Turkey warns on 'dilution' of EU goal

By Tony Barber in Brussels

Turkey warned France on Wednesday against trying to bury its aspirations to European Union membership by manipulating a "wise men's committee" that is expected to pronounce on Europe's long-term future.
Mehmet Simsek, Turkey's economy minister, also re­affirmed his government's promise to remove an obs­tacle to Turkish entry by changing a much-criticised article of the penal code that makes it a crime to insult Turkish national identity.
Mr Simsek's remarks amounted to a forceful assertion of Turkey's rights as an official candidate for EU membership and of its readiness to take politically difficult measures to achieve its goal.
"Purely technically, in terms of adopting the acquis [the EU's body of accumulated law], I think Turkey can do this by 2014 very comfortably," Mr Simsek said. "But we don't really have an entry date in mind, and what is importantis that we keep the process alive. We hope that common sense will prevail."
Mr Sarkozy's proposal for a "wise men's committee" of 10 to 12 people to study the EU's future up to 2020 or 2030 is expected to win approval from fellow EU leaders at a summit in Brussels next month.
Some EU states, such as Austria and France, oppose Turkey's entry, even though accession talks started in October 2005. Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany, the EU's biggest country, says she would prefer a "privileged relationship" with Turkey to full membership.
EU countries sympathetic to Turkey, such as Sweden and the UK, want the committee's members to be carefully chosen and its mandate to be precise, so that it does not turn into a vehicle for critics of Turkey.
Mr Simsek made clear in no uncertain terms that Turkey would accept no recommendation from the "wise men" involving a privileged EU relationship, partnership in a French-proposed Mediterranean Union, or anything else short of full EU membership.
"We cannot accept dilution of the commitment to Turkey. Dilution sends an extremely poor message," Mr Simsek told a meeting of the European Policy Centre think-tank.
Referring to the association agreement that Turkey signed in 1963 with the European Economic Community, the EU's forerunner, Mr Simsek said: "We waited in the anteroom for 40 years. Trying to find a way to dilute the commitment doesn't serve French interests."
Mr Simsek said the ruling Justice and Development party was strong enough after its comfortable election victory in July to amend Article 301 of the penal code, a step that the European Commission said this week should be a precondition of Turkish entry into the EU.
"My government would like to amend it, and we will. But I'd like to highlight that it's easy to change legislation but it takes a long time to digest the changes and to change the mentality," he said.
"More importantly, we'd like to make fundamental changes that would secure these freedoms in a more fundamental way. Things don't happen overnight," he added.
Discussing a recent spate of attacks on Turkish targets by the separatist Kurdish PKK movement, Mr Simsek said Turkey preferred not to launch a military incursion into northern Iraq, but stressed that it remained an option.
"If there is a military incursion, it will be aimed purely at rooting out terrorists on Iraqi soil. It will be limited in scope," he said.
Copyright The Financial Times Ltd. All rights reserved

Ban on free speech keeping Turkey out of EU

David Charter in Brussels
A growing number of prosecutions against writers and academics is damaging Turkey’s case to become a fully fledged member of the European Union, an annual assessment report said yesterday.
The country has made little progress in the past year and its failure to end torture, improve minority rights or guarantee freedom of expression were all highlighted as significant stumbling blocks to EU membership.
Britain joined the European Commission in arguing that only the offer of full membership would bring real reform inside Turkey, but President Sarkozy Sarkozy of France, has led calls for the Muslim nation of 71 million to be offered only associate membership.
Olli Rehn, the Enlargement Commissioner, signalled a battle with those who want to end Turkey’s hopes of membership, however, declaring: “Conditionality only works if the EU respects its own commitment to the prospect of accession. Without this, we can always demand reforms but this would be as if we were speaking to the wall.”
Population growth would probably make Turkey the EU’s largest member if it joins, as it hopes, by 2020, and give the Community borders with Syria, Iran and Iraq. But there are many hurdles yet to overcome, the European Commission’s progress check said.
One of the key demands was for the repeal of Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which makes it a crime to insult Turkish identity. The article has been used to prosecute the Nobel prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk and the murdered journalist Hrant Dink for commenting on the killings of Armenians by Turks in the early 20th century.
The report cautioned: “The prosecution and conviction for the expression of non-violent opinions under certain provisions of the Turkish criminal code are a cause of serious concern. The number of persons almost doubled in 2006 compared with 2005 and there was a further increase in 2007. The Turkish legal system does not fully guarantee freedom of expression in line with European standards.”
Mr Rehn added: “It is not acceptable that writers, journalists, academics and other intellectuals . . . are prosecuted for simply expressing a critical but completely non-violent opinion.”
Yielding to pressure from the EU Mehmet Ali Sahin, the Turkish Justice Minister, said last night that a new Bill repealing Article 301 would be put before Parliament in the coming days.
“Several drafts have been prepared in line with proposals by civic groups. The Cabinet will discuss them at first opportunity, select one and submit it to parliament,” Mr Sahin told Anatolia news agency. Other issues remain outstanding, however. The EU repeated demands that Ankara normalise relations with Cyprus and honour a 2005 agreement to open its ports and airports to the EU member.
The pace of reforms had slowed since Turkey’s membership negotiations opened two years ago. “Cases of torture and ill-treatment are still being reported, especially during arrest and outside detention centres,” it added.
It commended the Turkish Government for solving a constitutional crisis before President Gül was elected this year, but said that the military still exerted “significant political influence”.
In the southeast of the country: “Turkey needs to create the conditions for the predominantly Kurdish population there to enjoy full rights and freedoms.”
Mr Rehn would not be drawn on the consequences for Turkey’s membership ambitions if it invaded Iraq to quash Kurdish separatists.
Wider community
EU enlargement candidate countries Croatia The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Turkey
Potential candidates Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Montenegro Serbia Kosovo (under United Nations Interim Administration Mission)
Source: European Commission

Pace of Turkey's reforms slowing down, EU progress report says

BRUSSELS, Belgium: The European Union will urge Turkey on Tuesday to press ahead with reforms crucial for its bid to join the bloc, singling out freedom of expression, democratic oversight of the military and rights for Kurds as key areas where more progress is needed.
In an annual report on the progress in Turkey's membership bid, the EU's executive Commission will also repeat that Ankara must normalize its relations with Cyprus and honor a 2005 pact to open its ports and airports to the island republic.
The pace of reforms "has slowed down" since Turkey's membership negotiations opened two years ago, and "significant further efforts are needed" in the crucial areas, said a draft of the report seen by The Associated Press.
The talks stalled last year when the EU froze negotiations on eight out of 35 policy areas, because of Turkey's refusal to open its ports to trade with Cyprus, an EU member since 2004. But EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn said last month that negotiations in two new areas could be opened "in the coming weeks."
On Tuesday, Rehn planned also to present reports on the efforts of six Balkan nations to join the EU.
The draft report on Turkey commends the country's government on solving a constitutional crisis earlier this year, but says the military — which has vowed to safeguard Turkish secularism — still exerts "significant political influence." The draft report calls for a better civilian oversight of the armed forces.
Abdulah Gul, a former foreign minister in Turkey's Islamic-oriented government, was elected president in July after months of confrontation with the secular establishment, with the military threatening to intervene when Gul was first nominated for the post.
The draft report says serious concerns remain over freedom of speech restrictions, particularly Article 301 of the Turkish penal code that make it a crime to insult Turkish identity or the country's institutions.
Nobel Prize-winning author Orhan Pamuk and slain ethnic Armenian journalist Hrant Dink are among those who have been prosecuted under the controversial article.
The report also mentions the need to improve religious and cultural rights for non-Muslims, but it lauds Turkey's economic reforms.
The 27-nation EU is divided over whether Turkey, a mainly Muslim country of 71 million, should one day join the EU. The prospect faces opposition from some member states, such as France or Austria, and the accession talks are expected to last at least a decade.
Turkey is under intense pressure from the EU to allow Greek Cypriot planes and vessels to use Turkish ports and airports, but Ankara has said it would not agree to any concessions on Cyprus until the EU keeps to a promise to end the isolation of Turkish Cypriots.
Cyprus has been divided between a Greek Cypriot south and a Turkish-occupied north since 1974, when Turkey invaded after an abortive Athens-backed coup by supporters of union with Greece
The European Parliament said last month that Turkey's refusal to comply with the commitments made when it opened its accession talks with the EU would seriously affect the negotiations.

Why Turkey Matters

Turkey’s increasing significance is arresting the world’s attention. Here’s why it should arrest yours. By Joel Hilliker

Suddenly, Turkey is all over the headlines.
Most Americans would tend to underestimate its significance. But why, in the midst of October, did an outburst of public discussion center on whether to call the World War i-era Turkish killing of Armenians a “genocide”? Why did Congress raise the issue, and why did the White House scramble to squelch it?
The crux of debate rested on the potential for losing Turkey’s help in the war in Iraq. Its role as vital supply route for U.S. troops took center stage. In fact, some analysts suggested that the Democrat-led Congress pushed the “genocide” issue to alienate Turkey in an underhanded effort to spite the president and torpedo the Iraq war.
Is it really possible that this nation—about which few Americans concern themselves—could make the difference between victory and defeat in Iraq?
Who knew Turkey was so important?
At the Crossroads
The instant clamor surrounding that single issue is a meaningful symbol of just how much this historically pivotal nation is rising again to prominence in modern geopolitics.
Turkey sits right at the crossroads of a developing clash of civilizations. Its population is almost wholly Muslim, but its constitution is staunchly secular. It is a democracy and a constitutional republic, yet since 1960 its military leaders have overthrown four duly elected governments for being too religious. It is anchored to the Middle East as a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, yet welded to the West within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On top of that, a pillar in its foreign policy for a generation has been its bid for membership in the European Union.
The U.S. is not alone in trying to come to grips with this complex geopolitical puzzle. Nations across the globe are coming to see that, for all its contradictions, and after decades of quiet since the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of World War i, Turkey is shaping up to be an extremely significant global player. As the world increasingly fractures into regional blocs—the United States, the Middle East, Europe, Asia—Turkey remains a distinct entity whose value to all of these powers is rapidly rising.
This exceptional position, which we can witness developing right before us, appears to be setting Turkey up perfectly for the unique role it plays in end-time biblical prophecy.
Why the World Is Taking Note
Turkey is attracting interest for a number of reasons.
First, its economy is on fire—it is one of the fastest-growing on Earth. Since 2002, under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (akp), the economy has transformed. It is now the largest Muslim economy, and the largest in the region. Turkey is a member of the G-20, a gathering of the world’s 20 largest economies. It is playing its cards wisely, reducing restrictions on trade with Muslim states while simultaneously cultivating relationships with European and other nations.
As Dr. George Friedman put it, “The ability of Greece, Armenia, Syria, Iraq and Iran to remain hostile to Turkey decreases as the Turkish economy grows. Ideology and history are very real things, but so is the economic power of a dynamic economy” (Stratfor, July 31).
Of course, a large Turkish economy means a large Turkish military. Already it is nato’s second-largest armed force after the U.S., with over 1 million uniformed personnel. This reality has several ramifications regarding the balance of power in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Second, Turkey is comfortably stepping into a ready-made role as a vital energy hub linking Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia.
This is one of the most geographically strategic countries in the world—a literal bridge between continents. On its west, Turkey borders Greece and Bulgaria—EU nations; on its south, Syria, Iraq and Iran—Middle Eastern Muslim states; and on its east, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan—former Soviet republics. It connects to the Mediterranean, Black and Aegean seas, and encompasses the vital Bosporus and Dardanelles sea gates, linking Central Asia to the Mediterranean. In a world increasingly driven by energy politics, its unique location translates into valuable energy transit routes for more and more nations.
With Russia aggressively taking over global oil and natural gas markets, uncomfortable customers, particularly those in Europe, are actively seeking energy from other sources. Turkey is in the right place at the right time, with major oil pipelines being built across its soil, circumventing Russian territory altogether. It is proving itself a worthy middleman for energy from not only former Soviet republics Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, but also Iraq and Iran. In addition, Turkey, in conjunction with foreign investors and companies, is building new oil refineries that will increase its worth even more. Analysts say the nation’s refining capacity should double within only a few years.
This reality seems tailor-made to suit Ankara’s foreign-policy interests, because the entity hungriest for non-Russian energy happens to be the very one Turkey has been working so hard to pretty itself up for: Europe.
Naturally, the whole situation also deeply concerns Russia, whose monopolistic energy tendencies are undercut by Turkey’s activities. On top of that, Russia is robustly fighting a strong Islamist incursion on its southwestern border, particularly against Muslim separatists in Chechnya—and it possesses proof that Turkey has financially supported and trained Chechen terrorists in their struggle for independence.
A third reason for Turkey’s growing relevance—as became abundantly evident in October—is its role in the unfolding drama surrounding the future of Iraq.
A Strained Alliance
The Iraq war has created bad blood between the U.S. and Turkey. The Turks have long struggled with a restive Kurdish population in their southeast region, driven by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (pkk). This terrorist group seeks to carve an independent Kurdish state out of territory in southeast Turkey, as well as parts of Syria, Iraq and Iran. Whatever differences these four nations have, they are united in their determination to stop Kurdistan from materializing.
The fact that the U.S. empowered the Iraqi Kurds by eliminating Saddam Hussein rocked the American-Turkish alliance. In 2003, Ankara simply refused to let the U.S. invade Iraq from Turkish territory—a major snub from a nato ally. Add to that a turning of the historic tables: With a growing economy and military, Turkey simply isn’t as dependent on the U.S. as it once was. In fact, since the U.S. has gotten entrenched in Iraq, it has come to depend deeply on Turkey: 70 percent of its Iraq-bound air cargo and 33 percent of its fuel passes through Turkey, and it heavily uses the Incirlik Air Base for refueling operations and cargo flights to both Iraq and Afghanistan.
The upshot is, Turkey feels very comfortable with ignoring Washington’s wishes and doing what it feels it must to protect its own interests.
Recent events highlight just how monumental this change is.
In an October attack, pkk rebels killed 13 Turkish soldiers; the people of Turkey angrily demanded retaliation. The government bombed and shelled northern Iraq, and then the parliament approved plans to launch a ground invasion.
All this fuss puts the U.S. in an awkward spot. The Kurdish north has been the most stable part of Iraq since Saddam Hussein’s ouster in 2003, and Washington would rather nothing upset that. Supporting Turkey could well alienate the Kurdish allies the U.S. has built there, and the whole situation may further destabilize Iraq—something U.S. and Iraqi leaders are desperate to avoid.
But the amazing thing is, the Turks just don’t care. “We don’t need anyone’s advice on northern Iraq and the operation to be carried out there,” Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan said. Reuters reported that the crowd in Istanbul cheered this pronouncement, and cheered again when he said that the U.S. “came tens of thousands of kilometers and attacked Iraq without asking anyone’s permission.”
Amid these developments, the timing couldn’t have been worse for the U.S. congressional committee’s “genocide” resolution. Turkey bristled at the news, recalling its ambassador in the U.S. and threatening to close its doors to American troops. Anti-American demonstrations spilled into the streets, according to the Jerusalem Post. “All prospects look bad … and relations with the U.S. have already gone down the drain,” Turkish foreign policy expert Semih Idiz said.
The White House responded by going into full damage control mode: It issued public statements condemning the measure, it essentially apologized to Turkey’s leaders, and it finally convinced Congress to kill the resolution. The fervor of the response revealed just how desperately the U.S. needs Turkey’s cooperation in order to resolve the crisis in Iraq in a manner suited to its own national interests. But the U.S. isn’t the only country in that situation. So is the other primary external player in this theater: Iran.
An Islamic Shift
In practical terms, as Washington contemplates reducing its presence in Iraq, its primary concern is to try to prevent Iran from simply taking over—not just Iraq but virtually the entire Middle East. In Turkey, it sees the closest thing it has to a regional counterbalance to Iran.
Unfortunately, it so happens that all this friction between Ankara and Washington has strengthened Turkey’s historically wary relationship with Iran.
Something else that could strengthen this relationship—and markedly change the balance within several of the precarious situations in which Turkey plays a role—occurred on August 28, when Turkish parliamentarians elected a former Islamist as president.
The new president, Abdullah Gül, is a bit of a puzzle. He was a cabinet member in one of the Islamic governments the military ousted in the 1990s—yet he has been a leading supporter of his nation’s EU membership bid. His devotion to Europe certainly placates the nation’s generals and military commanders, but his religion still chafes against their fierce loyalty to the secularist ideals institutionalized in 1923 by the nation’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. His political party, the akp, has an Islamist pedigree and maintains pan-Islamic ties throughout the region. Turkey’s secularist military suspects that it retains a masked Islamist agenda.
Stratfor noted that, because the president chooses judges and hence dominates the judiciary, having Gül as president means that “for the first time since the founding of the Turkish republic more than 80 years ago, a political force rooted in Islamism essentially controls all of the key civilian institutions of the state” (August 29, emphasis mine). Stratfor expects the akp to seek to use its new power as a beachhead to move the nation away from secularism and toward the freer expression of religion in public life; it anticipates drama ahead as the akp is forced “to balance pan-Islamic issues with Turkish nationalist objectives” (ibid.). Though this analysis probably overstates how much Turkey will change under President Gül, we would not be surprised to see the nation proceed with a more sympathetic economic and foreign policy toward the leading Arab and Muslim energy producers in the region.
Any shift within Turkey away from secularism and toward Islam could help alter the balance of power in the Middle East—most notably, in favor of Iran.
A Nightmare for Israel?
In 1996, Turkey inked a mutual defense deal with Israel that, for years, analysts credited with contributing to the relative stability of the region. The Islamic Affairs Analyst went so far as to say that Israel’s enemies respected Turkey enough that the Jewish state’s national survival was all but assured as long as the deal stood.
Events in the past couple of years, however, have shown that whatever deterrent effect Turkey once had has already weakened to some degree: Iran and Syria have unleashed forces in Lebanon and within Israel against the Jewish state with few qualms. But, given Turkey’s new Islamic leadership, this trend could get worse.
Any further weakening of Turkey’s restraining influence on Iranian power is a nightmare for Israel, which Iran has committed itself to eliminating.
Tensions between Washington and Ankara over Iraq have already opened a door for the Islamic Republic. Suspicion between Turkey and Iran has thawed in recent years, and ties have improved. The fact that Turkey is now ruled by a Muslim—albeit Sunni—rather than a secularist certainly doesn’t hurt.
The more cooperative these two nations are, the more latitude the Turks are likely to give Iran without feeling directly threatened as Tehran pursues its regional ambitions.
Watch for that cooperation to increase—and for Iran to become even more brazen.
Unrequited Love
What does Turkey get out of the deal? If nothing else, it gets Iranian energy—energy it can pass on to Europe.
The two countries have just completed an oil pipeline that will pump 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil a day into Turkey. And the Turkish Petroleum Corp. has announced plans to invest $3.5 billion in Iran’s South Pars natural gas field. This project would include building the means to transport Iranian gas through Turkey to Europe. The U.S., though flatly opposed to the deal, can do little to stop it.
Ultimately, even under an Islamic president, it appears Europe is who Turkey most wants to please. Ankara simply sees Iran as a workable partner in increasingly procuring the energy that Europe desperately wants. Radio Free Europe reports that for decades to come, Iranian gas may be Europe’s most viable source of non-Russian gas. Nothing Turkey could do would strengthen its value to the EU more than its growth as an energy hub.
Even the slippage in Turkey’s relationship with the United States is driving it more toward Europe, according to Semih Idiz. Speaking of the Iraq crisis, Idiz said, “Having its relations with the U.S. ‘electrified,’ Ankara will be more and more eager to grab hold of the EU anchor” (Turkish Weekly, September 1).
President Gül has strongly emphasized his intent to forge ahead with plans to join the European Union, plans that will require further economic reforms and constitutional amendments. His ally, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also from the Justice and Development Party, has outlined a five-year program to increase individual freedoms, further boost the economy, and, above all, strengthen the nation’s case for EU membership.
Biblical prophecy indicates, however, that although Turkey will remain committed to its romance with Europe, all these efforts are doomed to fail—just as they always have.
Turkey’s Image Problem
From the time Atatürk himself famously admonished his countrymen to “turn toward Europe,” Turkey has labored, to varying degrees, to cast itself in the image of the West. For the past decade, it has worked overtime.
Still, for every obstacle Turkey hurdles, the EU throws up another. Since 1987, when Turkey applied for full membership, 15 other states have cut to the front of the line and been accepted: Austria, Finland, Sweden, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. The Turks have watched the Union swell from 12 states to 27, while they remain peering through the window from the outside.
Now, the prospect of becoming an energy bridge to the Continent has inflamed Turkey’s hopes of finally convincing the EU to return the love.
Those hopes are wasted. Try as it may to overcome it, Turkey clearly has an image problem among Europe’s decision makers—and even its voters. Just this year, France elected a president—Nicolas Sarkozy—who campaigned on opposition to Turkish EU membership.
Why? Why is Europe so opposed to considering Turks European citizens? Only one major issue separates Turkey from all the other nations being granted their pass into the Union: religion.
The fundamentally Roman Catholic continent simply has no intention of incorporating 70 million Muslims in one swoop. And Turkey—with its Ottoman history, which at one time threatened Catholicism’s very existence—has particularly negative associations in European minds. As Bernard Lewis expresses it, “[T]here is still a reserve of mistrust, and even at times of hostility [toward Turks], with roots deep in the European Christian past” (From Babel to Dragomans).
The election of an openly Islamic president has only solidified Europe’s unspoken yet inflexible resistance to embracing Turkey. Still, given this nation’s growing strategic value to Europe, watch for the EU to continue to dangle carrots and incentives to keep the Turks onside. And as Europe grows in power in the time ahead, Ankara’s devotion to the European cause will only grow along with it.
Thus, Turkey is destined to remain suspended between worlds—always searching, ever more desperate to please.
A Shocking Betrayal
These trends become far more significant in light of the Bible’s description of Turkey’s place in end-time events. It is only with the revelation of God’s Word that we can understand why Turkey truly matters.
The biblical prophecies regarding events in the Middle East are clear: A Muslim-Jewish war is about to erupt—initiated by Islamic forces clearly unrestrained by Turkey or anything else. That conflagration will trigger a series of events leading to the Second Coming of Jesus Christ.
When the Muslims move to sack Jerusalem, it will provoke a united European bloc of nations to intervene. This bloc will set up armies around Jerusalem—appearing like a “peacekeeping force”—but quickly transforming into a deadly war machine (Luke 21:20). It won’t be just Arabs or Muslims that suffer at their hands; this European power will turn its full force on the nations of Israel—including America and Britain. This horrifying double-cross is discussed in Ezekiel 23. Many in the Jerusalem area will be trapped!
The Prophet Obadiah recorded an extraordinary prophecy about “Edom,” whose modern descendants are the Turks. (Request a free copy of the Trumpet’s December 1997 article “Turkey: An Act of Revenge!” for a detailed explanation of this prophecy.) It shows how Turkey, possessing the escape route via land—the Cilician Gates mountain pass—will actually betray those Israelis, Americans and British who are trying to escape, delivering them into the hands of their conquerors. This is one last act, true to present form, of Turkey attempting to curry favor with Europe!
The description of these events reveals several things that illuminate the meaning of present-day headlines.
One, the fact that those escapees look to Turkey strongly indicates that Turkey’s alliances with the U.S. and with Israel will remain, at least in name.
Two, the betrayal may mean we can expect still more friction to develop within these alliances, like that which has arisen over the “genocide” question and the Kurd condition in Iraq. Though the U.S. still enjoys the support of Turkey’s secularist military, anti-Americanism is rampant and growing within Turkish media and among the Turkish people—a fact that the U.S., as desperate as it is to retain Turkey’s help, is willing to overlook.
Three, for Turkey, relations with Europe will continue to trump all other foreign-policy considerations.
Thus, based on biblical prophecy, in the end the Trumpet expects recent events that have thrust Turkey into the headlines only to cement the unique position this nation already occupies in modern geopolitics. They may tax Turkey’s agreements with the U.S. and Israel, but will not destroy them. They may increase Turkey’s cooperation with Muslim states, shifting the balance of power in favor of Iran, but that cooperation will fall short of a full-scale alliance. And most importantly, they will strengthen Europe’s resolve to keep Turkey at arm’s length, but do nothing to diminish Turkey’s undying resolve to get into Europe’s bed.
And as Obadiah’s prophecy reveals, that nation’s willingness to do anything to serve this ambition—including betrayal—will lead to its ruin.

EU easing tone with Turkey, while still seeking reforms

STRASBOURG (AFP) -- The European Commission and parliament signaled a new more positive strategy for EU-hopeful Turkey, swapping threats for encouragement, while still seeking political reforms.
""The Commission shares the basic approach of the parliament, which is to identify challenges and to encourage Turkey to meet these challenges,"" EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said during a debate in the Strasbourg chamber. The new mood was exemplified when members of the European Parliament decided not to explicitly call on Ankara to recognize the Armenian genocide of 1915, merely calling on both sides to engage in ""a process of reconciliation"". Rehn indicated that his annual report on Turkey's progress towards the EU, to be delivered on November 6, would be ""objective and fair"". Last year's very critical version led to the freezing of eight of the 35 policy chapters which EU candidate nations must successfully negotiate prior to membership. Since Ankara began talks with the European Union in October 2005, the talks have been severely hampered by Ankara's refusal to deal normally with EU member Cyprus -- which is split into Greek and Turkish sectors. Turkey has managed to open just four accession chapters, only one of which has been satisfactorily completed. That figure pales next to the 14 chapters opened with Croatia, which began its EU talks at the same time as Turkey. However, in keeping with the encouraging tone, Rehn announced that ""at least two chapters could be open in the coming weeks,"" despite French President Nicolas Sarkozy's repeated suggestion that Turkey does not culturally belong in the European Union. Rehn said both the EU and Turkey had ""to do what they've got to do"". ""That means when we are firm we also must be fair, we have to keep our word and stick to accession perspective,"" he said. The EU change of tone follows a popular vote in Turkey on Sunday which approved sweeping constitutional reforms. The reforms provide for the head of state to be elected by popular suffrage for a once-renewable five-year term, instead of being chosen by parliament for a single seven-year mandate. It also sets legislative elections every four years instead of the current five. ""The Commission welcomes the fact that the government has put the constitutional reform at the top of its agenda with a view to improving democracy and expanding individual freedoms,"" said Rehn. ""However this should not result in any postponement of reforms that are urgently needed today,"" he added. High on the EU's reform wish list is the infamous Article 301 of Turkey's penal code. This outlaws insults on ""Turkish identity"" and has led to criminal charges against dozens of intellectuals. The EU's executive arm also insists on improvements on religious freedoms, military control of civil authorities and the fight against corruption. Turning to more urgent matters, the EU's Portuguese presidency urged Turkey to think twice before launching military action in northern Iraq, following deadly attacks on Turkish troops from Kurdish rebels in the region. ""It's important that the international community supports Turkey in its efforts to counter terrorism, in respect of the law, without risking the stability of the region and the whole continent,"" Portuguese European Affairs Minister Manuel Lobo Antunes told the European parliament in Strasbourg. However for the EU, Cyprus remains the elephant in the room and no matter how far Turkey comes along the membership road it won't be able to join the club until that problem is sorted. So far Ankara refuses to respect the protocol which extended Turkey's customs union with the EU to the 10 nations which joined the bloc in May 2004 -- including the divided island of Cyprus.

Black Turks on the offensive —Ijaz Hussain

Many analysts believe that the real reason for the Turkish army’s unrelenting hostility towards the AKP lies less in its desire to protect secular values and more to guard its own powers and privileges, which it sees under attackThe newly elected Turkish President Abdullah Gul is persona non-grata for the Turkish army whose chiefs refused to extend him the protocol he deserved as commander-in-chief of the armed forces or as president of the Republic. For example, they were absent from his swearing in ceremony in the Parliament and failed to greet him at the Victory Day parade. They treated his wife and that of the prime minister no differently as they refused to invite them to the state functions. Analysts explain the snub in terms of the army’s suspicion of the AKP leaders’ commitment to secular values on which the Turkish Republic is founded and its belief that the AKP is working on the Islamist agenda. What does this tug of war portend for Turkey?The Turkish army that claims to be the guardian of the constitution has always suspected the Islamists of promoting their political agenda. It has a long history of overthrowing such governments, the last being that of Necmettin Erbakan in 1997. The army has not forgotten that President Gul was a minister in the Islamist government of Erbakan and supposedly made statements in the past against secularism and in favour of political Islam. This is compounded by the fact that his wife wears a headscarf, which symbolises Islamist outlook. According to the Turkish army, the case of Gul’s former boss and the head of the AKP Prime Minister Erdogan is no different; he, too, was an ardent follower of Erbakan, whose hands he would kiss with reverence. The army also blames Erdogan for making statements critical of secularism and favourable to political Islam. It cites, in particular, the poem in which he compared minarets with bayonets, domes with helmets, mosques with barracks and believers with soldiers and for which he received a prison sentence in addition to being banned from active politics.The AKP leaders now claim that they have changed; that they have renounced their Islamist past and are now firmly committed to the secular orientation of the Republic. The Turkish army is, however, not convinced of their claims. It believes that the leopard has not changed its spots and that the AKP leadership is merely engaged in the well-known Islamic practice of dissimulation (takiyye), hiding its true intentions and would show its true colours at an appropriate time. It refuses to consider the fact that, unlike Erbakan, the AKP leadership has worked for Turkey’s entry into the EU which would never accept an Islamist country; and that a section of the liberal electorate that voted for the AKP in the recent general elections accepts the party’s credentials. Many analysts believe that the real reason for the Turkish army’s unrelenting hostility towards the AKP lies less in its desire to protect secular values and more to guard its own powers and privileges, which it sees under attack. They cite in this regard the example of the National Security Council (NSC) through which the army used to impose its will on the Parliament and the government; the AKP leadership in its earlier stint in office successfully ensured that the NSC was transformed into a toothless body. They also cite the AKP’s reported intention to get the army-imposed 1982 constitution, which is the source of most of the powers and privileges that the army currently enjoys, replaced by a “civilian” constitution.The AKP has not yet revealed details of the proposed constitution as it is still working on it. However, the salient features that have appeared in the press are sufficient to scare secularists including the pashas (read: the army) as it puts their vested interests in jeopardy. For example, the proposed constitution envisages reforming the judiciary and the universities the secularists dominate. Similarly, it would require the head of the armed forces to report to the defence minister rather than the prime minister, which is the case presently. Again, it proposes to remove the exemption that rulings of the high military board currently enjoy from judicial review. The AKP intends to submit the final document to public for referendum, which it can only win if it enjoys support across the board including that from the liberals. How are secularists including the army likely to respond to the challenge?It is undeniable that secularist forces are terribly upset with the new development. This is evident from the fact that even before the ‘draft constitution’ sees the light of the day they are up in arms against it. For example, the Turkish daily Radikal rhetorically asks, “why is the “civilian” constitution being hidden from the civilians?” The Republican People’s Party, the main opposition secular party, has equated the move as a conspiracy to dismantle the secular principles of the Republic and has therefore pledged to resist it. Given the deep divisions within the Turkish society, it appears as if the coming battle on the constitution may be nothing short of an Armageddon. Though the army must be terribly upset with the AKP move, it would be hard for it to intervene for two reasons. First, the AKP enjoys popular support of 47% of the electorate that voted for it in the general elections (including a large section of liberals. With this kind of support, the pashas would think twice before moving. Secondly, the AKP enjoys unwavering EU support for the proposed change as the latter has been suggesting repeal or amendment of a large number of articles of the constitution to bring them in conformity with its own standards. The army knows that any action against the Erdogan government would not go down well with Brussels and would spell disaster for Turkey.Does the adoption of the “civilian” constitution augur well for Turkey? The secularists including the army do not think so because, in their opinion, it would erode the principle of the separation of state and religion, downgrade the army and foment ethnic divisions, particularly in the Kurdish southeast. These fears are largely unfounded because the real reason for the army’s opposition is its desire to perpetuate its hold on power through scare tactics. Nor is the fear of the Islamists dismantling secularism and introducing the Sharia rule warranted because the ever-vigilant Western world and domestic public opinion would never allow it to happen. Already the prediction that the Islamists’ first election is the last one has proved wrong, as the AKP has held second general elections. Whereas the incubus of Islamist threat is largely unfounded, the proposed change promises to be immensely beneficial for Turkey. The Kemalists have very little knowledge of the West or the true meaning of secularism. Their secularism is essentially anti-religion and imitates external Western forms while refusing to incorporate the core Western values of tolerance, liberalism and democracy in their worldview. The militant secularism they profess has divided the Turkish society into “white” and “black Turks”: the former have appropriated most of the powers and privileges while the latter have been left disenfranchised. The “civilian” constitution promises to bring about a paradigm shift in the power structure and rectify this imbalance by providing a level playing field to the both. The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com

Islamists won't follow Turkey's lead

Can Turkey's Justice and Development Party become a model for the ideal marriage between Islam and democracy that could be replicated in the Middle East?
Some Muslim intellectuals, politically correct commentators in the West and officials from the European Union seem to think so. They argue that the recent election of Abdullah Gul as president of Turkey and the success in parliamentary polls last July of his AK Party (as it is known in Turkey) are sound reasons to believe that a party comprised of Islamists can hold free elections, win at the polls and then run a state that is democratic and secular.
This presumption, however, rests upon the false belief that Turkey is much like the rest of the Islamic world and that all Islamists are similar to the leaders of the AK Party. For one thing, AK Party leaders should not be identified as "Islamists." As Gul declared during his acceptance speech: "Secularism, one of the basic principles of our republic, is a rule of social peace."
Islamists in most Muslim societies do not favor a secular state. In Jordan and Egypt, for example, unofficial Islamist parties and movements are fighting for Shariah, Islamic law, to be the guiding light for governing. Shariah-based governance, in fact, has been one of the foundations of opposition movements against authoritarian rulers in the Arab world for the last 30 years.
And it is not only the Islamists who are advocating Islamic law. The majority of Muslims surveyed in Arab countries, and in other Muslims societies, say they prefer that Islamic law be either a source, or the sole source, of legislation. By contrast, according to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, support for Islamic law in Turkey has never exceeded 20 percent.
As far back as 1981, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt tried to appease his country's Islamists by revising the Constitution to mandate Shariah as the primary source of legislation. Islamic law has never been enforced, however, and today this has become one of main battle cries of the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition to Egypt's governing National Democratic Party.
Although many moderate Islamists in the Middle East admire the AK Party's success, the way ahead for them is far more difficult. The vast historical differences between Turkey and the region's other countries also have to be taken into account.
The AK Party was born out of the more ideological Welfare Party, but then evolved to become more in line with Turkey's secular tradition. By contrast, secularism in the Arab world peaked in the 1950s and 60s, then came to a halt with the Six Day War of 1967. The Arabs' humiliating defeat by Israel inspired the rise of political Islam, which has grown in influence since then.
If Islamists came to power in many Arab states they would likely ban alcohol, homosexuality and pornographic images on the Internet and in film. For years, Islamists have complained about the millions of bikini-clad foreign tourists who frequent beach resorts in Arab countries, even though tourism helps keep their beleaguered economies afloat.
In addition, Arab societies have transformed over the last 30 years and are far more religious than Turkish society, even though an increasing number of Turks are embracing Islam in ways unseen since the Ottoman Empire.
Even if the Islamists in the Arab world had every intention of emulating Turkey's secular-style of government, they still would have to answer to the growing influence of religious authorities. These range from the scholars at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the 1,100-year-old seat of learning for Sunni Islam, to respected clerics in mosques and institutions stretching from Saudi Arabia to Qatar who have followers across the Arab world.
Religious authority in Turkey has always been part of the state structure, unlike in the Arab world, where religious scholars and imams have been free to interpret Islamic doctrine at will. Sheiks at Al-Azhar and religious scholars in the Gulf have been at odds over a range of fatwas, from whether the 9/11 attacks on the United States were justified to whether female circumcision is an Islamic duty or simply a cultural tradition that began in Africa and was adopted in Arab society.
By contrast, the state's control over Islamic interpretation has a long history in Turkey, one that continues today.
In forging his country into a secular state, Kemal Ataturk did not allow Islam to become a basis for opposition movements, as happened in the Arab world after the Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1928. Instead, the Turkish state institutionalized Islam by controlling the message and the messenger - only imams licensed by the state are allowed to preach in mosques - making interpretations of the faith subject to state approval.
Policy makers and pundits in the United States and Europe should not rush to judgment by assuming that the Turkish model can be applied elsewhere. Just as the Islamic world is not monolithic, so too will Islamic-style democracy vary in each country, should it develop at all.
Geneive Abdo, a fellow at The Century Foundation, is the author of several books on contemporary Islam, most recently "Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America After 9/11."

A new Turkey?

The no-alternative secular ideology of Ataturk appears shattered at last in Turkey, writes Hassan Nafaa*
Current political developments in Turkey are significant in more than one way. On Thursday 28 August, Abdullah Gul walked into the presidential palace. He did not do so as a guest who, by secular laws, cannot bring his veiled wife along, but rather as president of the state. Army commanders refused to give him the due military salute for a new president, but this hardly dampened his victory. For the first time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has an Islamic-leaning president.
The "secular" regime established by Ataturk following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was unusual in that it didn't evolve from a democratic process. Secularism in Turkey was a tool of denigrating and expunging religion, not just enforcing a separation between church and state. Initially, Ataturk contemplated keeping the caliphate as a religious institution with Vatican-style status, but the power struggle that developed during the liberation stage finally prompted him to dissolve the caliphate and its affiliate institutions, ban Sufi chapters, and strike out the constitutional provision stating that Islam was the official religion of the state.
Because such measures were taken in the absence of political pluralism and under a one party system, Turkish secularism became imbued with a tyrannical streak and got more obstinate as time went by. But despite the initial insistence of the ruling party on uprooting religion altogether, Islamic traditions managed to creep back for cultural as well as political reasons.
A few years before he died, Ataturk formed the Academy of History and Social Science in order to promote nationalist ideas. But this research institution soon found itself delving into an Ottoman past that cannot be examined in isolation from Islam, eventually becoming a bastion for the preservation of Islamic culture. When Ataturk died, the political system allowed some restricted pluralism to develop, and that provided a chance for the expression of Islamic sentiments. When a liberal group led by Adnan Menderes split from the ruling party, it advocated an end to anti-Islamic measures and to all legal restrictions on Muslim rituals.
The authoritarian implementation of secular slogans lasted in Turkey for a long time, creating a mood of cultural alienation as well as an identity crisis among various social groups, especially the middle and working classes. Public pressure for greater religious freedom encouraged the creation of Islamic- leaning political parties. The first such party was Necmeddin Erbakan's National Order Party, established in 1970.
Political Islam is more recent in Turkey than in other Arab and Islamic countries and yet more successful. Why is that? One can think of a few reasons. First, the harshness with which the army dealt with Islamists boosted their popularity. The army, which acts as a guardian of secular values, carried out four military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. The first coup brought down the government of Menderes, who was then executed for violation of secular laws. In 1997, the army deposed the government of Erbakan and disbanded his Refah Party. This excessive use of force, along with the ineptness and corruption of secular parties, increased public sympathy for the Islamists.
Second, Turkey's Islamists exhibited credible moderation, refusing to resort to violence or impose their opinion on others. The political and intellectual discourse of the Islamists became more moderate with time, and with every crisis the Islamists came out stronger. The policies of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) are a case in point. The JDP made a serious attempt to reconcile the Islamic heritage of Turkey with its European affiliations. Internally, the JDP adopted a modernist approach that accommodated religious sentiments. Externally, it maintained an independent approach without antagonising anyone. So although Turkey is a NATO member, the JDP refused to let US troops go into Iraq from Turkish territories in 2003. The strategic cooperation agreement Turkey has with Israel didn't prevent the JDP from forging close relations with Palestinian and Arab parties. And while defending Turkey's vital interests in Cyprus, the JDP pressed for membership in the EU.
Third, Turkey's Islamists maintained their unity in the face of hardship. Each time their parties awere banned, they created new ones. So the National Order Party became the Salvation Party, then Refah, then Virtue, and finally Justice and Development. Those constant changes didn't lead to a split within the ranks of the Islamists. Add to this the decay of secular parties due to corruption or stagnation and you'll see why the Islamists grew in popularity over time. In the 1973 election, Erbakan won 12 per cent of the vote with his Salvation Party. In 2002, Erdogan won 34 per cent of the vote with his JDP, then 47 per cent in the recent elections. Now the JDP is the main party in Turkey and for the first time ever it controls both the legislative and executive branches.
Can the JDP use its current political and constitutional power to rebuild Turkey's political and social life? Can the JDP make Turkey a solid and modern democracy? Can it help Turkey come to terms with its history and get over the political schizophrenia of the past? Or will its adversaries, especially the army, succeed in turning back the clock?
I believe that the JDP has a fair chance of succeeding, for the following reasons. First, the army has lost much of its credibility and is therefore unable to intervene in politics in the same way it did before. A reform process that started under Ecevit and continued under Erbakan saw the National Security Council (NSC) restructured and its power curbed. The NSC is now made up of nine civilians (instead of four) and five officers. Its secretary-general is a civilian who answers to the prime minister. NSC decisions are no longer binding on the government and can be challenged by parliament.
Second, secular Turkish parties, including leftist ones, have lost much of their popularity due to their opportunism and flagrant support for despotism and fascist nationalism. Ironically, the JDP seems to be the one political power that can be trusted to defend both liberal democracy and social justice in Turkey.
Third, there is a growing need, both regionally and internationally, to build up the Turkish model of Islamic moderation as an alternative to Iranian fundamentalism and so-called Sunni extremism. Many in Europe and the US believe that an assault on the Turkish model would ignite Islamic militancy in the region. Look at how France's Sarkozy changed his mind about Turkey's joining the EU after the recent Turkish elections.
This doesn't mean that a new, modern, stable and democratic Turkey is around the corner. There are many external factors that can change the situation drastically in Turkey, including President Bush ordering a strike on Iran. Should this happen, the Turkish army may regroup and try to reclaim its lost power, throwing the entire country into the realm of the unknown.
* The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.

LOOK BEYOND 9/11 TO FIND MIDDLE EAST ANSWERS

WASHINGTON -- As the sixth anniversary of the tragic attacks of 9/11 approach next week, we need to move beyond grieving, hating -- and fighting -- and look for deeper answers to the profound cultural, political and economic reasons behind those attacks. I think we may find some of them in the surprise election to the Turkish presidency last week of a man described by the nation's secular traditionalists as one of the "Islamists" the West so fears.

There are few who would congratulate me on such an insight. In fact, among many Europeans and the many Turks who follow the historic road of the great Kemal Ataturk, who first made a modern country out of Turkey by isolating politics from religion in the 1920s, the election of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as president is a frightening event.
Gul's party, the Islamist Justice and Development Party, with its threatening Islamic roots that it has largely risen beyond, still deeply worries many who cannot get past the idea that the party REALLY wants to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state. Now, with the prime ministership held for nearly five years by the party's cosmopolitan Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the presidency held by Gul, they fear anything can happen. And if it could happen in modernized Turkey, well, then it could happen anywhere in the Middle East!
But let me go out on that proverbial limb and suggest that it is, to the contrary, likely that the changes in Turkey offer some answers to the deeper problems of the Middle East. Essentially these are problems of governance, which in practice means balancing and resolving the demands of political power and religious power. They happen also to be the problems -- whether in Saudi Arabia or Egypt or elsewhere -- that led to 9/11 and that haunt us daily in Iraq.
The newly elected Gul, to start with, is no cave-dwelling Muslim fundamentalist. He is an attractive man in Western dress with a doctorate in economics, and with study in London and Exeter and work with the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia behind him. As foreign minister, he became known for pushing for Turkey to join the European Union, for changes in a law that punished writers for "insulting Turkishness," and for devising a set of democratic reforms.
But most important, Gul's party, under Erdogan's leadership, has brought the country to an impressive new prosperity with an Islamic entrepreneurial class that springs from the formerly rigidly conservative hinterlands. It is centered around the new industries of the city of Kayseri, where, amazingly, an Islamic middle class has been created for the first time in Turkish history.
When a small group of us met with Prime Minister Erdogan last May, he said with passion: "This is a very different country today. It has become an open society. To use an Internet expression, it's a state on a 24-hour basis, an online country, an island of prosperity and stability. Our GNP has gone from $182 billion in 2002 to $400 billion by 2006, and the per capita income has risen in those four years from $2,600 to $5,500.
"Turkey is determined to become a full member of the European Union. ... In Europe, we find the harbinger of the possibility of the alliance of civilizations. Our goal is to become a responsible modern society, and we are a people who have totally internalized democracy."
There has been little reason over the last five years to doubt such statements. But now the Justice Party holds both the prime ministership and the presidency, and that gives it extraordinary powers that it did not have before -- and no one can be absolutely sure how its officials will use those powers.
Before, the cities of Turkey were filled with secular cosmopolites who would be at home anywhere in the world, while the poor and benighted of the countryside dragged hopelessly behind. But today, the formerly isolated and fearful countryside is taking part in that entrepreneurial progress -- and not only in Turkey.
In progressive Tunisia, for instance, development is moving so rapidly (again, across class and religious lines) that poverty is now below 2 percent.
In troubled Pakistan, as The Wall Street Journal just reported, "a clear demonstration of confidence in the country's future is coming from an emerging economic force: entrepreneurs." Americans hear little about Syria except for its support of terrorism, but in fact, entrepreneurship is also thriving in Syria. Even Iran, which the White House sees as unidimensionally bad, is in the middle of a profound struggle between the past and a progressive modernism favored overwhelmingly by the young.
America sees little in the Middle East except the war in Iraq. Yet it is in these other countries that we pinpoint the true and ultimately decisive struggles: bringing the traditionally conservative countryside of the past peacefully into the modern world of the cities, blending the world of religion peacefully with the secular world, and building equity for all in societies formerly dominated by the few.
And so, six years after 9/11, even while we fight a war in Iraq that fails to address these issues, at least we should understand the contours of the crucial question: Can you be modern and Muslim? Turkey may again provide some answers.

Turkish politics The next battle

Abdullah Gul has been elected president. But the ruling AK party faces more conflict with the generals over a new constitution


“IT'S the final nail in the army's coffin.” That is how one pro-secular government official summed up the elevation of Abdullah Gul, a former Islamist, to the presidency on August 28th in the teeth of opposition from the country's generals. Others saw it as a moral victory for the pious masses over an overweening secular elite that has long concentrated power and wealth in its hands.

Either way, Mr Gul's journey from a working class family in the Anatolian heartland to the pinnacle of secular power will transform Turkish politics. The new era may promise greater liberties, but also more meddling from the army. As president, Mr Gul, until this month Turkey's respected foreign minister, will have the power to veto legislation and a say in the appointment of senior officials. Most discomfiting of all for the generals, Mr Gul is now their commander-in-chief.

The top brass refused to salute him during his first official engagement, and stayed away from his oath-taking ceremony this week. So too did Mr Gul's wife, whose Islamic-style headscarf came to embody the political crisis of the past four months, since Mr Gul first announced his candidacy. The head covering is banned in all government buildings and schools and, until this week, in the presidential compound where Ataturk, founder of the republic, once lived.

In his inaugural address, Mr Gul sought to ease the fears of his critics, insisting that he would abide by the secular principles of Ataturk's republic. He also showered praise on the generals and pledged to keep up Turkey's attempt to join the EU.

Yet the 56-year-old former economist hinted at a looser interpretation of Turkey's unique brand of secularism. Until now this has been defined by Ataturk's renunciation of Islamic symbols and rigid state control over all aspects of religious life. Secularism, said Mr Gul, was a precondition for “social peace” but also offered a model “for different lifestyles”. Some seized on his words as proof that he will support loosening restrictions on the headscarf and religious education.

Much will depend on his former boss, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Justice and Development (AK) Party was swept back into office in July's elections. These were called after a prolonged trial of strength that began when the army, backed by the pro-secular judiciary, tried to stop Mr Gul's attempt to become president. The generals, who have toppled four governments since 1960, threatened to intervene again but have so far stayed their hand.

As Mr Gul approved a new pro-EU cabinet this week, another clash loomed over a “civilian” constitution that Mr Erdogan proposes to adopt next year to replace the current text, written by the generals after their last coup in 1980. Draft clauses leaked to the media are nothing short of revolutionary: senior officers will no longer be immune from prosecution in civilian courts, military appeals courts will be scrapped, Kurdish will be taught as a second language in government schools and the definition of Turkishness will be expanded to embrace citizens from different backgrounds and creeds.

The army is unnerved. Pundits reckon Yasar Buyukanit, the chief of general staff, was alluding to the new constitution when he spoke of “centres of evil” bent on eroding secularism in a statement this week. Some expect that the generals may now to try to drive a wedge between the president and Mr Erdogan. There has long been an undercurrent of rivalry in their political alliance. Moreover, the new constitution also calls for a significant trimming of presidential powers. Might Mr Gul be tempted to block it? This may be wishful thinking by the humbled generals.

Turkey and Iran Too energetic a friendship

An attempt to bypass Russia annoys the United States


COCKING a snook at America seems an odd way to launch a second term in office for a government eager to prove its pro-Western credentials. Yet that is what Turkey's mildly Islamist Justice and Development party (AK) appears to be doing, just weeks after its landslide victory in the July 22nd parliamentary election.

Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, dispatched his energy minister, Hilmi Guler, to Iran last week where he concluded a raft of deals. They include the establishment of a joint company to carry up to 35 billion cubic metres of Iranian natural gas via Turkey to Europe, and the construction of three thermal power plants by Turkish companies in Iran.

America swiftly complained. “If you ask our opinion, do we think it's the right moment to be making investments in the Iranian oil and gas sector, no we don't,” sniffed a State Department spokesman. There were mutterings about possible sanctions. But Turkey insists it has the right to pursue its interests. And Iran is delighted. “Nobody can come between Iran and Turkey,” Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, crowed recently.

Mr Erdogan's critics have seized on his dealings with Iran as proof that he is trying to steer Turkey away from the West. In fact, they have just the opposite aim: to boost Turkey's chances of joining the European Union by making it a vital energy corridor for oil and gas flowing between the energy-rich former Soviet states, the Middle East and Europe.

This is not as far-fetched as it sounds. EU countries import half their energy, with around a fifth of their oil and gas coming from Russia's state monopoly, Gazprom. The need to diversify sources was driven home in 2005 when Gazprom arbitrarily increased the price of gas it supplies to Ukraine by pipeline. Russia's use of its energy riches to flex its muscles on the world stage is one reason why America is lobbying so hard for the creation of an east-west energy corridor—a network of oil and gas pipelines running from former Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan via Turkey, and on to European markets.

The first big step towards weakening Russia's grip was the inauguration in 2005 of a multi-billion-dollar pipeline carrying Azerbaijani oil from offshore Caspian fields to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, in the southern Mediterranean. This provocation, from the Russian point of view, was compounded by the launch of a parallel line carrying natural gas from Azerbaijan (and eventually, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan), which was completed last year. But Gazprom hit back by raising the price of the gas it sells to the Azerbaijanis, who rely on Russia for nearly half their supply.

This, in turn, forced them to use more of their own gas, leaving them unable to fill the Turkish pipeline, which lay idle until last month.

In a further blow, Gazprom announced a venture with Italy's Eni in June to build a line across the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria. All this makes it less likely that Turkey will, by 2011, achieve its dream of extending a recently completed pipeline to Greece as far as southern central Europe.

That is why Turkey has turned to Iran, according to Necdet Pamir, a veteran Turkish energy analyst. Iranian gas would not only help to fill the Nabucco pipeline, another mooted conduit from the Middle East or Central Asia, bypassing Russia, but would also reduce Turkey's own dependence on Russian supplies: over half of Turkey's natural-gas demand is met by Gazprom. Unlike the former Soviet producers, Iran controls several shipping lanes and borders Turkey. “The paradox for America is that Iran is the only country other than Iraq that can truly undermine Russia's [energy] supremacy,” observes Mr Pamir.

TURKEY AND ISLAM Tolerance and tradition in Turkey

Turkey, the first secular republic with a majority Muslim population, is expected to soon have a president who prays in public and whose wife wears a headscarf as a manifestation of her religious convictions. Anti-religious secularists in the Muslim world see this development as a threat to Turkey's laicism. But it could also be an opportunity to define secularism in the Muslim world as a political system ensuring separation of theology and state rather than as an anti-religious ideology.

For almost a century, secular elites in Muslim countries have equated secularization with renunciation of Islamic symbols and practices. This rejection of traditional religion was initially a reaction to the efforts of Muslim clerics to enforce Islam by law. But the radical secularism of authoritarian regimes, such as that of the shah of Iran, has contributed to the rise and expansion of Islamist radicalism. Islamists portray their religion as being in danger; the exclusion of practicing Muslims from the power structure in majority Muslim states helps the Islamists build that argument.

The threat to secularism in the Muslim world comes from religious intolerance, not from individual acts of piety. Turkey's election of a conservative Muslim president need not be seen as a deviation from its secular ideals. It is a much-needed embrace of a path different from that of radical Islam as well as radical secularism.

The Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish initials, AK), led by Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan, won parliamentary polls in July with 47 percent of the popular vote and a clear majority of seats in the Grand National Assembly. This was a significant improvement over the 34 percent share of the vote it won in 2002 - an election that first brought the conservative party with Islamist roots to power.

The elections last month were called earlier than scheduled because of an inconclusive presidential vote in April, when, the AK Party's nominee for president, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, faced severe opposition from Turkey's secular establishment led by the military. Gul's election was blocked by technical maneuvers backed by the outgoing president and top army generals, notwithstanding the AK Party's majority in Parliament.

This time around, the party has again nominated Gul for president and, given the recent resounding popular mandate for AK Party, the army might not be able to block his election short of an improbable military coup.

Although the AK Party grew out of a succession of Islamist parties banned by Turkish courts, it describes itself as a moderate conservative party rather than an Islamist one. It does not seek the enforcement of Shariah law, and its performance in office during its first term confirms its claims.

Although both Erdogan and Gul are practicing Muslims who were once active in the Islamist movement, their first stint in office reflected an effort to distance themselves from Islamist politics. Under Erdogan, Turkey pursued European Union membership, maintained close ties with the United States and Israel, and attained new levels of economic prosperity.

The AK Party government has not curtailed civil liberties and continues to observe the basic tenets of secularism by keeping religion out of its political decisions. In the post-9/11 world, Islamist parties and leaders in several countries have become instant converts to moderation. The AK Party's critics insist that it has changed only strategically and that it would revert to demanding Shariah rule if and when it gets a chance.

Such fears must be weighed only in light of available evidence, and so far the evidence favors AK Party's credentials as a religiously conservative party willing to operate within the broad principles of secularism.

For too long, the Muslim world has been polarized between secularists who want all public manifestations of Islamic religion banished from their countries and Islamists who insist on reverting to obscurantist theocracy.

This polarization cannot come to an end without secularists tolerating the practice of religion and Islamists moving away from radical Islam to a middle where individuals can be Islamic even though the state is secular.

As in the West, Muslims need to be able to fuse faith and enlightenment while also accepting the rights of unbelievers.

Under a Gul presidency, Turkey will hopefully continue to combine tolerance with tradition. This would open the way for secularism in the Islamic world that concerns itself with protecting individual freedom and pluralism instead of being preoccupied with debates over issues such as headscarves.

Turkey Ready to take office

Turkey's Abdullah Gul will soon become president. Then what?

ABDULLAH GUL, Turkey's foreign minister, took another step towards the presidency on Monday August 20th as parliamentarians held a first round of voting for the post. Mr Gul, a pious Muslim whose earlier bid for the job sparked political turmoil, won 341 votes in the 550-member chamber. He fell short of the two-thirds of ballots needed to win the presidency outright in the first round, though he is all but assured of eventual victory. His closest rival, Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, a former defence minister fielded by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), got just 70 votes.

Mr Gul is expected to become president after a third round of voting on August 28th, when a simple majority will suffice. He is backed by his ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party, which won 341 seats in snap parliamentary polls last month. The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) boycotted Monday's session and claimed that Mr Gul's earlier involvement in Islamist politics posed a threat to the secular system laid down by the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk.

The job of president is partly ceremonial, but the incumbent has influence over politics through his right to block legislation. He may also name judges and veto appointments to the government and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Mr Gul’s first go at the presidency in April was greeted with mass anti-government rallies called by secularists, including many women who voiced concern that their liberal lifestyles might be threatened. Tensions escalated when the army, which has toppled four governments since 1960, threatened to intervene. His effort came to an end when the constitutional court upheld a claim by the CHP that the parliament lacked a quorum in a first round of balloting. The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then called an early general election.

In the event, the AK Party romped back for a second term with nearly 47% of the vote. Four years of robust economic growth, political calm and democratic reforms have kept the public happy. Voters may also have been offering a mandate for Mr Gul’s attempt on the presidency. Fearful of a fresh dust-up with the army, Mr Erdogan at first balked at his colleague's continued presidential ambitions. But Mr Gul persisted and won the backing of the AK's conservative rump led by Bulent Arinc, a former speaker of parliament, forcing Mr Erdogan’s hand. As important, the MHP announced after the elections that its parliamentarians would take part in the vote for president, ensuring there would be a quorum.

Mr Gul says that, as president, he will reach out to all Turks and that he will remain loyal to the secular tenets of the constitution. His four years as foreign minister leave little room for doubt. He was the driving force behind the many reforms that persuaded European Union leaders to open long delayed membership talks with Turkey in 2005. And it was Mr Gul who engineered the defection of fellow moderates from the overtly Islamist Welfare Party which was bullied out of office by the generals in 1997.

His sole handicap appears to be his wife, Hayrunnisa. She wears the Islamic style headscarf that is banned in all government buildings and schools. In a sop to the secularists she is expected to tie it in a more fashionable style. Over time they should grow accustomed to her headgear just as they eventually accepted Mr Erdogan's wife, Emine, who became the first ever prime ministerial spouse to cover her head.

As for relations with the army, there remains scope for more tensions with the ruling politicians. Mr Erdogan is promising to write a new “civilian” constitution to replace the one that was imposed by the generals after their last direct coup in 1980. But Mr Gul is, for now, playing down the prospects of confrontation. It is rumoured that he has already met the chief of general staff, Yasar Buyukanit, in recent days to offer personal assurances that he will not stray from Ataturk’s path, although Mr Buyukanit denies any meeting has taken place. It would seem to be in nobody’s interest to spark fresh political upheaval once again.

The A.K.P.'s Complex Victory in Turkey

The A.K.P.'s Complex Victory in Turkey
Drafted By: Dario Cristiani
http://www.pinr.com

On July 22, 2007, the Turkish public voted in early parliamentary elections called after the parliament failed to appoint a new president. The election of a new chief of state was the reason for the political stalemate in April and May and of the harsh split between the Kemalist military establishment of the Turkish Armed Forces (T.S.K.) and the Justice and Development Party (A.K.P.), the Islamic-rooted party led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The attempt at appointing an important Islamic political personality, such as Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, as the new president was the last straw between the T.S.K. and the A.K.P.

The military perceived the appointment of Gul as a presidential candidate (the president is also the commander-in-chief of the T.S.K.) as a direct menace for Turkey and its secular character. It also saw the act as one that would further weaken the power of the military. In light of these developments, the Republican People's Party (C.H.P.), the leftist party created by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and whose ideology is based on a strict observance of the principles of Ataturk, moved to block the election of Gul as president and, after the second failed vote, Gul withdrew his candidacy.

The results of the July 22 elections were as follows: the A.K.P. came in first with about 46.5 percent of the vote and will have 341 seats in the next Turkish unicameral parliament, which is made up of 550 seats. The C.H.P. came in second with about 21 percent of the vote, giving it 112 seats in the new parliament. The ultra-nationalist and right-oriented Nationalist Movement Party (M.H.P.) came in third with 14.3 percent of the vote, giving it 70 seats. The independents took 26 seats and a large part of them were from the Party for a Democratic Society (D.T.P.), the Kurdish party.

The Structural Roots of A.K.P. Consensus

The elections have represented a sort of paradox for the A.K.P.: they have demonstrated how the party has strongly increased its popular support but, at the same time, has fewer seats than before the elections. That is because the M.H.P. has exceeded the electoral threshold of ten percent. Hence, while the A.K.P. has received an autonomous parliamentary majority, it does not have the capability to elect the president on its own.

The elections, however, have demonstrated again the electoral power and the consensus that the A.K.P. has among the Turkish electorate. This consensus is rooted in a series of structural and contingent factors, which explain how the A.K.P. has strengthened its popular support during the past few years.

From a structural viewpoint, the first factor that must be taken into account is the progressive Islamization of the public and political space in Turkey. Such a development, even though abhorred by the military and secularist elites, has allowed Islam, its symbols and its cultural and social values to play a stronger role in the public discourse and to be a fully recognized part, by the largest component of the population, of the Turkish political mainstream.

Certainly, the presence in power of the A.K.P. since 2002 has reinforced such a trend, with Islam and Islamic values becoming the core of the political discourse. However, the process began before the A.K.P. took power and its increasing consensus is partly a result of the resurgence of Islam in the political sphere.

The second structural factor is the presence of a new, different middle class, characterized for its Islamic roots, in search of political representation. The so-called "green capitalists," united under the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD), promote an Islamic, conservative vision of society associated with a liberal and market-oriented vision of the economy. The emergence of such a social and political actor is one of the more durable results of the economic liberalization process and the market-oriented reforms implemented by the Turgut Ozal-led government in the 1980s.

The appearance of such a group has created a new economic power faction, whose creation has had several important political implications. It has represented not only an economic concurrent for the secular state elite, but a political one too. This new middle class has weakened the concept of a "strong state," a stronghold of Turkey since its foundation, and one of the consequences of such a weakening has been the end of the hegemony of secularism and nationalism as the main political narratives within the Turkish political scene.

Unlike its predecessors, the A.K.P. has repudiated the Welfare Party and Virtue Party legacy, in order to avoid a new "February 28, 1997" -- the day in which the T.S.K. ousted the Welfare Party from power -- with the aim of demonstrating the clear discontinuity between these experiences and its full acceptance of the modern lifestyle, the secular nature of the Turkish republic and the parliamentary confrontation, managing, at the same time, to keep intact its credentials as an Islamic-oriented party.

Moreover, the A.K.P. has an impressive and branched party machine and a strong network of local administrators. These two elements give the party a rooted and deeper presence in the country, which is a tool for building and consolidating its consensus. The presence of many A.K.P. mayors and the control over the local administrations, strengthened after the local elections in 2004, give the party a fundamental instrument for creating several consensus networks using welfare and local services in order to reinforce the clientele networks based on the lavishing of jobs in the public sector or the redistributing of wealth, above all in the less developed areas of the country.

Contingent Factors of the A.K.P. Affirmation and the Weakness of Nationalist Responses

In the affirmation of the A.K.P. in the latest election, an important role has been played by those factors closely linked to the political and economic situation in the country. For example, the economic growth rate of the country, close to 5.5 percent in 2006, and the overall economic record of the A.K.P. government in the past five years are elements that have had a fundamental role in its victory.

Moreover, the performance of the A.K.P. as a reformist party during its first mandate in the way of European Union membership, even though such an attitude has been weakened in the past two years, has caused liberal sectors of the society to look with interest to the A.K.P.

The run toward the European Union is an important goal for Turkey; however, Erdogan and his party have used the European Union also as an instrument for changing the domestic political and institutional panorama and the internal balance of power. The power of the military establishment has been weakened by the reforms implemented with the aim of fulfilling the so-called "Copenhagen Criteria."

A clear example of such an attitude has been the popular response to the April 27 Military Memorandum, which has not been as strong as it has been in the past for a similar event. Erdogan has also used as a propaganda instrument military interference within the political arena. He has tried to show that the A.K.P. is a genuine democratic force concerned about the future of democracy in Turkey and that the party wants to "normalize" the democratic life of the country, avoiding direct interference by the army in the political sphere. Hence, it has been a tool to acquire leverage and influence over the more liberal sectors of Turkish society that do not agree with an active role of the military in politics.

Finally, the lack of electoral depth of the political adversaries was the final factor. The concern, that still exists in some sectors of Turkish society, over the possible existence of a hidden, radical Islamist agenda of the A.K.P., expressed by the military and the nationalist parties, has not been as strong as in the largest part of the electorate. The main adversaries of the A.K.P. -- the C.H.P. and the M.H.P. -- have only played the nationalist card. Such a move has been useful for securing their targeted electorate, but this has prevented them from gaining influence over the part of the electoral body farther from their positions. By choosing the card of a harsh nationalist response to the moves of the Erdogan-led party, they have polarized the electorate: on one side, there are the nationalist and secular electors, while on the other there are the rest, consisting of the conservatives, the Islamic-oriented population, the lower middle-class, the liberals and the part of the left that does not agree with the aggressive nationalist turn of the C.H.P.

Conclusion

The impressive victory of the A.K.P. in a country in which the ruling party has had historic difficulty being reelected is rooted in many structural factors. However, while this victory has reinforced the government's party from a political viewpoint, from a strictly numerical point of view the A.K.P. does not have the necessary numbers to appoint a party's candidate as chief of state. It will need the support of other parliamentarians in order to reach the threshold of 367 members.

In the end, the situation is complex and unclear. The candidature of Gul will bring further tension within the Turkish political scene. The military will try to move in to avoid an election of an Islamic-oriented president, even though they are weaker than before. The political problem correlated to the election of the chief of state could also bring some problems to the tenure of Erdogan's position within the party.

The A.K.P. clearly won the latest elections, but the problems that it is going to face are more difficult and complex than they were prior to the elections.

Report Drafted By:
Dario Cristiani

Ataturk’s Turkey: A Model For the Greater Middle East?

Sedat Laciner

Friday , 17 August 2007

Recently, there is a hot debate on Turkey’s importance as model for Iraq, Pakistan or any Muslim country among the American thinkers. ‘Turkish model prescription’ is very important for the US who has confronted with difficulties in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq. US decision-makers have no hope for Muslim democratization or liberalization, they think that Muslims can not become democrats, Muslims can not develop liberal economy and Muslims can not be integrated to the global political and economic system. The Western World has lost its all hopes about Iran and Arabs. For them, Arab means poverty, war, terrorism, backwardness, uneducated children and humiliated women. Iranians are similarly perceived as barbarian, militarist people who want to destroy Israel and the West. The US’ post 9/11 measures against terrorism and extremism nourished religionist terrorism and extreme movements in Muslim world instead of moderate groups. Despite of this simple fact, the fresh republican prescriptions for international terrorism and relations with the Muslims are not different and/or better than Bush policies. For example, one of the republican presidential nominees affirmed “If there is a need, we will bomb Mecca and Medina, two holiest Muslim cities.” Proposal of the Democrats is not much different than the Republicans’. Even Democrat presidential candidate Barrack Obama, who is pacifist and anti-militarist, affirmed that the US may occupy Pakistani territories and overthrow Musharraf’s government in order to fight terrorists. Similarly in Netherlands, which is considered the most liberal European country, there are some discussions about forbidding Koran, Islam’s holly book.


In such an atmosphere, Turkey appears as a different example compared with the rest of the Muslim world. Even tough Turkey has no natural energy resources; it is the biggest economy among the Muslim countries. Turkish economy is the 5th largest economy of Europe and 17th of the world. By courtesy of economic reforms realized within last years, Turkish economy became industrial and service economy instead of agrarian economy. Level of education, use of internet and other educational indicators are closer to European countries than Muslim countries. During last 5 years, thanks to the legal reforms important clauses of Turkish law (including penalty of death) were changed. As a result of the economic, political and legal reforms, the European Union (EU) accepted that Turkish democracy, human rights records and Turkish economy fulfilled the criteria for full membership to European Union and negotiations for full membership started on 3 October 2005. It means that Turkey’s membership to the European Union is a matter of time.

This awkward Muslim country, Turkey, attracts specially US’s attention and the American intellectuals and experts try to understand secret of this success. For them, reason of this success is Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his up-to-down policies of modernization. In other words, Americans and some Europeans do the same mistake again; they simplify cases, explain the causes as they want to see (wishful thinking). But Turkey’s story can not be reduced only to Ataturk or anyone in spite of Ataturk’s undeniable contribution to Turkish development. Moreover, the model that Ataturk formed can not be evaluated as dictatorship or “aggressive reforms” under the military protection. A society can not be changed only by the efforts of a man; democracy, human rights and liberalism can not nourish under any army’s pressure. Secret of Turkey’s success story is more complex than the Western experts think.

First of all, ‘Turkish Islam’ concept has always been different than other Muslim nations’ religious understanding. Ghaznavid Empire (Gazneliler), Karakhanids (Karahanlar), Seljuk Empire (Selcuklular), Ottoman Empire (Osmanlilar) and other Turkish states in the past saw expanding Islamic borders as ultimate aim as French, Italian states who had seen increasing Christianity as state politics. But these Turkish states at the same time were never been administered by solely religious rules contrarily to modern Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although Turkish Sultans were caliph, they did not act as the highest ecclesiastic, thus the religious rules didn’t dominate the society. Ottoman sultans acted as a secular political power and Sheyhülislam (the chief religious official in the Ottoman Empire) represented religious authority. However, when Sultan’s and Sheyhülislam’s point of view were in contradiction in any issue, the Sheyhülislam lost his post and ‘secular’ Sultan’s decisions were implemented. Although the Ottoman Empire is defined as modern Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan or Iran in some books published in Western countries, in reality, the Ottoman case was so different. There were pubs in 19th century Ottoman Empire, people wore whatever they wanted with no official pressure and religious and sectional minorities executed their religious exercises without restriction. Chief rabbi, Armenian, Bulgarian, and Greek Patriarchs were deputies for the Sultan, and Jewish and Christian minorities were autonomous in their internal affairs, including legal issues and taxation.

It could be argued that Turkish people and statesmen acknowledged their mistakes about politics, religion and economics earlier than other Muslim peoples. As early as the end of the 18th century the Ottomans started to discuss why European countries were relatively more developed than the Ottoman Empire and they started to introduce reforms. In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was part of the European system and balance of power and Europeanization in diplomacy, politics, social life and economy continued during the 19th century. The Ottoman State even applied some of the fundamental concepts of modern liberal democracy such as democracy, decentralization, liberal economy, liberty, civic rights, constitution and fundamental rights to its very values and principles in 19th century. The Ottomans had parliamentary system almost more than one century ago. At the end of 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was a parliamentary kingdom as most of the European states. At this period of time, the Ottoman Empire had elections, a constitution, an elected parliament, a lively press and an opposition who criticized even the Sultan and the government. Minority rights were also under statutory protection. If we compare Ottoman Empire and other European States by this point of view, we see no substantial difference between them. At the beginning of the 20th century, Sultan’s competences were reduced and governments formed by the Committee of Union and Progress party were more powerful than the Sultan. At this period of time, the Sultanate was a more symbolical position. Reforms executed by Ataturk after the foundation of Turkish Republic had been proposed and even started to implant at this period of time. For example, use of Latin letters, change of weekend holidays, costume reform, reforms in educational system, support to modern arts, etc. were all Ottoman ideas. Modern educational system for instance wasn’t fully formed after foundation of Turkish Republic. II. Abdulhamit had made great contribution to establish fundamentals of modern educational system in Turkey. Primary, secondary and high schools were built not only in the city centers but also in the remote towns during the Hamidian period.

Another important factor which makes Turkey different than other Muslim states is that Turkey had never been colony of any other Western countries. Except for the short occupation period which was after First World War, more than 1000 years, Turkish people have been independent. In addition to independence, they could stand puissant against the Western World for a long time. The self-confidence and self-reliance of the Turks continued during the 20th century and Turkey has been one of the rare countries who could debate the problems with the Western countries equally. For example, Turkish war of independence was against the western countries, Turkish army’s detachment to Cyprus came true in spite of the US’s USSR’s and European Communities’ (EU’s) strong objections. And also, although Turkey has disagreements with western countries on Armenian issue, Cyprus issue and even on combating terrorism issue, sometimes Turkey can execute its policies without asking the West’s permission or support. When we compare Turkish attitude before the West with Arab Governments’ submissive attitudes, Turkey’s difference could easily be understood. That’s why after the Iraq War one of the Lebanese newspaper called Turkey ‘more Arab than the Arab states’.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk Model

In brief, Ataturk was one of the best Ottoman generals and he succeeded to realize the transformation at Turkish Republic that Sultans and the CUP at Ottoman Empire tried to perform. Unfortunately, the number of articles at which Ataturk is defined as a ‘dictator’ or militarist has increased recently. At these articles Ataturk is compared to Hitler and Saddam Hussein and only difference between Ataturk and them is explained by Ataturk’s success and the others’ failure. All these claims are not true and not.

Although Ataturk was a soldier, reforms that he executed didn’t aim to form a militarist country. Even when the country was surrounded by conflicts, Ataturk and his friends didn’t delay the elections and Mustafa Kemal defined the parliament as the uppermost authority over any power. Deputies had ardent discussions while deciding to ratify Mustafa Kemal’s supreme military commend though the enemy armies were just 90 km away from the Parliament. In a phrase, Ataturk refused to abjure the will of people even at war. While organizing resistance, he lost his military ranks and continued organizing the war of salvation as a civilian. After the foundation of Turkish Republic, he preferred to define himself as a civilian. He might declare himself general or the super-general as the leaders in many Third World countries did, but he did not follow such a way. Ataturk even forced his friend to leave their military posts when they applied for general elections. ‘Ataturk laws’ prevented the soldiers to make politics. The generals had to chooce military post or MP seat in the parliament. It was obligatory to choose to become a civilian to be a candidate at elections. In this frame, some of Ataturk’s friends abdicated and became politicians while the others chose to continue their work as soldiers. In most of militarist, authoritarian countries, politicians prefer to call themselves by military appellations although they had never been soldiers in the past.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk told that continuity of republic is depended on education and developed economy instead of military instruments. That’s why he gave more importance to education which makes Turkey different than many other Muslim countries. Unlike Saddam-like leaders in the Muslim world, Mustafa Kemal did not try to create a one-leader country. Republican educational system aimed to create a pluralistic youth, because Kemal had no doubt that pluralism and free minds are the only way to save Turkey’s future. Mustafa Kemal’s ideal country was United Kingdom, United States or revolutionary France, not the Soviet Union or Hitler’s Germany

People who affirm that Mustafa Kemal was a dictator show the number of political parties at that time and ineffectiveness of opposition as proofs. This is an anachronistic approach. At that period of time, Turkey was as liberal and democrat as many other European countries. We should remember that the Czech Republic was the only liberal state at continental Europe at this period. Ataturk made efforts to pass to multiparty system but because of international crisis and conjectural depressions in Turkey, he couldn’t succeed. But after Ataturk’s presidency, Ismet Inonu, one of his closest friends, succeeded to pass to a multiparty system. And in 1950, multiparty system started to be carried out without pressure of Western countries and Turkey took part between the prestigious countries of Europe by the courtesy of its relatively liberal and democratic structure.

Defining Ataturk as a dictator, whose power depends only on army, and offering such a model for countries like Pakistan and Iraq is a capital mistake. Unfortunately, the Western World misunderstands Ataturk’s policies and Turkish model just like they misunderstand the Middle East in general.

17 August 2007

Translated by Jale Aktug and Meral Tuzce