulted it to single-party rule in 2002. If it were to win a sufficiently big majority (two-thirds of the 550 parliamentary seats) to change the constitution and force through its own choice of president, the army might well step in. The president has considerable power. He can approve the expulsion of overtly pious officers, and appoints judges and university rectors. He can also veto legislation deemed to violate the secular constitution. To the generals, and millions of secular Turks, no AK man can be trusted in this role.

The generals have other concerns. Among the reforms that earned Turkey membership talks with the EU were provisions to trim the influence of the army. But the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as France’s president is a blow because he is strongly against Turkey’s membership. And the impasse in Cyprus has become an excuse for all who want to derail talks. Not surprisingly, popular support in Turkey for the EU has diminished.

The EU’s focus on issues such as free speech and minority rights has also helped to feed a dangerous nationalism. This was most chillingly demonstrated in January when a Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor was shot dead because he had “insulted the Turks”. Renewed nationalism is also affecting Turkey’s other big foreign-policy issue: northern Iraq.

Kurds in the quasi-independent state in northern Iraq are fearful about what may happen after the election. The new political landscape is likely to determine whether the army makes good on its repeated threats to attack separatist guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) who are based in northern Iraq.

An invasion would destabilise the only fairly calm bit of Iraq and wreck Turkey’s relations with America and the EU. Worse, it might not succeed. Mr Erdogan has resisted the army’s calls for a cross-border incursion, while quietly testing the ground for a “grand bargain”. Turkey would recognise the Iraqi Kurds’ semi-independent status; the Iraqi Kurds would coax PKK fighters to give up their guns and pledge to respect Turkey’s borders. Relieved of the pressure of having to choose between its Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish allies, America would be delighted, as would Turkey’s own Kurds.

But the generals refuse to play along. They still hope that, after the election, they will get the nod to stomp into northern Iraq. It is not only the future of Turkish democracy that is at stake this weekend; it may be the future of the whole region.

Truly democratic - and anti-American By JOSHUA W. WALKER

2007-07-16T08:34:00.000+02:00

What country in the world is most anti-American? According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project's 47-nation survey released Wednesday it would not be one of the usual suspects - the Palestinian Authority, Pakistan, or Venezuela - but rather America's 50-year-NATO ally, Turkey.

This finding should trouble the Bush administration deeply; Turkey is exactly the type of Muslim-majority democracy that officials have been touting as a model for the Middle East and the Islamic world.

Consider the facts: Turkey ranked dead last in all the most important categories on the survey, something which indicates the depth of anti-American sentiment. Most tellingly, Turks have the lowest favorability for both America and its citizens (9% and 13%). Moreover, Turkey tied with the Palestinian Authority for the lowest percentage of citizens who think the US is fair in its Middle East policies, a paltry 2%.

Another disturbing sign for US policymakers is the fact that Turkey, an active partner in Afghanistan and a crucial transportation hub for Iraq, has the second-lowest level of support for the US-led war on terror (9%) of all nations surveyed.

It does not stop at US foreign policy. Turkey had the highest percentage of respondents who disliked American ideas about democracy (81%) and even the way that Americans do business (83%).

Turks have never been the most pro-American Middle Eastern country, yet the drop in favorability from when Bush first took office (52% in 2000) and even at the one-year anniversary of the war in Iraq (30% in 2004) to today is truly unprecedented. It is shocking.

THE TRENDS are clear. We are not just dealing with the usual anti-Bush or anti-US policy sentiment in Turkey. We have now slid into an anti-Americanism that cannot simply be erased with a new president in January, 2009, or a special envoy to the Muslim world.

The causes of this pervasive anti-Americanism are fairly straightforward and obvious to even the casual observer. US missteps in Iraq have heightened Turkey's own security on its southeastern border. In particular, the reemergence of PKK terrorism in Turkey, where a soldier dies daily, has produced a non-stop drumbeat of nationalist and anti-American rhetoric throughout the country in the runup to the July 22 parliamentary elections.

The perception that America controls Northern Iraq and restricts the Turkish army from crossing the border, all while doing nothing to stop the PKK terrorists who operate with impunity in Iraq, is widespread. Bush's words, "You're either with us, or against us" now rings hollow to Turks. US policy is increasingly seen as being hypocritical and Americans themselves are now viewed as untrustworthy.

Turkey has officially slid from being anti-US policy to anti-American. This is particularly worrying given the Bush administration's emphasis on democracy promotion and reform throughout the greater Middle East. The underlying assumption is that a more democratic and open society is in the US national interest because such a nation would surely be more pro-American. Within this context, Turkey has been a particularly important country upon which to focus. It is the only Muslim-majority nation of NATO and the only fully functioning Middle-Eastern, Muslim democracy.

The results from the Pew survey disprove the preconceived notions of administration experts and should force policymakers to reconsider their underlying assumptions.

TURKEY MATTERS to America. Its geo-strategic position is vital for US interests throughout the region, but, more importantly, it represents what a truly democratic Middle East might look like. Hating US policy or a particular president is undesirable, but repairable. Hating America and Americans is a disturbing trend that requires serious attention and prolonged engagement.

Turkey: Quo Vadis A pre-election profile of a nation where politics defies predictions

2007-07-16T08:33:00.000+02:00

With one week to go before elections, Turkey seems somewhat lethargic about politics. Nevertheless, here in Istanbul, minivans with electoral slogans and logos plastered on them circulate throughout the city. From loudspeakers music blares onto the crowded sidewalks and the promises of candidates and their party platforms are spewed out in ear piercing decibels. The colorful vans stop in narrow alleyways and distribute festoons and flags to eager young children and to Turkish voters who seem to be delighted with these party "presents" or free electoral handouts.

Politicians are on the campaign trial pandering their electoral programs to the masses in towns and villages across the country. The most remote communities still are without running water and sewage but their residents have the right to vote. In the heat wave that has gripped the country for weeks, there is an air of apathy or an almost palpable indifference. Projections are that the weather might reduce the turnout at the polls, a scenario the ruling AK (Justice and Development) Party dreads. A low turn out would likely mean more seats for the opposition CHP (Republican People's Party) and the ultranationalist National Movement Party.

An Electoral Casino

The Turkish vote is a complicated numbers game for a novice like me. And placing bets on who will win at the polls in the tearooms and coffee houses of the city can be tricky. As a kind Turkish reader pointed out to me (for I am perplexed by the complexity of Turkish politics), it takes 310 seats to form a government in the Turkish parliament out of 510 seats in all. However, it takes the votes of 367 deputies to elect a new president. Assuming as the polls predict that the AK Party is reelected with a reduced majority it will then govern in partnership with the other two parties mentioned above.

The new government's top priority in the post-electoral period will then be to elect a new head of state. The potential hitch is this: the ruling party can't endorse a candidate of its own without the support of its coalition partners. The AK Party's man is Abdullah Gul. He has been selected to run by his party's rank and file and the benediction of Prime Minister Recep Tayip Edrogan. Yet so far, there is apparently no real consensus on the other potential presidential candidates and no clear frontrunners to challenge Gul's candidacy, which looks like a done deal. (Gul has not hidden his pro-Islamist leanings.) So as the local press predicts "a presidential impasse is on the horizon." Furthermore, what if a hung parliament results in no party being able to form either a minority or a majority? Then the electoral casino could result in a parliamentary circus without a head of state.

It is not clear whether the next president will be elected by a majority vote in parliament, chosen in a last minute, midnight session in a smoky backroom parlor or chosen directly by a popular nationwide vote. No agreement has been made yet on a consensus candidate acceptable to all coalition parties forming the next government.

Boom Times?

The Turkish economy seems on the surface at least to be in good health. As AK Party posters proudly proclaim, inflation is at the lowest it's ever been -- in the single digits. It is growing at an average of 7 percent yearly. The stock markets last week hit an all time high. However, Istanbul is an island of prosperity. The banks and multinationals based in this city make it a magnet for high-salaried corporate jobs. Yet this tends to mask the stubbornly high unemployment rate among the idle youths who fill the tearooms during the day. According to residents born here, Istanbul is also inundated with newcomers looking for work.

Onur Ozcan, a 28-year-old smartly dressed businessman, tells me over a chilled mug of Efes beer that there's "too much speculation but not enough production" in Turkey, especially in the manufacturing sector. There doesn't seem to be enough local output to underpin and consolidate the current bonanza driven mainly by the very fickle short-term foreign investment capital flowing in and out of the country. He also points out that if Turkey fails in its bid to join the EU other options are on the table. Turkey is seeking to gain access for its exports such as textiles in other markets located in Russia or Asia in case Europe closes its doors. Europe's loss in this regard would likely be Asia's gain.

Europe: El Dorado or Nemesis?

The EU's current ambivalence toward Turkey is reflected in the tensions arising in Cologne, Germany, where Turkish Muslims are seeking to build a new mosque. Despite these frictions, the fact that 2.5 million Germans of Turkish decent live and work in the EU is an unbreakable bond between Brussels, Berlin and Ankara. Cheap Turkish labor has helped the EU economy and the remittances the workers send to their "second homeland" have been a boon to the local economy in Turkey. Yet, in the long run, the accession of Turkey into the EU depends on how well the Islamic community integrates itself in Europe. For now, the EU issue looks to be on the backburner in this pre-electoral period. There are more pressing issues to address after the elections related to foreign affairs: growing tensions with the U.S., the ongoing Kurdish revolt and its "spillover effect" into northern Iraq, and last but not least Turkey's bid to become a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council. These matters will likely remain unresolved until Turkey elects a new majority government and finds a new president.

Reformers battle for Turkey's soul

2007-07-16T08:32:00.000+02:00

Suna Erdem in Istanbul
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime Minister, swaggered across the stage, eyed the crowd and paused to take in their cheers. “Are you going to vote for freedoms or for those who block them?” he declaimed, in a voice almost hoarse from days on the campaign trail. “Are you going to vote for those who want to integrate with the world, or those who want to turn inwards?”

The hundreds of thousands of his supporters massed into Kazlicesme Square, Istanbul, chanted to his words, screaming approval in every pause.

In a confident, unprompted, almost jovial performance, the Prime Minister and leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) wooed the crowd with a rundown of his Government’s economic performance and mocking quips about opposition promises.

The crowd was a cross-section of the city’s complicated social makeup – little blonde girls dancing on adults’ shoulders next to elderly women with headscarves, and young students jollied along by their bearded fathers. It was hard to believe that the Prime Minister is under siege from the most powerful sections of Turkish society.

When Turks go to the polls this weekend, they are likely to return Mr Erdogan as Prime Minister of one of the most reformist Governments modern Turkey has lived under. The former Islamist’s seemingly smooth reelection has become a high-stakes referendum over the basic values of the Turkish state.

The polls were called, earlier than scheduled, after a crisis over Mr Erdogan’s choice for President. The military, judiciary, opposition parties and millions of secularist protesters attacked his perceived Islamist agenda for nominating Abdullah Gul, the Foreign Minister, whose wife wears a Muslim-style headscarf. Secularists abhor the scarf as a sign of backwardness.

Beneath the veneer of a religious-secularist rift lies a tussle between the entrenched nationalist, militarist ethos of the 85-year-old secular Turkish Republic and the looser, proWest and pro-market but socially more flexible vision of a new guard trying to reshape the country.

“This is an extraordinary election. We could consider it a sort of referendum on the changes brought about by the EU membership process,” said Ali Bayramoglu, a liberal political commentator, referring to the sweeping social and political changes demanded by the European Union and begun by AKP, including reducing the strong influence of the powerful Turkish military in civilian life. The Turkish Republic, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a heroic soldier, has always embodied a respect for the military.

Ranged against AKP is a catalogue of secularist parties, almost all representing the status quo and embracing the rising tide of anti-EU, anti-markets nationalism. Mr Erdogan, who is accused of harbouring a secret agenda to turn Turkey into a restrictive religious society, is playing on his Government’s pro-EU, pro-market record in the face of an opposition that has criticised him for pushing reforms to the detriment of national interest.

Tellingly, as opposition parties become desperate to dent the 40 per cent support that AKP is said to enjoy, there is greater focus on its alleged soft approach to Kurdish terror, a pet nationalist charge. With nationalism the new trump card, all parties seem to have forgotten that only two months ago the secular state was about to collapse under the weight of Mrs Gul’s headscarf.

Some parties are even vaguely offering to “solve the headscarf situation”– that is, to remove barriers to headscarved women studying at university, working in public offices or entering parliament.

However, the headscarf remains so controversial a symbol that not even Mr Erdogan has dared to field a woman candidate who covers up.

In his 4½ years in office, he has unpicked decades of Turkish naysaying to seek a compromise on Cyprus, the stilldivided EU member, pushed through sweeping rights reforms, including lifting restrictions on Kurdish culture despite accusations of encouraging terror, and forged ahead successfully with an IMF programme of privatisation and painful economic reform – despite charges of selling off the nation’s soul.

Faith and secularism

–– Turkish secularism was instituted in 1923 by the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. He separated faith from political institutions when establishing the current Turkish republic

–– Its forerunner, the Virtue Party, was closed by the courts in 2001 for its “antisecular” activities

–– Turkey’s current ruling party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party), came to power in 2002 as a popular movement with a strong religious basis

–– Since 1960 the Turkish military has intervened four times to unseat Islamist governments in the country

–– 99.8% of Turkey’s population currently identify themselves as Muslim, most of those as Sunnis. The other 0.2% consists largely of Christians and Jews

–– As part of negotiations to join the European Union, the Turkish Government has announced a plan to adopt a wide range of EU laws by 2013

*Sources: William and Mary College, Virginia; Gallup; CIA World Factbook; Centre for European Reform; The Washington Institute

Military, mosques battle for Turkey

2007-07-15T08:44:00.001+02:00

Jul 14, 2007 04:30 AM
Mitch Potter
Europe Bureau

ISTANBUL–These are topsy-turvy days for the unfinished business that is Turkish democracy, where the struggle for crucial parliamentary elections in eight days boils down to a contest of mosque versus military.

On one side is Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is widely expected to earn a fresh mandate after a dichotomous four years in power.

Lining up in opposition are parties loyal to Turkey's omnipresent military establishment, which hovers in the background as the self-appointed guarantor of the secular system of governance founded from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire 84 years ago. Make no mistake that, in this election, size very much matters.

A dramatic AKP landslide will be difficult for traditionally pro-Western army brass and senior judiciary, which has a long and undemocratic history of dismissing governments it deems a threat to the strictly secular principles set down by the beloved founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

Going into these elections, however, Erdogan's AKP has turned that political equation upside down, coming off a four-year run of impressive reforms and fiscal belt-tightening that have earned the blessings of the business community, triggering an unprecedented surge of foreign investment. No one doubts the party's Islamist roots, or its social conservatism, but in opening Turkey to the global economy the AKP has won friends in unlikely places.

Between the two poles of Turkish power are the people themselves, who teeter with uncertainty between East and West, modern and traditional, secular and religious, uncertain who best deserves their trust.

"It is worrying because the situation today is not a political crisis, it is an historical crisis," said Mehmet Altan, a professor of economics at the University of Istanbul.

"We live in a military republic and it needs to become a democratic republic. This is an obligation. The struggle between military and mosque is the defining characteristic of power in Turkey. And we need to get over it, get past it somehow.

"But in making this transition, Turkey is vulnerable to threat and that's why I am concerned. For me, the soldiers are dangerous and an Islamic state is dangerous. Both extremes make me uncomfortable."

External factors, most analysts agree, loom large in the Turkish political equation, not least the actions of the United States and Europe, both of which appear to have succeeded in alienating large swaths of the Turkish public in recent years.

A new poll of global attitudes by the Washington-based Pew Research Center found that favourable views of the United States have fallen to single digits in Turkey, where just 9 per cent express trust in Washington.

Likewise, the Pew poll found a collapse in Turkish support for the European Union, with 27 per cent expressing a favourable opinion, compared to 58 per cent in 2004.

Turkish antipathy toward the U.S. stems not only from its ringside seat in witnessing the Bush administrations extraordinary policy struggles in the Middle East, where de facto Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq is of paramount concern to a country that fears further unrest among its own sizable Kurdish minority. What Turks dislike most, according to the Pew poll, are American ideas about democracy, with 81 per cent soured on the notion.

Erdogan Aktas, news director of Turkey's Star TV network, said with numbers like these, the best thing America could do to help Turkey now would be "simply to leave us alone.

"America has big expectations of us. But one of our biggest problems is that our democracy was built upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.

"We had the shell of an empire, the mentality of empire, even, and the democratic framework that was set inside it never grew naturally. It was never really embraced by society," Aktas said in an interview.

"The result is a very fragile system. It's like having a car without a steering wheel."

Turkish antipathy toward Europe is in some ways more palpable than attitudes toward Washington, driven by widespread disillusionment over Turkey's decades-long, and now largely stalled, efforts to join the EU.

"The EU issue has fed the extremes in Turkish politics. Each time Europe sends a negative message to Turkey, it reinforces the perception that the EU is a Christian club, which leads the average person to think, `Okay, than maybe we should be joining a Muslim club instead,'" said Fikrit Ilkez, a prominent Istanbul lawyer and free-speech advocate.

European rejection has also driven a resurgent Turkish nationalism.

The evidence hangs in the form of national flags flying from apartment windows throughout the country. Many political watchers see the manipulative hand of the military here, working to revive its nationalist base as a bulwark against the Islamists.

"The sad reality in Turkish politics is most people have been persuaded there are only two sides – the Islamic camp and the pro-military camp," said Fehmi Hasanoglu, a social activist based in Istanbul.

"Both of these camps are highly conservative, and it serves their purposes to present themselves as the lone alternative to the other.

"One side points to the Islamic movement and says, 'That is the monster.' And they conclude the only other choice is an administration based on anti-democratic, military principles," said Hasanoglu.

"And beyond that you have a very small minority fighting for truly democratic space. These are people who are trying to say, 'No, there is a third way.' "

The path of the "third way" – Turkey's smattering of fledgling and fragmented left-wing parties – stands little hope because of the 10-per-cent threshold required to win even a single seat in the 550-seat parliament.

Beneath the struggle for political power, the continuing inflow of foreign capital suggests that Turkey remains a destination of confidence for investors. Or at the very least, the potential rewards of the modernizing Turkish economy outweigh the risks of political uncertainty.

"I don't see this election as a confrontation of two sides so much as politicians playing politics to get the most votes," said Fatih Akol, an Istanbul entrepreneur and the Turkish manager of a network of four radio stations purchased recently by the Canadian media giant CanWest.

"If you break it down, the fundamentalist Islamic movement has maybe 6 to 7 per cent support in Turkey, the same as ever. And yes, so an Islamic-rooted government has been in power for four years. But the fact is they did a fantastic job because they had to represent everyone and not just that tiny percentage," said Akol.

"I think that eventually the political world will see what the entrepreneurial community is seeing. With or without the EU, with or without an Islamic government, Turkey is moving ahead, modernizing, opening its doors and joining the world economy.

"That points to a stable and prosperous future in the long term, no matter what."

Turkey's Great Divide Thursday

2007-07-14T14:54:00.000+02:00

Jul. 12, 2007 By ANDREW PURVIS/ISTANBUL
A DIFFERENT OUTLOOK
KATHRYN COOK FOR TIME

Only a few months ago, Utku Koseoglu would spend his evenings playing football or maybe downing an Efes beer or two with friends at a waterside nightclub in one of the trendier parts of Istanbul. His reading ran to thrillers like The Da Vinci Code. But these days, the 27-year-old lawyer is more likely to be found hunched over a conference table in a cramped and sweaty office in Istanbul's hectic Kadikoy district, toiling late into the summer night writing blogs, collecting Web clippings and organizing marches. When he finds time for a book, it's the writings of Turkey's revered founder Kemal Ataturk, not Dan Brown. "I could have been starting my career," he says with a wry smile. "Instead, I am doing this."

The reason for his conversion to political activism, he says, is that his country is facing the gravest threat to its secularist identity in more than 50 years. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has links, he believes, to Islamic sects that are intent on undermining democracy and Turkey's treasured secularist principles. For the the sake of the nation, says Koseoglu, they must be defeated at the polls. "We want to expose the true face of the AKP and make sure no vote is wasted." The little outfit to which he belongs, formed a year ago under the title the Kemalist Politics Group, is one of scores that have emerged in in the run-up to parliamentary elections on July 22. In a rare expression of political will from a middle class that has traditionally seen scant need to get involved, these groups have organized dozens of marches that have brought millions onto the streets in cities across the nation. "Our strategies are long-term," says a friend of Koseoglu's, Demir Buyukozkan, 28, at a recent late-night session in Istanbul. "In the next generation, our goal is to be leaders of this country."

Unfortunately for these emboldened secularists, a great many young conservatives have precisely the same goal. Indeed, supporters of the AKP, which has dominated the Turkish parliament for the past five years, have been invigorated by the secularists' opposition. After the Turkish army, a stalwart (if frequently undemocratic) defender of the country's secular heritage, intervened in April to block the party's choice for President, the AKP vowed to leave the decision to the people by calling for early elections. (If the party wins a majority in the parliament, it aims to change the constitution to allow a direct presidential vote.) Hundreds of thousands of volunteers for the AKP are, like their secularist counterparts, pounding the pavement in 81 provinces to rally support.

In an interview with TIME, Turkey's Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, whose efforts to become President were opposed by the military because his wife wears a head scarf, said he plans to stand for the job again if the party is returned to power. "What we have done in the last five years speaks for itself," he says, noting, for example, his party's move for Turkey to adopt the European Union's body of law. "Is this an Eastern country's legal system? Is this Shari'a? No, it is the European laws! We are upgrading this country. We are the real reformers."

These elections promise to be the most hotly contested in memory, and turnout may reach historic highs. Seaside cottages are renting for half price on the balloting weekend as Turks plan to flock back to the cities to vote. Conspiracy theories are rife as parties accuse each other of undermining Turkish democracy. At stake are policies vitally important in Turkey and beyond, including the question of whether or not to send Turkish forces into Iraq, Turkey's stalled membership talks with the E.U., and economic and democratic policies at home. On most of these issues, Turks are deeply divided.

And nowhere do the fault lines run deeper than among young Turks. A generation not previously known for its activism is rallying around secularist, pro-Islamic or nationalist flags in unprecedented numbers — a political awakening attributed by some to the ideological currents of the present campaign. Their convictions and involvement are key in a nation where nearly 70% of the population is now under 35, the highest proportion among industrialized economies. And political parties are making tremendous efforts to woo the young. An attempt by the AKP to lower the age of eligibility for a seat in parliament from 30 to 25 just narrowly missed being implemented. "We are forcing them to get involved," Gul told TIME. "They are the future of this country." Mark Parris, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey now at the Brookings Institution in Washington, says 2007 is pivotal: "This could define the kind of country that Turkey is for a generation."

For years, young secularists like Utku Koseoglu took their power for granted. They saw themselves as the rightful heirs to Ataturk, the West-leaning founder of modern Turkey in 1923 who decreed a secular state and exhorted subsequent generations to defend it. Ataturk's "secular establishment," rooted in the military and judiciary, became a kind of ruling class. When political parties strayed too far from secularist principles, the army stepped in — for example, to force an Islamist-led government from power in 1997. Few young Turks felt compelled to vote, the more so after the military banned political parties from campuses following a 1980 coup.

Against that backdrop, the rise of Erdogan's AKP did not at first seem a serious threat. Its landslide victory in 2002 caught many by surprise, but even that victory was chalked up to a protest vote against the incompetence of established political parties, notably the secularist Republican People's Party (CHP). But unlike previous parties with Islamist roots, the AKP has so far steered clear of the kind of overt Islamist doctrine that got its predecessors in trouble. Instead, it has built a record based on reforming Turkish democratic and economic institutions to fit E.U. standards. The ostensible aim has been to boost Turkish prosperity and to bring the nation into Europe. A side effect has been to weaken the role of the military in Turkey's political life and to strengthen religious and minority rights. The result: a de facto challenge to the secular establishment that has dominated Turkish society since the country's foundation.

Secularists are now rising to meet that challenge. The almost visceral response they have to the AKP focuses less on what the party has done than on who its leaders are. Even staunch opponents of the government concede that Erdogan has done some things right. A buoyant economy growing at a 7% clip, lower inflation and joblessness, and the opening of E.U. membership talks after 40 years of waiting would be a credit to any government. Instead, critics stress the alleged long-term Islamist agenda of the party's leaders. The current e-mail and blogging campaign by the young Istanbul Kemalists, for example, is focusing on claims that leaders like Erdogan and Gul are conservative Muslims who have in the past flirted with political Islam.

Both leaders were members of the Welfare Party that was banned in 1997 for undermining Turkey's secular regime. Erdogan was imprisoned a few months later for reading, while mayor of Istanbul, a poem that likened minarets to bayonets. "Democracy is like a street car," Erdogan is alleged to have said in one mailing. "You only ride it to get to your destination." The Kemalists' blogs remind skeptics of the Islamic notion of takiye, according to which it is permissible for devout Muslims to dissimulate in order to achieve their goal. The fact that the party has not yet pursued an Islamist agenda on a national scale is, secularists argue, not proof that it never will. To bolster their argument, the secularists' newspapers zealously publish stories about municipal officials who have imposed Islam on public life by, for example, segregating the sexes at public pools.

Young secularist women say they are particularly worried. Pinar Ozkan, 23, an events organizer who is a member of the Kemalist Politics Group, says her company recently organized a gathering for several junior AKP officials in Istanbul. When she offered them a tray of tea, she claims, they refused to be served by a woman whose hair was uncovered. "I felt like a second-class citizen," says Ozkan, dressed in gold lamé heels, a miniskirt and white tank top. "As a woman in Turkey, my freedom is very important. We owe that freedom to Ataturk. I will never give that up to anyone." Later that night, she gets ready for an antigovernment rally in Istanbul, donning a Halloween-style mask of the mustachioed Turkish founder. "I want to see the world through his eyes," she says. Ozkan, like most secularists, is backing the CHP, which was founded by Ataturk; others support the Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, though neither has a chance of winning on its own.

AKP officials acknowledge their roots in Islamist parties. But they insist that they have changed, and that they respect Ataturk's separation of mosque and state. Secularist charges of creeping fundamentalism are just a way to scare voters, they say. "It's a witch hunt," says Ali Kemal Eksioglu, 30, an AKP youth leader who has been working to get out the vote in Kadikoy, Istanbul's largest, wealthiest and most traditionally secularist voting district. "I mean, it's 2007, and they are still asking, 'Why is that woman wearing a head scarf?' It's too much." As he sees it, what his party is really about is "tolerance of different lifestyles and economic stability."

Swiftly moving from underdog to favorite in just six years, the AKP has become the party to beat. But its rise, supporters say, has bred misunderstanding. The party appeared on the scene in 2001 as a grassroots movement, going door to door to introduce itself to people individually. But Eksioglu's small army of volunteers in Kadikoy has stopped canvassing like this, he says, because the atmosphere has become too tense. That doesn't mean they're no longer active in the neighborhood, however. Indeed, the party recently opened a branch office in Kadikoy — its bright orange-and-blue party flags fluttering conspicuously over the local Starbucks and its well-heeled clientele. The office is not far from where the Kemalist group meets to plot the AKP's downfall. Eksioglu says he likes to go there to listen to the catcalls from the street: "I don't care about them. I believe in what I am doing."

Eksioglu himself is an example of how the AKP is drawing from an ever wider pool of supporters. Traditionally, AKP supporters hailed from central Anatolia or the sprawling, working-class suburbs of big cities like Istanbul. But Eksioglu is conspicuously uptown. His family's property-development firm has flourished under AKP rule (it has put up four buildings since 2002, vs. none in the previous political term), thanks to a stable economy and lower interest rates that have made buying homes easier for ordinary residents of Istanbul. He now owns an apartment on Baghdad Avenue, the smartest address in the city, lined with designer shops and sushi bars. And while secularists once made fun of AKP officials for their brown, poorly tailored suits, Eksioglu adopts a cooler style with a fashionably unshaven jaw, shorts and a Led Zeppelin T shirt or, while campaigning, a sharp suit. To the consternation of local secularists, plenty of young, prosperous Turks, who also happen to be religious, are rallying to the AKP. One of the best known cafés in the area, in a former Pasha's palace overlooking the Bosporus, a place once reserved for wine-sipping secularists, now serves no alcohol; its female patrons, wealthy as ever, are as likely to cover their hair as not.

To understand why Turks are voting for the AKP in such numbers, visit Pursaklar, a hillside town just outside Ankara in the brown hills of central Anatolia. Ten years ago, the place was an afterthought, its small population made up mostly of poor migrants from rural parts of central and eastern Turkey. Today it is a booming residential center of 120,000, with 10,000 more arriving each year, according to its AKP mayor. The town boasts two new parks, a town square redesigned around an imposing new mosque, and a factory-sized cultural center (with separate facilities for men and women). There are no fewer than 14 supermarkets in the town, up from two in 2000.

Locals credit their town's rebirth to AKP policies and, in particular, the party's economic management. After a financial crisis in 2001 caused Turkey's currency to lose half its value, the country introduced IMF-inspired reforms that the AKP has doggedly maintained. As a result, Turkey has not only experienced impressive gdp growth, but has rid itself of the hyperinflation that plagued it for most of the 1990s. For real estate agent Abdullah Cam, 23, who says his family firm has tripled revenues in the past five years, the AKP has been "great for business." Down the road, Mehmet Goktas, 41, agrees. Sales at the supermarket he owns have more than doubled in the same period. "We've moved from an inflation-based economy to a normal one," he says. Both Cam and Goktas consider themselves "very religious" and both come from conservative families who were drawn to the AKP for its "Islamic values," but it's the party's economic record that has sustained their support.

Secularists may fear for their Western lifestyles, but very devout youngsters, for their part, see in the AKP potential relief from Turkey's remorselessly secularist laws. Mine Karakas, 27, has worn a head scarf since the age of 10 and as a result was prevented from attending university. (Head scarves are banned in public buildings.) She protested the law, picketing the university gates for two years, but eventually gave up. She headed to the U.S. to study instead, but returned after 9/11. She now works for a private foundation that operates Muslim orphanages around the world. For her, the religious values of Erdogan and Gul are reassuring: "We feel more comfortable with them." How such sentiments will play out at the polls remains unclear. Public opinion surveys put support for the AKP at 35-42% vs. 18-25% for the CHP and 15-25% for the MHP, an overtly nationalist party that has benefited from Turkish anger over the Iraq war, fears of Kurdish separatism, and frustration over resistance to Turkish membership of the E.U. The two opposition parties have not ruled out forming a coalition in order to replace the AKP — if they get the votes.

One irony is that the policies of the Islamic AKP are significantly more pro-Western than those promised by its secularist and nationalist rivals. A coalition of the MHP and the CHP may keep head scarves out of the presidential mansion, but it might also put the brakes on European-inspired democratic and economic policies, jeopardize talks to join the E.U., and lead to a clampdown on Turkey's Kurdish minorities. The AKP, if elected, vows to press ahead with additional requirements of E.U. accession, whether or not the Europeans are willing to let Turkey join. The party also promises to nearly double personal annual incomes to $10,000, and raise national gdp from $400 billion to $800 billion by the end of its next five-year term. "Then," says Gul, "I don't think France or Austria or anyone else will be able to ignore Turkey."

In the meantime, the nation can take heart from the fact that young Turks are so deeply engaged in determining their country's future. In Kadikoy, Utku Koseoglu says he has no regrets about his decision to stop partying and focus on the less frivolous pleasures of getting out the vote. "Rallies are fun," he says. "It's as if we've all known each other forever. We can thank the AKP for one thing: they got us out in the streets."

Turkey boosts troops at Iraqi border: sources

2007-07-14T14:53:00.000+02:00

Paul de Bendern, Reuters Published: Friday, July 13, 2007

DIYARBAKIR, Turkey -- Turkey's army has boosted troop levels in the restive southeast to more than 200,000, most of them stationed along the border with Iraq, security sources told Reuters Friday.

Those sources, who declined to be named, said the unusually large buildup, which includes tanks, heavy artillery and aircraft, was part of a security crackdown on Kurdish rebels hiding in southeast Turkey and northern Iraq.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates dismissed the estimate of 200,000 troops, saying it was too high.

"I have not seen anything that would indicate there are numbers of Turkey's soldiers along the border of that size," Gates told reporters in Washington.

The Pentagon has disputed reports of increased Turkish troop levels for days. The top U.S. general, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Peter Pace, said Turkey has the capability to fight the rebels inside Iraq without boosting troop levels.

"The truth of the matter is that the Turkish armed forces on their side of the border have always had sufficient forces to be able to take actions without having to be reinforced," Pace said.

NATO-member Turkey has refused to rule out a possible cross-border operation to crush up to 4,000 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebels believed to be based in mountains in northern Iraq, despite opposition from Washington and Baghdad.

The military General Staff in Ankara was not immediately available for comment on troop numbers. It usually does not release such figures.

Tensions along the border have soared in recent months following an upsurge in attacks across Turkey that Ankara blames on PKK militants. More than 200 Turkish soldiers and PKK rebels have been killed since the start of the year, a Turkish human rights association said Friday.

Armed forces chief General Yasar Buyukanit has repeatedly urged the government to allow an incursion into Iraq to target PKK militants. Those statements have drawn warnings from the head of the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq that Kurds would fight back if attacked.

Washington, while naming the PKK a terrorist group, fears any major operation by Turkey in northern Iraq could anger Iraqi Kurdish allies and stoke wider conflict in a relatively peaceful region of the war-torn country.

But U.S. and Iraqi forces have been unable to clamp down on the PKK because they are stretched fighting insurgents elsewhere in Iraq. Both Washington and Baghdad have called for diplomatic means to calm tensions with Turkey.

Sources close to Turkey's ruling AK Party say the Turkish government has been reluctant to push for a cross-border operation because it fears the move could rattle the economy ahead of parliamentary elections July 22.

Ahmet Birsin, editor of Turkish Kurdish local television channel Gun, said people in the region were very worried. "We want peace not more violence," he said.

But amid national public anger over the deaths, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has hinted parliament could be recalled to approve an operation.

Analysts say the tough talk by the armed forces and the government is partly driven by domestic politics amid rising nationalism in the country.

The armed forces usually boost troop levels in the mainly Kurdish southeast region in the spring when rebels cross the mountains into Turkey from Iraq to carry out attacks.

But security forces said the current buildup was larger than normal. One source said troop levels in Sirnak province were as high as 50,000 compared with 10,000 to 20,000 normally.

An unusually high number of military convoys have been seen making their way to the border. One Reuters reporter said he saw heavy artillery and tanks being transported on trains.

Security sources said a wide-ranging clampdown in the region -- including security zones limiting movement of civilians -- had put the PKK on the defensive, limiting their movements and forcing them to use remote-controlled bombs to attack soldiers rather than risking close combat.

More than 30,000 people have been killed in fighting between Turkish security forces and the PKK since the separatist rebels launched their armed campaign for an independent homeland in mainly Kurdish southeast Turkey in 1984.

(Additional reporting Kristin Roberts in Washington)

The Upcoming Elections in Turkey (1): General Background

2007-07-14T14:52:00.000+02:00

Introduction

The AKP's refusal to seek a consensus presidential candidate, its uncompromising effort to appoint "a religious [i.e. Islamist] president" from the AKP ranks, the secrecy surrounding who their candidate would be, and the last-minute announcement of Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul from the Islamist Milli Gorus movement as the candidate, have all pushed Turkey into a political crisis.

Millions of Turks participated in demonstrations against the AKP government, its Islamist agenda, the appointment of Islamists to key positions in public institutions, and especially against the attempt to nominate an Islamist presidential candidate - a nomination that would jeopardize Turkey's system of checks and balances, creating a situation where both the prime minister and the president belong to the Islamist camp.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's political moves provoked a controversial memorandum from the Turkish military establishment, which is - traditionally and by the power accorded to it in the constitution - the guardian of the secular regime in Turkey.

On presidential election day, members of the opposition parties boycotted the election by not participating in the first round of the vote, and the necessary quorum of 367 MPs (two thirds of the 550-member parliament) was not reached. The matter ended up in the High Constitutional Court, which decided to annul the first round of the vote.

The mass demonstrations, the memorandum by the military and the High Court's decision forced the AKP to declare early parliamentary elections, to take place on July 22, 2007.

The Political Scene

Turkey's election system - which, during its five years in power, the AKP has refused to change - allows only parties receiving 10% of the vote nationwide to be represented in parliament. This threshold, unusually high for a democracy, keeps many smaller parties out of the legislature. It was this factor that brought the AKP to power in November 2002, when it received a two-thirds majority in parliament while receiving only one-third of the national vote. The only other political party that passed the 10% threshold and gained representation in 2002 was the Republican People's Party (CHP).

This system is now placing all the parties of the fragmented opposition at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the AKP.

To overcome the 10% threshold problem, the center-left CHP and the smaller Democratic Left Party (DSP) merged their lists to run together under the CHP. However, unification efforts by the once-powerful conservative center-right Motherland Party (ANAP) and the True Path Party (DYP) under the new name of Democrat Party (DP) were unsuccessful, and ANAP withdrew from the elections process. This failure to produce a strong center-right alternative will probably prove to be the AKP's biggest advantage in the upcoming elections.

The AKP, for its part, included in its candidate list some well-known names from the center right, and even from the social democrats, with the aim of attracting votes from the nonreligious sector.

Among the CHP candidates are also some leading political figures from the center right, who joined the CHP believing it to be the only secular alternative that could challenge the AKP.

Besides the AKP and the CHP, there is the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which has been gaining ground due to the increasingly nationalist sentiment in the country. The MHP - and to some extent the CHP - are being strengthened by the AKP's failure to deal with increased terrorist activity by the PKK, which claims over 60 lives every month. It is also gaining ground due to the government's hesitation to allow the Turkish military to launch a cross-border incursion into northern Iraq where the PKK is based; and by the daily funerals of terror victims that turn into anti-government protests.

Another force emerging on the political scene is the representation of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. Members of the Democratic Society Party (DTP) - which followed the earlier, outlawed Kurdish parties DEP and DEHAP, and which is strong in Turkey's mainly Kurdish southeast - have decided to run in the upcoming elections as independent candidates, in order to avoid the 10% barrier. These independent candidates are expected to hold 25 to 30 seats in the next parliament.

Other political parties, such as the Young Party (GP) and the Democrat Party (DP), which may come close to the threshold with 7% to 9% of the votes, are not expected to gain legislative representation.

The Election Campaign

The AKP seems to be campaigning harder than its opponents, and is covering more of the country. Recently, it has begun to distribute, through its local branches and municipalities, "gift packages" in poorer neighborhoods nationwide, containing rice, wheat, beans, sugar, flour, oil, jam, pasta, soap, and so on, as well as one ton of coal per family for winter heating. Campaign buses are carrying loads of toys that are being distributed to children across the country by AKP candidates. These practices are being strongly criticized in the mainstream media as undemocratic means of "buying" votes.

Despite the fact that AKP is entering the upcoming elections as the largest as well as the ruling party, it is effectively depicting itself as a "victim," whose presidential candidate was "unjustly" rejected by the secular establishment because he is "religious" and "Muslim."

In its campaign, the AKP is also touting the economic growth that has taken place under its rule. [1]

A Consensus Presidential Candidate - Still a Contentious Issue

While Foreign Minister Gul continues to declare, in campaign forums, that he is still the presidential candidate, and is claiming that, judging by the reactions of the people, he would win if the presidency was to be decided by popular vote, Prime Minister Erdogan recently announced that he was ready to seek consensus with the opposition on a name. This decision was welcomed by all opposition leaders as the prime minister "finally accepting what was requested of him prior to the May stalemate." Had he agreed then to compromise, and worked with the opposition to find an impartial candidate, with respect for the constitutional principles of the republic - the crisis would have been avoided. Yet, another dispute has now ensued on the meaning of "consensus" and how to reach it.

Erdogan, who is by now probably aware of the fact that the AKP will not have the 367 seats necessary to elect a president by itself, said that he was ready to offer the opposition a few names as AKP candidates. However, Deniz Baykal, leader of the main opposition party CHP, responded that more names of the same kind would not be acceptable, and expressed his desire for the nomination of a nonpolitical, independent figure from outside the parliament.

If an agreement cannot be reached within the parliament that will be formed after the July 22 elections, and if the new parliament also fails to elect a president - or if the elections produce a CHP-MHP coalition and the AKP retaliates by boycotting the presidential vote - the parliament must again dissolve itself, and within 45 days again go to parliamentary elections. [2]

Findings of Public Opinion Polls

Many polls and surveys are predicting an AKP win on July 22. With millions of votes bound to be thrown out because of the very high threshold that blocks representation by smaller parties, the AKP may indeed emerge as the first party. However, it is difficult to estimate the seat distribution in the next parliament.

According to a survey published in June by the reputable research and polling organization SONAR, the AKP may receive 40% of the votes, followed by the CHP with 20%. However, the findings also showed that a total of five parties - including the CHP, the MHP, the DP and the YP - would pass the 10% threshold and send representatives to the legislature. If the Kurdish DTP - now represented by independent candidates - fills 27-29 seats, as is indicated, the AKP might not be able to form a single-party government. The poll results point at 275-280 AKP seats (out of 550 parliamentary seats) in the event that five parties pass the threshold. This number would be 290-295, if four parties pass the threshold, and 320 if only three parties make it to parliament.

Analysis by the DHA (Dogan News Agency) without the DP and GP - since they are unlikely to pass the threshold - shows the following: AKP, 252-260 seats; CHP, 160-165 seats; MHP, 89-95 seats; and independents, 30-32 seats. With this distribution of seats, an expected CHP-MHP coalition cannot emerge, as both parties are sworn not to enter any coalition with AKP or Kurdish DTP representatives. This would give the AKP the opportunity to form the next government with active or passive support from DTP "independents."

While almost all the surveys indicate that three parties (AKP, CHP and MHP) will gain representation, some polls point to a head-to-head race between the AKP and the CHP - with each gaining about 30% of the votes. This would make the MHP the key party in forming the next coalition government.

*R. Krespin is the director of the Turkish Media Project.

Turkey's election In search of the female voter

2007-07-13T11:18:00.000+02:00

Jul 12th 2007 | ANKARA AND ISTANBUL
From The Economist print edition
Women will have an important role in Turkey's election on July 22nd

IN ISTANBUL'S Carsamba district, women in head-to-toe chadors trail obediently behind bearded men sporting Islamic caps and baggy trousers. Shop windows are crammed with Islamic memorabilia from Mecca. Many secular women fret that, if Recep Tayyip Erdogan's mildly Islamist Justice and Development (AK) Party, which has run Turkey since 2002, wins the election on July 22nd, all of Ataturk's republic may resemble Carsamba.

Turkey's bossy generals and the secular opposition are doing their utmost to encourage such fears. Their tactics sometimes work. Many of those who joined the wave of pro-secular rallies before Mr Erdogan called an early election were urban, middle-class women, who also supported the army's April 27th threat to intervene over the choice of a president whose wife wears the Muslim headscarf.

But if the same ladies thumbed through a study of Turkish women by the Berlin-based European Stability Initiative, their notions about Islam and modernity might change. Entitled “Sex and Power in Turkey”, the paper deconstructs the myth that Ataturk was the sole champion of Turkish women. Certainly, they owe him a huge debt: he made women equal before the law and gave them the right to vote earlier of their counterparts in France and Switzerland, thereby making Turkish women unquestionably freer than any of their sisters in the Muslim world.

Yet the paper notes that such changes “barely penetrated Turkish society beyond a small urban elite”, and patriarchy remained entrenched in both civil and criminal law. Despite growing numbers of women in banking, medicine and academia, Turkey lags behind other European countries on most measures of gender equality. It has the smallest share of women in parliament and the workforce, and the highest rate of female illiteracy. Violence against women is on the rise: the police report a big rise last year, when 842 women were murdered and 1,113 raped.

Awkwardly for secularists, it took the AK government to pass the most radical set of women's reforms since Ataturk. Husbands are no longer officially heads of household, and wives no longer need their consent to work. Laws letting rapists off the hook if they married their victims have gone; new ones make intra-marital rape a criminal offence and scrap reduced sentences for honour killings.

The AK Party's enthusiasm for women's lib may even cost it votes among its more pious constituents. In Carsamba many promise to back the overtly Islamist Saadet party (which is expected to take no more than 2% of the vote). Yet critics still claim that AK's reformist zeal is driven less by conviction than by a wish to please the European Union. As evidence, they cite Mr Erdogan's failed bid to criminalise adultery three years ago.

Hulya Gulbahar, a lawyer who helped to co-ordinate women who were lobbying parliament for reform, says they faced more resistance from the secular Republican People's Party (CHP) than from AK. Tellingly, only 10% of CHP's parliamentary candidates are women. Admittedly, AK does little better. Edibe Sozen, an academic who is among 62 women (out of 550 candidates) fielded by AK, acknowledges that “changing the [patriarchal] mentality is not as easy as changing the laws.”

The judiciary is another problem. Recently, in the case of a woman who was raped by her neighbour, the presiding judge in an appeal court opined that she must have “consented” because she had “not screamed or shouted” during the act. “She kept silent so as not to upset her children,” fumes a lawyer, Fatma Benli. Miss Benli is fighting the ban on the Muslim headscarf in government offices and schools. Shedding her headscarf and overcoat to reveal a lace-trimmed top and a shock of auburn curls, she is indistinguishable in looks and rhetoric from female human-rights campaigners in the West.

Miss Benli, who cannot defend her clients in court because of her garb, argues that, before the headscarf ban in 1998, universities were among the few places where secular and devout Turkish women could mix. “The [headscarf ban] not only polarises society, it runs counter to the very purpose it claims to serve: to modernise Turkish women,” she insists.