Wednesday, September 12, 2007
Black Turks on the offensive —Ijaz Hussain
Many analysts believe that the real reason for the Turkish army’s unrelenting hostility towards the AKP lies less in its desire to protect secular values and more to guard its own powers and privileges, which it sees under attackThe newly elected Turkish President Abdullah Gul is persona non-grata for the Turkish army whose chiefs refused to extend him the protocol he deserved as commander-in-chief of the armed forces or as president of the Republic. For example, they were absent from his swearing in ceremony in the Parliament and failed to greet him at the Victory Day parade. They treated his wife and that of the prime minister no differently as they refused to invite them to the state functions. Analysts explain the snub in terms of the army’s suspicion of the AKP leaders’ commitment to secular values on which the Turkish Republic is founded and its belief that the AKP is working on the Islamist agenda. What does this tug of war portend for Turkey?The Turkish army that claims to be the guardian of the constitution has always suspected the Islamists of promoting their political agenda. It has a long history of overthrowing such governments, the last being that of Necmettin Erbakan in 1997. The army has not forgotten that President Gul was a minister in the Islamist government of Erbakan and supposedly made statements in the past against secularism and in favour of political Islam. This is compounded by the fact that his wife wears a headscarf, which symbolises Islamist outlook. According to the Turkish army, the case of Gul’s former boss and the head of the AKP Prime Minister Erdogan is no different; he, too, was an ardent follower of Erbakan, whose hands he would kiss with reverence. The army also blames Erdogan for making statements critical of secularism and favourable to political Islam. It cites, in particular, the poem in which he compared minarets with bayonets, domes with helmets, mosques with barracks and believers with soldiers and for which he received a prison sentence in addition to being banned from active politics.The AKP leaders now claim that they have changed; that they have renounced their Islamist past and are now firmly committed to the secular orientation of the Republic. The Turkish army is, however, not convinced of their claims. It believes that the leopard has not changed its spots and that the AKP leadership is merely engaged in the well-known Islamic practice of dissimulation (takiyye), hiding its true intentions and would show its true colours at an appropriate time. It refuses to consider the fact that, unlike Erbakan, the AKP leadership has worked for Turkey’s entry into the EU which would never accept an Islamist country; and that a section of the liberal electorate that voted for the AKP in the recent general elections accepts the party’s credentials. Many analysts believe that the real reason for the Turkish army’s unrelenting hostility towards the AKP lies less in its desire to protect secular values and more to guard its own powers and privileges, which it sees under attack. They cite in this regard the example of the National Security Council (NSC) through which the army used to impose its will on the Parliament and the government; the AKP leadership in its earlier stint in office successfully ensured that the NSC was transformed into a toothless body. They also cite the AKP’s reported intention to get the army-imposed 1982 constitution, which is the source of most of the powers and privileges that the army currently enjoys, replaced by a “civilian” constitution.The AKP has not yet revealed details of the proposed constitution as it is still working on it. However, the salient features that have appeared in the press are sufficient to scare secularists including the pashas (read: the army) as it puts their vested interests in jeopardy. For example, the proposed constitution envisages reforming the judiciary and the universities the secularists dominate. Similarly, it would require the head of the armed forces to report to the defence minister rather than the prime minister, which is the case presently. Again, it proposes to remove the exemption that rulings of the high military board currently enjoy from judicial review. The AKP intends to submit the final document to public for referendum, which it can only win if it enjoys support across the board including that from the liberals. How are secularists including the army likely to respond to the challenge?It is undeniable that secularist forces are terribly upset with the new development. This is evident from the fact that even before the ‘draft constitution’ sees the light of the day they are up in arms against it. For example, the Turkish daily Radikal rhetorically asks, “why is the “civilian” constitution being hidden from the civilians?” The Republican People’s Party, the main opposition secular party, has equated the move as a conspiracy to dismantle the secular principles of the Republic and has therefore pledged to resist it. Given the deep divisions within the Turkish society, it appears as if the coming battle on the constitution may be nothing short of an Armageddon. Though the army must be terribly upset with the AKP move, it would be hard for it to intervene for two reasons. First, the AKP enjoys popular support of 47% of the electorate that voted for it in the general elections (including a large section of liberals. With this kind of support, the pashas would think twice before moving. Secondly, the AKP enjoys unwavering EU support for the proposed change as the latter has been suggesting repeal or amendment of a large number of articles of the constitution to bring them in conformity with its own standards. The army knows that any action against the Erdogan government would not go down well with Brussels and would spell disaster for Turkey.Does the adoption of the “civilian” constitution augur well for Turkey? The secularists including the army do not think so because, in their opinion, it would erode the principle of the separation of state and religion, downgrade the army and foment ethnic divisions, particularly in the Kurdish southeast. These fears are largely unfounded because the real reason for the army’s opposition is its desire to perpetuate its hold on power through scare tactics. Nor is the fear of the Islamists dismantling secularism and introducing the Sharia rule warranted because the ever-vigilant Western world and domestic public opinion would never allow it to happen. Already the prediction that the Islamists’ first election is the last one has proved wrong, as the AKP has held second general elections. Whereas the incubus of Islamist threat is largely unfounded, the proposed change promises to be immensely beneficial for Turkey. The Kemalists have very little knowledge of the West or the true meaning of secularism. Their secularism is essentially anti-religion and imitates external Western forms while refusing to incorporate the core Western values of tolerance, liberalism and democracy in their worldview. The militant secularism they profess has divided the Turkish society into “white” and “black Turks”: the former have appropriated most of the powers and privileges while the latter have been left disenfranchised. The “civilian” constitution promises to bring about a paradigm shift in the power structure and rectify this imbalance by providing a level playing field to the both. The writer is a former dean of social sciences at the Quaid-i-Azam University. He can be reached at hussain_ijaz@hotmail.com
Islamists won't follow Turkey's lead
Can Turkey's Justice and Development Party become a model for the ideal marriage between Islam and democracy that could be replicated in the Middle East?
Some Muslim intellectuals, politically correct commentators in the West and officials from the European Union seem to think so. They argue that the recent election of Abdullah Gul as president of Turkey and the success in parliamentary polls last July of his AK Party (as it is known in Turkey) are sound reasons to believe that a party comprised of Islamists can hold free elections, win at the polls and then run a state that is democratic and secular.
This presumption, however, rests upon the false belief that Turkey is much like the rest of the Islamic world and that all Islamists are similar to the leaders of the AK Party. For one thing, AK Party leaders should not be identified as "Islamists." As Gul declared during his acceptance speech: "Secularism, one of the basic principles of our republic, is a rule of social peace."
Islamists in most Muslim societies do not favor a secular state. In Jordan and Egypt, for example, unofficial Islamist parties and movements are fighting for Shariah, Islamic law, to be the guiding light for governing. Shariah-based governance, in fact, has been one of the foundations of opposition movements against authoritarian rulers in the Arab world for the last 30 years.
And it is not only the Islamists who are advocating Islamic law. The majority of Muslims surveyed in Arab countries, and in other Muslims societies, say they prefer that Islamic law be either a source, or the sole source, of legislation. By contrast, according to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, support for Islamic law in Turkey has never exceeded 20 percent.
As far back as 1981, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt tried to appease his country's Islamists by revising the Constitution to mandate Shariah as the primary source of legislation. Islamic law has never been enforced, however, and today this has become one of main battle cries of the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition to Egypt's governing National Democratic Party.
Although many moderate Islamists in the Middle East admire the AK Party's success, the way ahead for them is far more difficult. The vast historical differences between Turkey and the region's other countries also have to be taken into account.
The AK Party was born out of the more ideological Welfare Party, but then evolved to become more in line with Turkey's secular tradition. By contrast, secularism in the Arab world peaked in the 1950s and 60s, then came to a halt with the Six Day War of 1967. The Arabs' humiliating defeat by Israel inspired the rise of political Islam, which has grown in influence since then.
If Islamists came to power in many Arab states they would likely ban alcohol, homosexuality and pornographic images on the Internet and in film. For years, Islamists have complained about the millions of bikini-clad foreign tourists who frequent beach resorts in Arab countries, even though tourism helps keep their beleaguered economies afloat.
In addition, Arab societies have transformed over the last 30 years and are far more religious than Turkish society, even though an increasing number of Turks are embracing Islam in ways unseen since the Ottoman Empire.
Even if the Islamists in the Arab world had every intention of emulating Turkey's secular-style of government, they still would have to answer to the growing influence of religious authorities. These range from the scholars at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the 1,100-year-old seat of learning for Sunni Islam, to respected clerics in mosques and institutions stretching from Saudi Arabia to Qatar who have followers across the Arab world.
Religious authority in Turkey has always been part of the state structure, unlike in the Arab world, where religious scholars and imams have been free to interpret Islamic doctrine at will. Sheiks at Al-Azhar and religious scholars in the Gulf have been at odds over a range of fatwas, from whether the 9/11 attacks on the United States were justified to whether female circumcision is an Islamic duty or simply a cultural tradition that began in Africa and was adopted in Arab society.
By contrast, the state's control over Islamic interpretation has a long history in Turkey, one that continues today.
In forging his country into a secular state, Kemal Ataturk did not allow Islam to become a basis for opposition movements, as happened in the Arab world after the Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1928. Instead, the Turkish state institutionalized Islam by controlling the message and the messenger - only imams licensed by the state are allowed to preach in mosques - making interpretations of the faith subject to state approval.
Policy makers and pundits in the United States and Europe should not rush to judgment by assuming that the Turkish model can be applied elsewhere. Just as the Islamic world is not monolithic, so too will Islamic-style democracy vary in each country, should it develop at all.
Geneive Abdo, a fellow at The Century Foundation, is the author of several books on contemporary Islam, most recently "Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America After 9/11."
Some Muslim intellectuals, politically correct commentators in the West and officials from the European Union seem to think so. They argue that the recent election of Abdullah Gul as president of Turkey and the success in parliamentary polls last July of his AK Party (as it is known in Turkey) are sound reasons to believe that a party comprised of Islamists can hold free elections, win at the polls and then run a state that is democratic and secular.
This presumption, however, rests upon the false belief that Turkey is much like the rest of the Islamic world and that all Islamists are similar to the leaders of the AK Party. For one thing, AK Party leaders should not be identified as "Islamists." As Gul declared during his acceptance speech: "Secularism, one of the basic principles of our republic, is a rule of social peace."
Islamists in most Muslim societies do not favor a secular state. In Jordan and Egypt, for example, unofficial Islamist parties and movements are fighting for Shariah, Islamic law, to be the guiding light for governing. Shariah-based governance, in fact, has been one of the foundations of opposition movements against authoritarian rulers in the Arab world for the last 30 years.
And it is not only the Islamists who are advocating Islamic law. The majority of Muslims surveyed in Arab countries, and in other Muslims societies, say they prefer that Islamic law be either a source, or the sole source, of legislation. By contrast, according to a recent report by the International Crisis Group, support for Islamic law in Turkey has never exceeded 20 percent.
As far back as 1981, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt tried to appease his country's Islamists by revising the Constitution to mandate Shariah as the primary source of legislation. Islamic law has never been enforced, however, and today this has become one of main battle cries of the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition to Egypt's governing National Democratic Party.
Although many moderate Islamists in the Middle East admire the AK Party's success, the way ahead for them is far more difficult. The vast historical differences between Turkey and the region's other countries also have to be taken into account.
The AK Party was born out of the more ideological Welfare Party, but then evolved to become more in line with Turkey's secular tradition. By contrast, secularism in the Arab world peaked in the 1950s and 60s, then came to a halt with the Six Day War of 1967. The Arabs' humiliating defeat by Israel inspired the rise of political Islam, which has grown in influence since then.
If Islamists came to power in many Arab states they would likely ban alcohol, homosexuality and pornographic images on the Internet and in film. For years, Islamists have complained about the millions of bikini-clad foreign tourists who frequent beach resorts in Arab countries, even though tourism helps keep their beleaguered economies afloat.
In addition, Arab societies have transformed over the last 30 years and are far more religious than Turkish society, even though an increasing number of Turks are embracing Islam in ways unseen since the Ottoman Empire.
Even if the Islamists in the Arab world had every intention of emulating Turkey's secular-style of government, they still would have to answer to the growing influence of religious authorities. These range from the scholars at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, the 1,100-year-old seat of learning for Sunni Islam, to respected clerics in mosques and institutions stretching from Saudi Arabia to Qatar who have followers across the Arab world.
Religious authority in Turkey has always been part of the state structure, unlike in the Arab world, where religious scholars and imams have been free to interpret Islamic doctrine at will. Sheiks at Al-Azhar and religious scholars in the Gulf have been at odds over a range of fatwas, from whether the 9/11 attacks on the United States were justified to whether female circumcision is an Islamic duty or simply a cultural tradition that began in Africa and was adopted in Arab society.
By contrast, the state's control over Islamic interpretation has a long history in Turkey, one that continues today.
In forging his country into a secular state, Kemal Ataturk did not allow Islam to become a basis for opposition movements, as happened in the Arab world after the Muslim Brotherhood was created in 1928. Instead, the Turkish state institutionalized Islam by controlling the message and the messenger - only imams licensed by the state are allowed to preach in mosques - making interpretations of the faith subject to state approval.
Policy makers and pundits in the United States and Europe should not rush to judgment by assuming that the Turkish model can be applied elsewhere. Just as the Islamic world is not monolithic, so too will Islamic-style democracy vary in each country, should it develop at all.
Geneive Abdo, a fellow at The Century Foundation, is the author of several books on contemporary Islam, most recently "Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America After 9/11."
Friday, September 07, 2007
A new Turkey?
The no-alternative secular ideology of Ataturk appears shattered at last in Turkey, writes Hassan Nafaa*
Current political developments in Turkey are significant in more than one way. On Thursday 28 August, Abdullah Gul walked into the presidential palace. He did not do so as a guest who, by secular laws, cannot bring his veiled wife along, but rather as president of the state. Army commanders refused to give him the due military salute for a new president, but this hardly dampened his victory. For the first time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has an Islamic-leaning president.
The "secular" regime established by Ataturk following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was unusual in that it didn't evolve from a democratic process. Secularism in Turkey was a tool of denigrating and expunging religion, not just enforcing a separation between church and state. Initially, Ataturk contemplated keeping the caliphate as a religious institution with Vatican-style status, but the power struggle that developed during the liberation stage finally prompted him to dissolve the caliphate and its affiliate institutions, ban Sufi chapters, and strike out the constitutional provision stating that Islam was the official religion of the state.
Because such measures were taken in the absence of political pluralism and under a one party system, Turkish secularism became imbued with a tyrannical streak and got more obstinate as time went by. But despite the initial insistence of the ruling party on uprooting religion altogether, Islamic traditions managed to creep back for cultural as well as political reasons.
A few years before he died, Ataturk formed the Academy of History and Social Science in order to promote nationalist ideas. But this research institution soon found itself delving into an Ottoman past that cannot be examined in isolation from Islam, eventually becoming a bastion for the preservation of Islamic culture. When Ataturk died, the political system allowed some restricted pluralism to develop, and that provided a chance for the expression of Islamic sentiments. When a liberal group led by Adnan Menderes split from the ruling party, it advocated an end to anti-Islamic measures and to all legal restrictions on Muslim rituals.
The authoritarian implementation of secular slogans lasted in Turkey for a long time, creating a mood of cultural alienation as well as an identity crisis among various social groups, especially the middle and working classes. Public pressure for greater religious freedom encouraged the creation of Islamic- leaning political parties. The first such party was Necmeddin Erbakan's National Order Party, established in 1970.
Political Islam is more recent in Turkey than in other Arab and Islamic countries and yet more successful. Why is that? One can think of a few reasons. First, the harshness with which the army dealt with Islamists boosted their popularity. The army, which acts as a guardian of secular values, carried out four military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. The first coup brought down the government of Menderes, who was then executed for violation of secular laws. In 1997, the army deposed the government of Erbakan and disbanded his Refah Party. This excessive use of force, along with the ineptness and corruption of secular parties, increased public sympathy for the Islamists.
Second, Turkey's Islamists exhibited credible moderation, refusing to resort to violence or impose their opinion on others. The political and intellectual discourse of the Islamists became more moderate with time, and with every crisis the Islamists came out stronger. The policies of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) are a case in point. The JDP made a serious attempt to reconcile the Islamic heritage of Turkey with its European affiliations. Internally, the JDP adopted a modernist approach that accommodated religious sentiments. Externally, it maintained an independent approach without antagonising anyone. So although Turkey is a NATO member, the JDP refused to let US troops go into Iraq from Turkish territories in 2003. The strategic cooperation agreement Turkey has with Israel didn't prevent the JDP from forging close relations with Palestinian and Arab parties. And while defending Turkey's vital interests in Cyprus, the JDP pressed for membership in the EU.
Third, Turkey's Islamists maintained their unity in the face of hardship. Each time their parties awere banned, they created new ones. So the National Order Party became the Salvation Party, then Refah, then Virtue, and finally Justice and Development. Those constant changes didn't lead to a split within the ranks of the Islamists. Add to this the decay of secular parties due to corruption or stagnation and you'll see why the Islamists grew in popularity over time. In the 1973 election, Erbakan won 12 per cent of the vote with his Salvation Party. In 2002, Erdogan won 34 per cent of the vote with his JDP, then 47 per cent in the recent elections. Now the JDP is the main party in Turkey and for the first time ever it controls both the legislative and executive branches.
Can the JDP use its current political and constitutional power to rebuild Turkey's political and social life? Can the JDP make Turkey a solid and modern democracy? Can it help Turkey come to terms with its history and get over the political schizophrenia of the past? Or will its adversaries, especially the army, succeed in turning back the clock?
I believe that the JDP has a fair chance of succeeding, for the following reasons. First, the army has lost much of its credibility and is therefore unable to intervene in politics in the same way it did before. A reform process that started under Ecevit and continued under Erbakan saw the National Security Council (NSC) restructured and its power curbed. The NSC is now made up of nine civilians (instead of four) and five officers. Its secretary-general is a civilian who answers to the prime minister. NSC decisions are no longer binding on the government and can be challenged by parliament.
Second, secular Turkish parties, including leftist ones, have lost much of their popularity due to their opportunism and flagrant support for despotism and fascist nationalism. Ironically, the JDP seems to be the one political power that can be trusted to defend both liberal democracy and social justice in Turkey.
Third, there is a growing need, both regionally and internationally, to build up the Turkish model of Islamic moderation as an alternative to Iranian fundamentalism and so-called Sunni extremism. Many in Europe and the US believe that an assault on the Turkish model would ignite Islamic militancy in the region. Look at how France's Sarkozy changed his mind about Turkey's joining the EU after the recent Turkish elections.
This doesn't mean that a new, modern, stable and democratic Turkey is around the corner. There are many external factors that can change the situation drastically in Turkey, including President Bush ordering a strike on Iran. Should this happen, the Turkish army may regroup and try to reclaim its lost power, throwing the entire country into the realm of the unknown.
* The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
Current political developments in Turkey are significant in more than one way. On Thursday 28 August, Abdullah Gul walked into the presidential palace. He did not do so as a guest who, by secular laws, cannot bring his veiled wife along, but rather as president of the state. Army commanders refused to give him the due military salute for a new president, but this hardly dampened his victory. For the first time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has an Islamic-leaning president.
The "secular" regime established by Ataturk following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was unusual in that it didn't evolve from a democratic process. Secularism in Turkey was a tool of denigrating and expunging religion, not just enforcing a separation between church and state. Initially, Ataturk contemplated keeping the caliphate as a religious institution with Vatican-style status, but the power struggle that developed during the liberation stage finally prompted him to dissolve the caliphate and its affiliate institutions, ban Sufi chapters, and strike out the constitutional provision stating that Islam was the official religion of the state.
Because such measures were taken in the absence of political pluralism and under a one party system, Turkish secularism became imbued with a tyrannical streak and got more obstinate as time went by. But despite the initial insistence of the ruling party on uprooting religion altogether, Islamic traditions managed to creep back for cultural as well as political reasons.
A few years before he died, Ataturk formed the Academy of History and Social Science in order to promote nationalist ideas. But this research institution soon found itself delving into an Ottoman past that cannot be examined in isolation from Islam, eventually becoming a bastion for the preservation of Islamic culture. When Ataturk died, the political system allowed some restricted pluralism to develop, and that provided a chance for the expression of Islamic sentiments. When a liberal group led by Adnan Menderes split from the ruling party, it advocated an end to anti-Islamic measures and to all legal restrictions on Muslim rituals.
The authoritarian implementation of secular slogans lasted in Turkey for a long time, creating a mood of cultural alienation as well as an identity crisis among various social groups, especially the middle and working classes. Public pressure for greater religious freedom encouraged the creation of Islamic- leaning political parties. The first such party was Necmeddin Erbakan's National Order Party, established in 1970.
Political Islam is more recent in Turkey than in other Arab and Islamic countries and yet more successful. Why is that? One can think of a few reasons. First, the harshness with which the army dealt with Islamists boosted their popularity. The army, which acts as a guardian of secular values, carried out four military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997. The first coup brought down the government of Menderes, who was then executed for violation of secular laws. In 1997, the army deposed the government of Erbakan and disbanded his Refah Party. This excessive use of force, along with the ineptness and corruption of secular parties, increased public sympathy for the Islamists.
Second, Turkey's Islamists exhibited credible moderation, refusing to resort to violence or impose their opinion on others. The political and intellectual discourse of the Islamists became more moderate with time, and with every crisis the Islamists came out stronger. The policies of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) are a case in point. The JDP made a serious attempt to reconcile the Islamic heritage of Turkey with its European affiliations. Internally, the JDP adopted a modernist approach that accommodated religious sentiments. Externally, it maintained an independent approach without antagonising anyone. So although Turkey is a NATO member, the JDP refused to let US troops go into Iraq from Turkish territories in 2003. The strategic cooperation agreement Turkey has with Israel didn't prevent the JDP from forging close relations with Palestinian and Arab parties. And while defending Turkey's vital interests in Cyprus, the JDP pressed for membership in the EU.
Third, Turkey's Islamists maintained their unity in the face of hardship. Each time their parties awere banned, they created new ones. So the National Order Party became the Salvation Party, then Refah, then Virtue, and finally Justice and Development. Those constant changes didn't lead to a split within the ranks of the Islamists. Add to this the decay of secular parties due to corruption or stagnation and you'll see why the Islamists grew in popularity over time. In the 1973 election, Erbakan won 12 per cent of the vote with his Salvation Party. In 2002, Erdogan won 34 per cent of the vote with his JDP, then 47 per cent in the recent elections. Now the JDP is the main party in Turkey and for the first time ever it controls both the legislative and executive branches.
Can the JDP use its current political and constitutional power to rebuild Turkey's political and social life? Can the JDP make Turkey a solid and modern democracy? Can it help Turkey come to terms with its history and get over the political schizophrenia of the past? Or will its adversaries, especially the army, succeed in turning back the clock?
I believe that the JDP has a fair chance of succeeding, for the following reasons. First, the army has lost much of its credibility and is therefore unable to intervene in politics in the same way it did before. A reform process that started under Ecevit and continued under Erbakan saw the National Security Council (NSC) restructured and its power curbed. The NSC is now made up of nine civilians (instead of four) and five officers. Its secretary-general is a civilian who answers to the prime minister. NSC decisions are no longer binding on the government and can be challenged by parliament.
Second, secular Turkish parties, including leftist ones, have lost much of their popularity due to their opportunism and flagrant support for despotism and fascist nationalism. Ironically, the JDP seems to be the one political power that can be trusted to defend both liberal democracy and social justice in Turkey.
Third, there is a growing need, both regionally and internationally, to build up the Turkish model of Islamic moderation as an alternative to Iranian fundamentalism and so-called Sunni extremism. Many in Europe and the US believe that an assault on the Turkish model would ignite Islamic militancy in the region. Look at how France's Sarkozy changed his mind about Turkey's joining the EU after the recent Turkish elections.
This doesn't mean that a new, modern, stable and democratic Turkey is around the corner. There are many external factors that can change the situation drastically in Turkey, including President Bush ordering a strike on Iran. Should this happen, the Turkish army may regroup and try to reclaim its lost power, throwing the entire country into the realm of the unknown.
* The writer is a professor of political science at Cairo University.
LOOK BEYOND 9/11 TO FIND MIDDLE EAST ANSWERS
WASHINGTON -- As the sixth anniversary of the tragic attacks of 9/11 approach next week, we need to move beyond grieving, hating -- and fighting -- and look for deeper answers to the profound cultural, political and economic reasons behind those attacks. I think we may find some of them in the surprise election to the Turkish presidency last week of a man described by the nation's secular traditionalists as one of the "Islamists" the West so fears.
There are few who would congratulate me on such an insight. In fact, among many Europeans and the many Turks who follow the historic road of the great Kemal Ataturk, who first made a modern country out of Turkey by isolating politics from religion in the 1920s, the election of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as president is a frightening event.
Gul's party, the Islamist Justice and Development Party, with its threatening Islamic roots that it has largely risen beyond, still deeply worries many who cannot get past the idea that the party REALLY wants to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state. Now, with the prime ministership held for nearly five years by the party's cosmopolitan Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the presidency held by Gul, they fear anything can happen. And if it could happen in modernized Turkey, well, then it could happen anywhere in the Middle East!
But let me go out on that proverbial limb and suggest that it is, to the contrary, likely that the changes in Turkey offer some answers to the deeper problems of the Middle East. Essentially these are problems of governance, which in practice means balancing and resolving the demands of political power and religious power. They happen also to be the problems -- whether in Saudi Arabia or Egypt or elsewhere -- that led to 9/11 and that haunt us daily in Iraq.
The newly elected Gul, to start with, is no cave-dwelling Muslim fundamentalist. He is an attractive man in Western dress with a doctorate in economics, and with study in London and Exeter and work with the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia behind him. As foreign minister, he became known for pushing for Turkey to join the European Union, for changes in a law that punished writers for "insulting Turkishness," and for devising a set of democratic reforms.
But most important, Gul's party, under Erdogan's leadership, has brought the country to an impressive new prosperity with an Islamic entrepreneurial class that springs from the formerly rigidly conservative hinterlands. It is centered around the new industries of the city of Kayseri, where, amazingly, an Islamic middle class has been created for the first time in Turkish history.
When a small group of us met with Prime Minister Erdogan last May, he said with passion: "This is a very different country today. It has become an open society. To use an Internet expression, it's a state on a 24-hour basis, an online country, an island of prosperity and stability. Our GNP has gone from $182 billion in 2002 to $400 billion by 2006, and the per capita income has risen in those four years from $2,600 to $5,500.
"Turkey is determined to become a full member of the European Union. ... In Europe, we find the harbinger of the possibility of the alliance of civilizations. Our goal is to become a responsible modern society, and we are a people who have totally internalized democracy."
There has been little reason over the last five years to doubt such statements. But now the Justice Party holds both the prime ministership and the presidency, and that gives it extraordinary powers that it did not have before -- and no one can be absolutely sure how its officials will use those powers.
Before, the cities of Turkey were filled with secular cosmopolites who would be at home anywhere in the world, while the poor and benighted of the countryside dragged hopelessly behind. But today, the formerly isolated and fearful countryside is taking part in that entrepreneurial progress -- and not only in Turkey.
In progressive Tunisia, for instance, development is moving so rapidly (again, across class and religious lines) that poverty is now below 2 percent.
In troubled Pakistan, as The Wall Street Journal just reported, "a clear demonstration of confidence in the country's future is coming from an emerging economic force: entrepreneurs." Americans hear little about Syria except for its support of terrorism, but in fact, entrepreneurship is also thriving in Syria. Even Iran, which the White House sees as unidimensionally bad, is in the middle of a profound struggle between the past and a progressive modernism favored overwhelmingly by the young.
America sees little in the Middle East except the war in Iraq. Yet it is in these other countries that we pinpoint the true and ultimately decisive struggles: bringing the traditionally conservative countryside of the past peacefully into the modern world of the cities, blending the world of religion peacefully with the secular world, and building equity for all in societies formerly dominated by the few.
And so, six years after 9/11, even while we fight a war in Iraq that fails to address these issues, at least we should understand the contours of the crucial question: Can you be modern and Muslim? Turkey may again provide some answers.
There are few who would congratulate me on such an insight. In fact, among many Europeans and the many Turks who follow the historic road of the great Kemal Ataturk, who first made a modern country out of Turkey by isolating politics from religion in the 1920s, the election of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as president is a frightening event.
Gul's party, the Islamist Justice and Development Party, with its threatening Islamic roots that it has largely risen beyond, still deeply worries many who cannot get past the idea that the party REALLY wants to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state. Now, with the prime ministership held for nearly five years by the party's cosmopolitan Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the presidency held by Gul, they fear anything can happen. And if it could happen in modernized Turkey, well, then it could happen anywhere in the Middle East!
But let me go out on that proverbial limb and suggest that it is, to the contrary, likely that the changes in Turkey offer some answers to the deeper problems of the Middle East. Essentially these are problems of governance, which in practice means balancing and resolving the demands of political power and religious power. They happen also to be the problems -- whether in Saudi Arabia or Egypt or elsewhere -- that led to 9/11 and that haunt us daily in Iraq.
The newly elected Gul, to start with, is no cave-dwelling Muslim fundamentalist. He is an attractive man in Western dress with a doctorate in economics, and with study in London and Exeter and work with the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia behind him. As foreign minister, he became known for pushing for Turkey to join the European Union, for changes in a law that punished writers for "insulting Turkishness," and for devising a set of democratic reforms.
But most important, Gul's party, under Erdogan's leadership, has brought the country to an impressive new prosperity with an Islamic entrepreneurial class that springs from the formerly rigidly conservative hinterlands. It is centered around the new industries of the city of Kayseri, where, amazingly, an Islamic middle class has been created for the first time in Turkish history.
When a small group of us met with Prime Minister Erdogan last May, he said with passion: "This is a very different country today. It has become an open society. To use an Internet expression, it's a state on a 24-hour basis, an online country, an island of prosperity and stability. Our GNP has gone from $182 billion in 2002 to $400 billion by 2006, and the per capita income has risen in those four years from $2,600 to $5,500.
"Turkey is determined to become a full member of the European Union. ... In Europe, we find the harbinger of the possibility of the alliance of civilizations. Our goal is to become a responsible modern society, and we are a people who have totally internalized democracy."
There has been little reason over the last five years to doubt such statements. But now the Justice Party holds both the prime ministership and the presidency, and that gives it extraordinary powers that it did not have before -- and no one can be absolutely sure how its officials will use those powers.
Before, the cities of Turkey were filled with secular cosmopolites who would be at home anywhere in the world, while the poor and benighted of the countryside dragged hopelessly behind. But today, the formerly isolated and fearful countryside is taking part in that entrepreneurial progress -- and not only in Turkey.
In progressive Tunisia, for instance, development is moving so rapidly (again, across class and religious lines) that poverty is now below 2 percent.
In troubled Pakistan, as The Wall Street Journal just reported, "a clear demonstration of confidence in the country's future is coming from an emerging economic force: entrepreneurs." Americans hear little about Syria except for its support of terrorism, but in fact, entrepreneurship is also thriving in Syria. Even Iran, which the White House sees as unidimensionally bad, is in the middle of a profound struggle between the past and a progressive modernism favored overwhelmingly by the young.
America sees little in the Middle East except the war in Iraq. Yet it is in these other countries that we pinpoint the true and ultimately decisive struggles: bringing the traditionally conservative countryside of the past peacefully into the modern world of the cities, blending the world of religion peacefully with the secular world, and building equity for all in societies formerly dominated by the few.
And so, six years after 9/11, even while we fight a war in Iraq that fails to address these issues, at least we should understand the contours of the crucial question: Can you be modern and Muslim? Turkey may again provide some answers.
Saturday, September 01, 2007
Turkish politics The next battle
Abdullah Gul has been elected president. But the ruling AK party faces more conflict with the generals over a new constitution
“IT'S the final nail in the army's coffin.” That is how one pro-secular government official summed up the elevation of Abdullah Gul, a former Islamist, to the presidency on August 28th in the teeth of opposition from the country's generals. Others saw it as a moral victory for the pious masses over an overweening secular elite that has long concentrated power and wealth in its hands.
Either way, Mr Gul's journey from a working class family in the Anatolian heartland to the pinnacle of secular power will transform Turkish politics. The new era may promise greater liberties, but also more meddling from the army. As president, Mr Gul, until this month Turkey's respected foreign minister, will have the power to veto legislation and a say in the appointment of senior officials. Most discomfiting of all for the generals, Mr Gul is now their commander-in-chief.
The top brass refused to salute him during his first official engagement, and stayed away from his oath-taking ceremony this week. So too did Mr Gul's wife, whose Islamic-style headscarf came to embody the political crisis of the past four months, since Mr Gul first announced his candidacy. The head covering is banned in all government buildings and schools and, until this week, in the presidential compound where Ataturk, founder of the republic, once lived.
In his inaugural address, Mr Gul sought to ease the fears of his critics, insisting that he would abide by the secular principles of Ataturk's republic. He also showered praise on the generals and pledged to keep up Turkey's attempt to join the EU.
Yet the 56-year-old former economist hinted at a looser interpretation of Turkey's unique brand of secularism. Until now this has been defined by Ataturk's renunciation of Islamic symbols and rigid state control over all aspects of religious life. Secularism, said Mr Gul, was a precondition for “social peace” but also offered a model “for different lifestyles”. Some seized on his words as proof that he will support loosening restrictions on the headscarf and religious education.
Much will depend on his former boss, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Justice and Development (AK) Party was swept back into office in July's elections. These were called after a prolonged trial of strength that began when the army, backed by the pro-secular judiciary, tried to stop Mr Gul's attempt to become president. The generals, who have toppled four governments since 1960, threatened to intervene again but have so far stayed their hand.
As Mr Gul approved a new pro-EU cabinet this week, another clash loomed over a “civilian” constitution that Mr Erdogan proposes to adopt next year to replace the current text, written by the generals after their last coup in 1980. Draft clauses leaked to the media are nothing short of revolutionary: senior officers will no longer be immune from prosecution in civilian courts, military appeals courts will be scrapped, Kurdish will be taught as a second language in government schools and the definition of Turkishness will be expanded to embrace citizens from different backgrounds and creeds.
The army is unnerved. Pundits reckon Yasar Buyukanit, the chief of general staff, was alluding to the new constitution when he spoke of “centres of evil” bent on eroding secularism in a statement this week. Some expect that the generals may now to try to drive a wedge between the president and Mr Erdogan. There has long been an undercurrent of rivalry in their political alliance. Moreover, the new constitution also calls for a significant trimming of presidential powers. Might Mr Gul be tempted to block it? This may be wishful thinking by the humbled generals.
“IT'S the final nail in the army's coffin.” That is how one pro-secular government official summed up the elevation of Abdullah Gul, a former Islamist, to the presidency on August 28th in the teeth of opposition from the country's generals. Others saw it as a moral victory for the pious masses over an overweening secular elite that has long concentrated power and wealth in its hands.
Either way, Mr Gul's journey from a working class family in the Anatolian heartland to the pinnacle of secular power will transform Turkish politics. The new era may promise greater liberties, but also more meddling from the army. As president, Mr Gul, until this month Turkey's respected foreign minister, will have the power to veto legislation and a say in the appointment of senior officials. Most discomfiting of all for the generals, Mr Gul is now their commander-in-chief.
The top brass refused to salute him during his first official engagement, and stayed away from his oath-taking ceremony this week. So too did Mr Gul's wife, whose Islamic-style headscarf came to embody the political crisis of the past four months, since Mr Gul first announced his candidacy. The head covering is banned in all government buildings and schools and, until this week, in the presidential compound where Ataturk, founder of the republic, once lived.
In his inaugural address, Mr Gul sought to ease the fears of his critics, insisting that he would abide by the secular principles of Ataturk's republic. He also showered praise on the generals and pledged to keep up Turkey's attempt to join the EU.
Yet the 56-year-old former economist hinted at a looser interpretation of Turkey's unique brand of secularism. Until now this has been defined by Ataturk's renunciation of Islamic symbols and rigid state control over all aspects of religious life. Secularism, said Mr Gul, was a precondition for “social peace” but also offered a model “for different lifestyles”. Some seized on his words as proof that he will support loosening restrictions on the headscarf and religious education.
Much will depend on his former boss, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Justice and Development (AK) Party was swept back into office in July's elections. These were called after a prolonged trial of strength that began when the army, backed by the pro-secular judiciary, tried to stop Mr Gul's attempt to become president. The generals, who have toppled four governments since 1960, threatened to intervene again but have so far stayed their hand.
As Mr Gul approved a new pro-EU cabinet this week, another clash loomed over a “civilian” constitution that Mr Erdogan proposes to adopt next year to replace the current text, written by the generals after their last coup in 1980. Draft clauses leaked to the media are nothing short of revolutionary: senior officers will no longer be immune from prosecution in civilian courts, military appeals courts will be scrapped, Kurdish will be taught as a second language in government schools and the definition of Turkishness will be expanded to embrace citizens from different backgrounds and creeds.
The army is unnerved. Pundits reckon Yasar Buyukanit, the chief of general staff, was alluding to the new constitution when he spoke of “centres of evil” bent on eroding secularism in a statement this week. Some expect that the generals may now to try to drive a wedge between the president and Mr Erdogan. There has long been an undercurrent of rivalry in their political alliance. Moreover, the new constitution also calls for a significant trimming of presidential powers. Might Mr Gul be tempted to block it? This may be wishful thinking by the humbled generals.
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