This article was first published May 14.
In the not too distant past here in Turkey's religious heartland, women would not appear in public unless they were modestly dressed, a single woman was not able to rent an apartment on her own, and the mayor proposed segregating city buses by sex.
Fears of such restrictions, inflamed by secularist politicians, have led thousands of Turks to march in major cities in the past month. A political party with a past in Islamic politics led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has tried to capture the country's highest secular post.
Once it succeeds, the secularists' argument goes, Turkey will be dragged back to an earlier era when Islam ran the state. [Another march drew a million people in Izmir on Sunday.]
But here in Konya, a leafy city on the plains of central Turkey, Mr. Erdogan's party has done no such thing. In the paradox of modern Turkey, the party here has had a moderating influence, helping to open a guarded society and make it more flexible.
Konya is still deeply attached to its faith. Mosques are spread thickly throughout the city; there are as many as in Istanbul, which has five times the population. But in a part of the world where religion and politics have been a poisonous mix and cultural norms are conservative regardless of religion, it is an oasis: women here wear relatively revealing clothing, couples hold hands and bus segregation is a distant memory.
"We've been wearing the same dress for 80 years, and it doesn't fit anymore," said Yoruk Kurtaran, who travels extensively in Turkey. "Things used to be black and white."
Now, he said, "there are a lot of grays."
The shift shows the evolution of Turkey's Islamic movement, which has matured under Mr. Erdogan, abandoning the restrictive practices of its predecessors and demonstrating to its observant constituents the benefits of belonging to the European Union.
It also follows a pattern occurring throughout Turkey, where the secularists who founded the state out of the Ottoman Empire's remains are now lagging behind religious Turks in efforts to modernize it.But secular Turks, like those who took part in the recent protests, do not believe that Mr. Erdogan and his allies have changed.
The mayor who proposed segregation, for example, is now part of Mr. Erdogan's party. The protesters argue that the party may say it wants more religious freedom for its constituents, for example allowing observant women to wear their head scarves in universities, but it has never laid out its vision for how to protect secular lifestyles.
Mr. Erdogan's party has been the most flexible and open of all parties that consider Islam an important part of Turkish society. Its politics have so far been respectful of secular freedom in most cases. But there are harder-line members who would like to see a more religious society, and secular Turks fear that highly personal questions like their children's education and rights for unmarried women could be threatened.
In the country as a whole, religious Turks have felt like second-class citizens for generations, in part a legacy of Ataturk's radical, secular revolution in the early 20th century. Now, elevated by a decade of economic growth, they are pressing for a bigger share of power.
In Konya some of the change started from the top. In 2003, around the time Mr. Erdogan's party came to power, an irreverent ophthalmologist and a veterinarian with long hair were appointed to run Selcuk University in Konya. They immediately began challenging the sensibilities of this conservative city, organizing concerts and encouraging student clubs.
Kursat Turgut, the veterinarian, who became vice rector, said he had been confronted by a group of students who went to his office and demanded that he cancel a concert because they did not like the singer. He refused.
"Change is the most difficult thing," Mr. Turgut said, sitting in the rector's office, where paintings lined the walls. "It takes time to change a mentality."
The students were from a nationalist group with an Islamic tinge that for years had used scare tactics to enforce a strict moral code on campus. When Umit, who did not want to give his last name, started at the university's veterinary school five years ago he was chastised by students from the group for cuddling with his girlfriend and, on another occasion, for wearing shorts.
"They thought they were protecting honor and morals," said Aliye Cetinkaya, a journalist who moved here 12 years ago for college. "If we crossed the line there was a fight."
Mr. Turgut and the rector, Suleyman Okudan, shut down the group's activities. Now, four years later, there are more than 80 student clubs, students like Umit behave and dress any way they choose, and Mr. Turgut's concerts, open to the public, draw large crowds.
"It is like a different century," Ms. Cetinkaya said.
She still faces limitations. When she covered a demonstration in Konya early last year against the Muhammad cartoons published in Denmark, stones and shoes were thrown at her because she was not wearing a scarf. But such incidents are rare, and far outweighed by improvements. For example, there were only about 50 women in the two-year degree program she attended a decade ago. Now the number is above 1,000, she said.
The deep-rooted religiosity in Konya found public expression in politics in the late 1980s, when the city became one of the first in the country to elect a pro-Islamic party -- the Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan, the grandfather of the Turkish Islamic movement -- to run the city. Mr. Erbakan himself was elected to Parliament from Konya.
The administration was restrictive: it was a Welfare Party mayor, Halil Urun, who proposed, unsuccessfully, segregating the buses in 1989. But the city kept electing the party until the late 1990s, when it was shut down by the state establishment for straying from secularism.
Then, in 2000, a young member of the banned party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, began the Justice and Development Party. Mr. Erdogan had made a concerted effort to take Islam out of politics altogether -- aware that continuing to push religion would lead to the same end -- and it was unclear whether Konya voters would accept it.
They did. Of the 32 members of the City Council, all but two are now members of Mr. Erdogan's party.
It was economics that convinced Ahmet Agirbasli, 57, a businessman who sells car parts and pasta. When he was younger he did not shake hands with women. For years he voted for Mr. Erbakan's party. He did not believe that Turkey's future was with Europe, but he changed his mind after Mr. Erdogan's party began reforms with the intention of joining the European Union, and his business began to grow.
"Erbakan didn't have an open mind," Mr. Agirbasli said, eating a club sandwich in a hotel restaurant. "He didn't believe the country needed links with the rest of the world."
Now he sells macaroni to 50 countries. Five years ago he sold to only 10.
Akif Emre, a columnist at Yeni Safak, a conservative newspaper in Istanbul, argues that Mr. Erdogan has helped to bridge the gap between Turkey's religious heartland and urban, secular Turks.
"They really accept secularism," he said of Mr. Erdogan and his allies. "They are changing the mentality. Conservative people changed their lifestyle toward a more secular way."
Religious Turks, for their part, still harbor an unspoken wariness of the state. New civil organizations are more focused on building mosques than engaging in public debate, and people scrupulously avoid talking about politics.
Religious extremists have been found on the fringes. In January the authorities arrested a man they said was the leader of Al Qaeda in Turkey, and in 2000 a pile of bodies that showed signs of torture was found buried under a villa rented by a homegrown Islamist group called Hezbollah.
"Konya is one of the main hubs of traditional and conservative, anti-Ankara countryside," said Ersin Kalaycioglu, a professor of political science at Isik University in Istanbul. "It has a structure that takes religion very seriously and formulates social life around it."
Rahmi Bastoklu, the leader in Konya of the secularist Republican People's Party and the only one of the Konya district's 16 members of Parliament who is not from Mr. Erdogan's party, put it bluntly: "People have to leave Konya to enjoy themselves."
But an unspoken understanding between Konya's religious Turks and the secular state is in place, in which the mosques are left alone, but religious Turks do not press too many demands on the state. The balance is often held steady by Mr. Erdogan's party.
Still, pushing too hard against the secular establishment might mean the loss of recent gains. "It's not a useful thing to talk about," said Ilhan Cumrali, 36, sitting in his clothing store among racks of floor-length skirts. "We are trying to find the right path. If we do it too aggressively there will be a negative reaction."
Wednesday, May 30, 2007
Friday, May 25, 2007
Turkey's battle plan could threaten northern Iraq
ANKARA, Turkey (CNN) -- The war drums are getting louder in Turkey, and they can be heard next door in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, and across the globe in Washington as well.
Many Turkish officials and citizens -- enraged by Tuesday's deadly bombing -- want the Turkish military to hit back at the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, the hard-line Kurdish separatist group thought by many in the government and on the street to have staged the blast and other militant actions.
At least six people died and more than 100 were injured in the rush hour bombing at an Ankara shopping district. (Full story)
Senior Turkish officers have said that operations against the PKK would require troops to cross into the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, which many PKK militants -- also long situated in southeastern Turkey -- have chosen as their base.
The PKK denies involvement in the Ankara attack, and a U.S. State Department spokesman cautions that the investigation into the attack is "ongoing."
However, the outrage in Turkey toward the PKK has been boiling over.
On Thursday, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that if the military were to request a retaliation, the parliament, which is dominated by Erdogan's AK party, would support it.
Turkey's army chief, Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, said recently his troops are ready to attack what he calls Kurdish terrorist camps in northern Iraq. And retired Turkish Gen. Edip Baser told CNN he believes an operation could be just weeks away.
As late as two weeks ago, there were an estimated 150,000 Turkish soldiers on or near the Turkish-Iraq border, and the PKK has stepped up cross-border attacks into the Kurdish region of Turkey now that snows have melted in the border mountains.
Seven Turkish soldiers were killed in the volatile southeast this week.
Six Turkish soldiers died and 10 were wounded Thursday when a roadside bomb detonated near the town of Siirt, the Turkish military said. Another soldier died Wednesday in an accident near Van during a search operation.
July election
The tough talk in Ankara comes two months before a general election, in which Erdogan's party, a movement with Islamist roots, faces a challenge from secularist parties. The vast majority of Turks are Muslims, but there has been a strict separation of mosque and state since the Turkish republic came into being in 1923. (Full story)
Supporters of Turkey's secular heritage have been demonstrating for weeks against the plan by Erdogan's governing party to vote one of its own members to the Turkish presidency.
Some analysts think that in the run-up to the election, Erdogan's AK party will use a war against Kurdish separatists to rally public opinion and downplay its differences with the military.
Mustafa Aydin -- professor of international relations at Ankara University and the National Security Academy -- said the government would "try to use this to rally Turkish people around the government, around the people. They will most likely try to use nationalistic themes and terms during the propaganda."
U.S. support
Nationalist feelings in Turkey are running high. Many Turks are disappointed with the lack of U.S. support for this long-time ally on the issue of operations against the PKK -- and resent U.S. support for Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq.
The United States is not deaf to the problem, but is caught between the competing interests of vital regional allies.
Two months ago, the special U.S. envoy working with Turkey on the threat of the PKK testified before a House committee. Retired Gen. Joseph Ralston said that Turkey is a "sovereign state with a responsibility to defend its people. Ultimately, the Turkish government will have to take the steps it thinks are necessary to protect its citizens."
He pointed to efforts to close a refugee camp in northern Iraq that has become a refuge for fighters and to get a "cessation of hostilities."
"Diplomatic progress on this issue has come grudgingly and with great effort, but there has been progress," Ralston testified in March. He could not immediately be reached for comment Thursday.
State Department spokesman Tom Casey cautioned that the Turkish authorities have not come to any final conclusions about who is responsible for the blast and that their probe into the blast continues.
At the same time, he said, "we believe, as does the Iraqi government, that the PKK represents a real threat, and it's a threat that needs to be dealt with."
Ralston's appointment as special envoy shows the importance of the issue, he said.
Casey said the "best way to deal" with the PKK is through "continued cooperation" between Turkey and Iraq, with the help of the United States.
"And we certainly don't think unilateral military action from Turkey or anyplace else would solve anything," he said.
Iraq backs Turkey
The Turkish Foreign Ministry said Thursday that the Iraqi government has expressed a willingness to work with Turkey on the issue of PKK terrorism.
Baser, a former special Turkish envoy on the PKK, has called the issue a "testing ground of Turkish-American relations."
The PKK has backing, with many Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey supporting a dream of an independent state. One PKK sympathizer, Faik Kaplan, told CNN that inviting the PKK to lay down its arms would be a better way to go than Turkish troops crossing the border.
But Turkey says it won't talk to PKK militants, and that stand resonates on the streets. Mustafa Ersoy, an Ankara shopkeeper, said: "The special message the flag carries is that the Turkish people are one body. And there is no power that can split the Turkish people into pieces."
The PKK has been fighting for what it calls Kurdish rights since the early 1980s. More than 30,000 people have lost their lives in the violence. The last incursions made by Turkey into Iraq came in the early 1990s.
CNN's Paula Hancocks, Phil Black, Talia Kayali, Joe Sterling and Elise Labott contributed to this report.
Many Turkish officials and citizens -- enraged by Tuesday's deadly bombing -- want the Turkish military to hit back at the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, the hard-line Kurdish separatist group thought by many in the government and on the street to have staged the blast and other militant actions.
At least six people died and more than 100 were injured in the rush hour bombing at an Ankara shopping district. (Full story)
Senior Turkish officers have said that operations against the PKK would require troops to cross into the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, which many PKK militants -- also long situated in southeastern Turkey -- have chosen as their base.
The PKK denies involvement in the Ankara attack, and a U.S. State Department spokesman cautions that the investigation into the attack is "ongoing."
However, the outrage in Turkey toward the PKK has been boiling over.
On Thursday, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that if the military were to request a retaliation, the parliament, which is dominated by Erdogan's AK party, would support it.
Turkey's army chief, Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, said recently his troops are ready to attack what he calls Kurdish terrorist camps in northern Iraq. And retired Turkish Gen. Edip Baser told CNN he believes an operation could be just weeks away.
As late as two weeks ago, there were an estimated 150,000 Turkish soldiers on or near the Turkish-Iraq border, and the PKK has stepped up cross-border attacks into the Kurdish region of Turkey now that snows have melted in the border mountains.
Seven Turkish soldiers were killed in the volatile southeast this week.
Six Turkish soldiers died and 10 were wounded Thursday when a roadside bomb detonated near the town of Siirt, the Turkish military said. Another soldier died Wednesday in an accident near Van during a search operation.
July election
The tough talk in Ankara comes two months before a general election, in which Erdogan's party, a movement with Islamist roots, faces a challenge from secularist parties. The vast majority of Turks are Muslims, but there has been a strict separation of mosque and state since the Turkish republic came into being in 1923. (Full story)
Supporters of Turkey's secular heritage have been demonstrating for weeks against the plan by Erdogan's governing party to vote one of its own members to the Turkish presidency.
Some analysts think that in the run-up to the election, Erdogan's AK party will use a war against Kurdish separatists to rally public opinion and downplay its differences with the military.
Mustafa Aydin -- professor of international relations at Ankara University and the National Security Academy -- said the government would "try to use this to rally Turkish people around the government, around the people. They will most likely try to use nationalistic themes and terms during the propaganda."
U.S. support
Nationalist feelings in Turkey are running high. Many Turks are disappointed with the lack of U.S. support for this long-time ally on the issue of operations against the PKK -- and resent U.S. support for Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq.
The United States is not deaf to the problem, but is caught between the competing interests of vital regional allies.
Two months ago, the special U.S. envoy working with Turkey on the threat of the PKK testified before a House committee. Retired Gen. Joseph Ralston said that Turkey is a "sovereign state with a responsibility to defend its people. Ultimately, the Turkish government will have to take the steps it thinks are necessary to protect its citizens."
He pointed to efforts to close a refugee camp in northern Iraq that has become a refuge for fighters and to get a "cessation of hostilities."
"Diplomatic progress on this issue has come grudgingly and with great effort, but there has been progress," Ralston testified in March. He could not immediately be reached for comment Thursday.
State Department spokesman Tom Casey cautioned that the Turkish authorities have not come to any final conclusions about who is responsible for the blast and that their probe into the blast continues.
At the same time, he said, "we believe, as does the Iraqi government, that the PKK represents a real threat, and it's a threat that needs to be dealt with."
Ralston's appointment as special envoy shows the importance of the issue, he said.
Casey said the "best way to deal" with the PKK is through "continued cooperation" between Turkey and Iraq, with the help of the United States.
"And we certainly don't think unilateral military action from Turkey or anyplace else would solve anything," he said.
Iraq backs Turkey
The Turkish Foreign Ministry said Thursday that the Iraqi government has expressed a willingness to work with Turkey on the issue of PKK terrorism.
Baser, a former special Turkish envoy on the PKK, has called the issue a "testing ground of Turkish-American relations."
The PKK has backing, with many Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey supporting a dream of an independent state. One PKK sympathizer, Faik Kaplan, told CNN that inviting the PKK to lay down its arms would be a better way to go than Turkish troops crossing the border.
But Turkey says it won't talk to PKK militants, and that stand resonates on the streets. Mustafa Ersoy, an Ankara shopkeeper, said: "The special message the flag carries is that the Turkish people are one body. And there is no power that can split the Turkish people into pieces."
The PKK has been fighting for what it calls Kurdish rights since the early 1980s. More than 30,000 people have lost their lives in the violence. The last incursions made by Turkey into Iraq came in the early 1990s.
CNN's Paula Hancocks, Phil Black, Talia Kayali, Joe Sterling and Elise Labott contributed to this report.
Turkey's battle plan could threaten northern Iraq
ANKARA, Turkey (CNN) -- The war drums are getting louder in Turkey, and they can be heard next door in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, and across the globe in Washington as well.
Many Turkish officials and citizens -- enraged by Tuesday's deadly bombing -- want the Turkish military to hit back at the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, the hard-line Kurdish separatist group thought by many in the government and on the street to have staged the blast and other militant actions.
At least six people died and more than 100 were injured in the rush hour bombing at an Ankara shopping district. (Full story)
Senior Turkish officers have said that operations against the PKK would require troops to cross into the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, which many PKK militants -- also long situated in southeastern Turkey -- have chosen as their base.
The PKK denies involvement in the Ankara attack, and a U.S. State Department spokesman cautions that the investigation into the attack is "ongoing."
However, the outrage in Turkey toward the PKK has been boiling over.
On Thursday, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that if the military were to request a retaliation, the parliament, which is dominated by Erdogan's AK party, would support it.
Turkey's army chief, Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, said recently his troops are ready to attack what he calls Kurdish terrorist camps in northern Iraq. And retired Turkish Gen. Edip Baser told CNN he believes an operation could be just weeks away.
As late as two weeks ago, there were an estimated 150,000 Turkish soldiers on or near the Turkish-Iraq border, and the PKK has stepped up cross-border attacks into the Kurdish region of Turkey now that snows have melted in the border mountains.
Seven Turkish soldiers were killed in the volatile southeast this week.
Six Turkish soldiers died and 10 were wounded Thursday when a roadside bomb detonated near the town of Siirt, the Turkish military said. Another soldier died Wednesday in an accident near Van during a search operation.
July election
The tough talk in Ankara comes two months before a general election, in which Erdogan's party, a movement with Islamist roots, faces a challenge from secularist parties. The vast majority of Turks are Muslims, but there has been a strict separation of mosque and state since the Turkish republic came into being in 1923. (Full story)
Supporters of Turkey's secular heritage have been demonstrating for weeks against the plan by Erdogan's governing party to vote one of its own members to the Turkish presidency.
Some analysts think that in the run-up to the election, Erdogan's AK party will use a war against Kurdish separatists to rally public opinion and downplay its differences with the military.
Mustafa Aydin -- professor of international relations at Ankara University and the National Security Academy -- said the government would "try to use this to rally Turkish people around the government, around the people. They will most likely try to use nationalistic themes and terms during the propaganda."
U.S. support
Nationalist feelings in Turkey are running high. Many Turks are disappointed with the lack of U.S. support for this long-time ally on the issue of operations against the PKK -- and resent U.S. support for Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq.
The United States is not deaf to the problem, but is caught between the competing interests of vital regional allies.
Two months ago, the special U.S. envoy working with Turkey on the threat of the PKK testified before a House committee. Retired Gen. Joseph Ralston said that Turkey is a "sovereign state with a responsibility to defend its people. Ultimately, the Turkish government will have to take the steps it thinks are necessary to protect its citizens."
He pointed to efforts to close a refugee camp in northern Iraq that has become a refuge for fighters and to get a "cessation of hostilities."
"Diplomatic progress on this issue has come grudgingly and with great effort, but there has been progress," Ralston testified in March. He could not immediately be reached for comment Thursday.
State Department spokesman Tom Casey cautioned that the Turkish authorities have not come to any final conclusions about who is responsible for the blast and that their probe into the blast continues.
At the same time, he said, "we believe, as does the Iraqi government, that the PKK represents a real threat, and it's a threat that needs to be dealt with."
Ralston's appointment as special envoy shows the importance of the issue, he said.
Casey said the "best way to deal" with the PKK is through "continued cooperation" between Turkey and Iraq, with the help of the United States.
"And we certainly don't think unilateral military action from Turkey or anyplace else would solve anything," he said.
Iraq backs Turkey
The Turkish Foreign Ministry said Thursday that the Iraqi government has expressed a willingness to work with Turkey on the issue of PKK terrorism.
Baser, a former special Turkish envoy on the PKK, has called the issue a "testing ground of Turkish-American relations."
The PKK has backing, with many Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey supporting a dream of an independent state. One PKK sympathizer, Faik Kaplan, told CNN that inviting the PKK to lay down its arms would be a better way to go than Turkish troops crossing the border.
But Turkey says it won't talk to PKK militants, and that stand resonates on the streets. Mustafa Ersoy, an Ankara shopkeeper, said: "The special message the flag carries is that the Turkish people are one body. And there is no power that can split the Turkish people into pieces."
The PKK has been fighting for what it calls Kurdish rights since the early 1980s. More than 30,000 people have lost their lives in the violence. The last incursions made by Turkey into Iraq came in the early 1990s.
CNN's Paula Hancocks, Phil Black, Talia Kayali, Joe Sterling and Elise Labott contributed to this report.
Many Turkish officials and citizens -- enraged by Tuesday's deadly bombing -- want the Turkish military to hit back at the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, the hard-line Kurdish separatist group thought by many in the government and on the street to have staged the blast and other militant actions.
At least six people died and more than 100 were injured in the rush hour bombing at an Ankara shopping district. (Full story)
Senior Turkish officers have said that operations against the PKK would require troops to cross into the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, which many PKK militants -- also long situated in southeastern Turkey -- have chosen as their base.
The PKK denies involvement in the Ankara attack, and a U.S. State Department spokesman cautions that the investigation into the attack is "ongoing."
However, the outrage in Turkey toward the PKK has been boiling over.
On Thursday, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that if the military were to request a retaliation, the parliament, which is dominated by Erdogan's AK party, would support it.
Turkey's army chief, Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, said recently his troops are ready to attack what he calls Kurdish terrorist camps in northern Iraq. And retired Turkish Gen. Edip Baser told CNN he believes an operation could be just weeks away.
As late as two weeks ago, there were an estimated 150,000 Turkish soldiers on or near the Turkish-Iraq border, and the PKK has stepped up cross-border attacks into the Kurdish region of Turkey now that snows have melted in the border mountains.
Seven Turkish soldiers were killed in the volatile southeast this week.
Six Turkish soldiers died and 10 were wounded Thursday when a roadside bomb detonated near the town of Siirt, the Turkish military said. Another soldier died Wednesday in an accident near Van during a search operation.
July election
The tough talk in Ankara comes two months before a general election, in which Erdogan's party, a movement with Islamist roots, faces a challenge from secularist parties. The vast majority of Turks are Muslims, but there has been a strict separation of mosque and state since the Turkish republic came into being in 1923. (Full story)
Supporters of Turkey's secular heritage have been demonstrating for weeks against the plan by Erdogan's governing party to vote one of its own members to the Turkish presidency.
Some analysts think that in the run-up to the election, Erdogan's AK party will use a war against Kurdish separatists to rally public opinion and downplay its differences with the military.
Mustafa Aydin -- professor of international relations at Ankara University and the National Security Academy -- said the government would "try to use this to rally Turkish people around the government, around the people. They will most likely try to use nationalistic themes and terms during the propaganda."
U.S. support
Nationalist feelings in Turkey are running high. Many Turks are disappointed with the lack of U.S. support for this long-time ally on the issue of operations against the PKK -- and resent U.S. support for Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq.
The United States is not deaf to the problem, but is caught between the competing interests of vital regional allies.
Two months ago, the special U.S. envoy working with Turkey on the threat of the PKK testified before a House committee. Retired Gen. Joseph Ralston said that Turkey is a "sovereign state with a responsibility to defend its people. Ultimately, the Turkish government will have to take the steps it thinks are necessary to protect its citizens."
He pointed to efforts to close a refugee camp in northern Iraq that has become a refuge for fighters and to get a "cessation of hostilities."
"Diplomatic progress on this issue has come grudgingly and with great effort, but there has been progress," Ralston testified in March. He could not immediately be reached for comment Thursday.
State Department spokesman Tom Casey cautioned that the Turkish authorities have not come to any final conclusions about who is responsible for the blast and that their probe into the blast continues.
At the same time, he said, "we believe, as does the Iraqi government, that the PKK represents a real threat, and it's a threat that needs to be dealt with."
Ralston's appointment as special envoy shows the importance of the issue, he said.
Casey said the "best way to deal" with the PKK is through "continued cooperation" between Turkey and Iraq, with the help of the United States.
"And we certainly don't think unilateral military action from Turkey or anyplace else would solve anything," he said.
Iraq backs Turkey
The Turkish Foreign Ministry said Thursday that the Iraqi government has expressed a willingness to work with Turkey on the issue of PKK terrorism.
Baser, a former special Turkish envoy on the PKK, has called the issue a "testing ground of Turkish-American relations."
The PKK has backing, with many Kurds in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey supporting a dream of an independent state. One PKK sympathizer, Faik Kaplan, told CNN that inviting the PKK to lay down its arms would be a better way to go than Turkish troops crossing the border.
But Turkey says it won't talk to PKK militants, and that stand resonates on the streets. Mustafa Ersoy, an Ankara shopkeeper, said: "The special message the flag carries is that the Turkish people are one body. And there is no power that can split the Turkish people into pieces."
The PKK has been fighting for what it calls Kurdish rights since the early 1980s. More than 30,000 people have lost their lives in the violence. The last incursions made by Turkey into Iraq came in the early 1990s.
CNN's Paula Hancocks, Phil Black, Talia Kayali, Joe Sterling and Elise Labott contributed to this report.
Monday, May 21, 2007
Taking stock in Turkey/Can Islamists and secularists work together?
Turkey’s general and presidential elections just might re-establish a tenuous balance of power between warring secularists and Islamists, reducing regime tensions at the expense of creating a less stable, and possibly more natıonalist, government. Whatever the outcome, Turkey will retain its contradictions—and an economy closely attuned to global liquidity conditions.
The catalyst for this test of strength has been the expiry of the term of Turkey's president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a 65-year-old former judge. By now, since his term ran out on May 16th, Mr Sezer should be relaxing in the bright spring sunshine on the balcony of his retirement home in a lakeside suburb of Ankara. Instead, he remains in the presidential palace—his home for the past seven years—overlooking the city centre. No date been fixed for his move.
The president is not complaining. Alongside the armed forces, the universities and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), he has been a mainstay of the secularist camp confronting the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party of Islamist roots. He is therefore unlikely to have been disappointed by the May 1st ruling of the Constitutional Court (of which he is a former president) which has, in effect, prevented the AKP from choosing his successor.
The Court issued its controversial judgment only days after the sole candidate Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister, had won the first round of voting--and after the armed forces had demanded a president committed to the secularist values of modern Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, lambasting the government for Islamicising education and social life. The judges upheld the opposition’s claim that two-thirds of MPs had to be present for a vote on a new head of state to be valid. With the CHP and the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP) boycotting presidential ballots, the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the charismatic but abrasive AKP leader, had no choice but to bring forward November’s general election.
Election lottery
Polling will take place on July 22nd, and predicting the outcome is strictly for gamblers. The Elections Law prevents parties winning less than 10% of the national vote from taking up seats in parliament. In 2002, 45% of the electorate voted for parties that won no seats. The five best losers took 9%, 8%, 7%, 6% and 5% of the vote respectively. In consequence, the AKP won 363 of the 550 seats with 34% of the votes, and the CHP won 178 with 19%. Independents took nine seats. Some parties, notably ANAP, which scored only 5%, later established a parliamentary presence by transferring MPs from other parties.
Until April, financial analysts were looking forward to a repeat performance this year. A renewed overall majority for the AKP, it was assumed, would guarantee the continuation of tight fiscal policy, the privatisation programme and other IMF-backed reforms. But massive demonstrations staged in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir on April 14th, April 29th and May 13th have attested to the depth of public concern, especially among women, about Turkey’s alleged Islamist drift, reinforcing the die-hard determination of the secularist camp. In these circumstances, monopolisation of power by the AKP has come to be seen as a risk, and political stability can no longer be equated with single-party government. Conversely, a more representative parliament and a broader-based government could mitigate social tensions.
New balance?
An AKP-led coalition looks worth a small bet. Mr Erdogan’s outfit is still the party to beat. It is backed by Sunni Islamic sects and charities, conservative businessmen, Islamist media organs and a swathe of the urban poor. It has a strong power base in local government. It has distributed jobs, contracts and food parcels. In contrast to the financial crisis and recession of 2001, it can boast a five-year record of 7.5% annual GDP growth—although few employees or farmers will admit to having seen any benefits. At the same time, other parties could increase—or at least consolidate—their support. The alliance recently forged with the small Democratic Left Party (DSP) may help CHP leader Deniz Baykal to overcome disenchantment with his narrowly-focused leadership. Meanwhile, the ANAP leader, Erkan Mumcu, has announced a merger with the True Path Party (DYP), the fellow centre-right party now led by ex-Interior Minister Mehmet Agar, which came third in 2002. The merged entity, to be known as the Democrat Party (DP), could attract support from big business and the mainstream media, which are no longer comfortable with the AKP. It will be the AKP’s most likely coalition partner.
Any coalition could bicker, procrastinate and eventually dissolve. It might also have to respond to public cynicism about Ankara’s EU, Cyprus and Iraq policies, and to criticisms of the overvalued lira and the high 17.5% overnight rate—a combination widely believed to favour financial investors at the expense of national industry and jobs. Issues such as these have contributed more than is often recognised to anti-AKP sentiment.
By way of complications, the far right Nationalist Action Party (MHP), fourth placed in 2002, is hoping to re-enter parliament. So are Kurdish nationalists—anathema to the MHP—who plan to circumvent the 10% rule by standing as independents. Kurdish nationalist PKK insurgents still regularly kill and are killed by conscript soldiers in the mainly Kurdish-populated Southeast, and plant bombs in other cities and tourist resorts. There have been no Kurdish nationalist MPs since thirteen were hounded from their seats in 1994. This year’s candidates can expect obstruction and harassment.
Holding firm
For all its fault lines and weaknesses, Turkey is not on the eve of collapse or revolution. Support for an outright military coup is minimal. Polling, as usual, will be largely free and fair. Similarly, whatever wild pledges they may make to the electorate over the next two months, none of the major parties are in principle opposed to the open free-market economy, fiscal rectitude or to attempts to lure foreign capital.
For now, the economy is riding a flood of global liquidity. The trade and current account deficits are said to be the fourth and sixth largest in the world respectively. But foreign lending and investment are financing them with ease. This week the lira firmed further to about YTL1.32:US$1, notwithstanding stubborn 10% inflation and data releases that underlined the ongoing slowdown in growth.
The solid fiscal performance of recent years may worsen in 2007 due to sluggish tax revenues, higher interest costs and some pre-election loosening by the government. However, privatisation is generating revenues (the recent offer for sale of Petkim, a petrochemical producer has attracted 19 bids), and a resurrection of debt sustainability doubts is some way off. A disruptively sharp currency correction is unlikely unless global tides turn or politics tests the nerves of the markets and domestic savers more severely. Eight years of IMF standby accords seem to be drawing safely to a close.
Electing the president
As for Mr. Sezer, he could help to clarify his retirement date this week by approving a package of drastic constitutional amendments which the AKP and ANAP have hastily pushed through Parliament. The amendments introduce direct election of the president in a “French-style” double ballot, cut the presidential term from seven years to five, permit a sitting president to be re-elected and space general elections every four years instead of every five. The president has until May 26th to make up his mind. Most likely, he will return the package to parliament for further consideration. If parliament then insists, he can also put it to a referendum.
In a nutshell, the new head of state may be elected by the people or parliament, with or without a referendum (which may or may not coincide with the general election). The AKP is standing by Mr Gul, but if it is to remain in government, a figure acceptable to the secularists would be a wiser choice for the sake of stability.
May 21st 2007
From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire
The catalyst for this test of strength has been the expiry of the term of Turkey's president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a 65-year-old former judge. By now, since his term ran out on May 16th, Mr Sezer should be relaxing in the bright spring sunshine on the balcony of his retirement home in a lakeside suburb of Ankara. Instead, he remains in the presidential palace—his home for the past seven years—overlooking the city centre. No date been fixed for his move.
The president is not complaining. Alongside the armed forces, the universities and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), he has been a mainstay of the secularist camp confronting the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party of Islamist roots. He is therefore unlikely to have been disappointed by the May 1st ruling of the Constitutional Court (of which he is a former president) which has, in effect, prevented the AKP from choosing his successor.
The Court issued its controversial judgment only days after the sole candidate Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister, had won the first round of voting--and after the armed forces had demanded a president committed to the secularist values of modern Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, lambasting the government for Islamicising education and social life. The judges upheld the opposition’s claim that two-thirds of MPs had to be present for a vote on a new head of state to be valid. With the CHP and the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP) boycotting presidential ballots, the prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the charismatic but abrasive AKP leader, had no choice but to bring forward November’s general election.
Election lottery
Polling will take place on July 22nd, and predicting the outcome is strictly for gamblers. The Elections Law prevents parties winning less than 10% of the national vote from taking up seats in parliament. In 2002, 45% of the electorate voted for parties that won no seats. The five best losers took 9%, 8%, 7%, 6% and 5% of the vote respectively. In consequence, the AKP won 363 of the 550 seats with 34% of the votes, and the CHP won 178 with 19%. Independents took nine seats. Some parties, notably ANAP, which scored only 5%, later established a parliamentary presence by transferring MPs from other parties.
Until April, financial analysts were looking forward to a repeat performance this year. A renewed overall majority for the AKP, it was assumed, would guarantee the continuation of tight fiscal policy, the privatisation programme and other IMF-backed reforms. But massive demonstrations staged in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir on April 14th, April 29th and May 13th have attested to the depth of public concern, especially among women, about Turkey’s alleged Islamist drift, reinforcing the die-hard determination of the secularist camp. In these circumstances, monopolisation of power by the AKP has come to be seen as a risk, and political stability can no longer be equated with single-party government. Conversely, a more representative parliament and a broader-based government could mitigate social tensions.
New balance?
An AKP-led coalition looks worth a small bet. Mr Erdogan’s outfit is still the party to beat. It is backed by Sunni Islamic sects and charities, conservative businessmen, Islamist media organs and a swathe of the urban poor. It has a strong power base in local government. It has distributed jobs, contracts and food parcels. In contrast to the financial crisis and recession of 2001, it can boast a five-year record of 7.5% annual GDP growth—although few employees or farmers will admit to having seen any benefits. At the same time, other parties could increase—or at least consolidate—their support. The alliance recently forged with the small Democratic Left Party (DSP) may help CHP leader Deniz Baykal to overcome disenchantment with his narrowly-focused leadership. Meanwhile, the ANAP leader, Erkan Mumcu, has announced a merger with the True Path Party (DYP), the fellow centre-right party now led by ex-Interior Minister Mehmet Agar, which came third in 2002. The merged entity, to be known as the Democrat Party (DP), could attract support from big business and the mainstream media, which are no longer comfortable with the AKP. It will be the AKP’s most likely coalition partner.
Any coalition could bicker, procrastinate and eventually dissolve. It might also have to respond to public cynicism about Ankara’s EU, Cyprus and Iraq policies, and to criticisms of the overvalued lira and the high 17.5% overnight rate—a combination widely believed to favour financial investors at the expense of national industry and jobs. Issues such as these have contributed more than is often recognised to anti-AKP sentiment.
By way of complications, the far right Nationalist Action Party (MHP), fourth placed in 2002, is hoping to re-enter parliament. So are Kurdish nationalists—anathema to the MHP—who plan to circumvent the 10% rule by standing as independents. Kurdish nationalist PKK insurgents still regularly kill and are killed by conscript soldiers in the mainly Kurdish-populated Southeast, and plant bombs in other cities and tourist resorts. There have been no Kurdish nationalist MPs since thirteen were hounded from their seats in 1994. This year’s candidates can expect obstruction and harassment.
Holding firm
For all its fault lines and weaknesses, Turkey is not on the eve of collapse or revolution. Support for an outright military coup is minimal. Polling, as usual, will be largely free and fair. Similarly, whatever wild pledges they may make to the electorate over the next two months, none of the major parties are in principle opposed to the open free-market economy, fiscal rectitude or to attempts to lure foreign capital.
For now, the economy is riding a flood of global liquidity. The trade and current account deficits are said to be the fourth and sixth largest in the world respectively. But foreign lending and investment are financing them with ease. This week the lira firmed further to about YTL1.32:US$1, notwithstanding stubborn 10% inflation and data releases that underlined the ongoing slowdown in growth.
The solid fiscal performance of recent years may worsen in 2007 due to sluggish tax revenues, higher interest costs and some pre-election loosening by the government. However, privatisation is generating revenues (the recent offer for sale of Petkim, a petrochemical producer has attracted 19 bids), and a resurrection of debt sustainability doubts is some way off. A disruptively sharp currency correction is unlikely unless global tides turn or politics tests the nerves of the markets and domestic savers more severely. Eight years of IMF standby accords seem to be drawing safely to a close.
Electing the president
As for Mr. Sezer, he could help to clarify his retirement date this week by approving a package of drastic constitutional amendments which the AKP and ANAP have hastily pushed through Parliament. The amendments introduce direct election of the president in a “French-style” double ballot, cut the presidential term from seven years to five, permit a sitting president to be re-elected and space general elections every four years instead of every five. The president has until May 26th to make up his mind. Most likely, he will return the package to parliament for further consideration. If parliament then insists, he can also put it to a referendum.
In a nutshell, the new head of state may be elected by the people or parliament, with or without a referendum (which may or may not coincide with the general election). The AKP is standing by Mr Gul, but if it is to remain in government, a figure acceptable to the secularists would be a wiser choice for the sake of stability.
May 21st 2007
From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire
In Turkey, a rumble is heard in Ataturk's grave
ISTANBUL: Surveying the wreckage of the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk saw an impoverished peasant society that was 90 percent illiterate, whose primary exports were tobacco and dried fruit.
An autocrat, a drinker and a nation builder, Ataturk set about assembling a state meant to wrench his countrymen out of their backwardness.
Today, Turkey is poised to join Europe - if the Continent will have it - in what would be the fulfillment of Ataturk's vision. But in an irony of history, a group of politicians who value Islam are hoisting Turkey toward the club, which Ataturk's secular contemporaries never were able to do.
So a look to Turkey's past is useful to understand its complicated present.
The model for a new Turkish state, Ataturk believed, was to be found in the nations of Europe and the West, where modern thought and reason had made the societies rich. Religion, he concluded, was a major hindrance to becoming modern.
"My people are going to learn the principles of democracy, the dictates of truth and the teachings of science," a well-known quotation of his goes. "Superstition must go. Let them worship as they will; every man can follow his own conscience provided it does not interfere with sane reason or bid him act against the liberty of his fellow men."
Andrew Mango, author of "Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey," said that Ataturk "accepted religion as a social fact, but he had no time for it."
So Ataturk instituted radical secular reforms. Changing the alphabet, replacing the Shariah with the Swiss civil code, criminalizing the wearing of the fez and traditional dress and discouraging the veil were intended to protect the state from religion, not just separate the two. And the approach was not unusual in Ataturk's day.
Revolutionaries in Mexico and Russia also linked the concepts of modernization and anticlericalism. A few years later, in Iran, Reza Shah would copy Ataturk's approach wholesale.
Over the next eight decades, the system that Ataturk built settled deeply into Turkish society. It brought Turkey up to levels of economic and social development on par with Europe's. The secular establishment produced wealthy families who established generously endowed private universities and museums. Turkey became largely literate and acquired a growing middle class.
But politically, it remained frozen in time.
While Europe redefined its ideas of modernity in ways that emphasized democracy, tolerance and human rights, Turkey's leaders continued down a path of rigid, corrupt and sometimes harshly repressive rule. The military remained the central guardian of Ataturk's legacy, ousting four elected governments in the last four decades of the 20th century. A period of economic openness in the 1980s was the one sustained break in the pattern of state control.
So the political group that claims to defend Ataturk's legacy became the one offering the least in the way of new ideas. "They defend secularism in a religious, dogmatic way," said Akif Emre, a columnist for Yeni Safak, a conservative newspaper here.
A turning point came in 2002, when voters rebelled against a spectacular display of corruption and incompetence by the secular parties and elected instead the party of Recep Tayyip Erdogan - a former mayor of Istanbul whose party, despite its Islamic roots, had proved adaptable to the rules of democracy while holding municipal power.
In the last four years, as the dominant power in Parliament, it has drawn more Turks into the political process and adopted as its major goal membership in the European Union. It has passed more than 800 laws to make Turkish laws and standards match those in Europe. It has scrapped the death penalty. It has removed military representatives from several layers of the civilian government.
Its domestic audience remains fearful of where any party with Islamist roots might one day lead Turkey; thousands of Turks have rallied in at least three major cities in the past month to express those concerns.
"If Ataturk came back today, he would say, 'I'm afraid I need to erase this and start all over again,' " said Guldal Okutucu, the head of the women's branch of the main secular opposition party. "He would have told his nation to wake up."
But a number of foreign experts and officials have concluded that Turkey's new leaders seem committed to the kind of dynamic, pluralist society that Europeans might welcome into their club.
"They opened up a system that had to be opened up to get into the EU," said Joost Lagendijk, a member of the European Parliament who heads a committee on Turkish issues. If the parties of the secular elites "had remained in the government it would have been impossible to start EU negotiations," he said.
Israel, which developed a military partnership with Turkey in the 1990s and might have been expected to be suspicious of the new government, has instead expressed enthusiasm. "We are at the highest moment in relations with Turkey ever," said Pinhas Avivi, Israel's ambassador to Turkey. "No prophet could have seen it in advance."
Trade with Israel is now $2.5 billion, double what it was before Erdogan came to power, he said.
But some important Europeans remain skeptical. Nicolas Sarkozy, the new president of France, put opposition to Turkey's membership in the European Union into his campaign platform, arguing that the country is neither culturally nor geographically part of Europe - a stance that Erdogan took issue with last week.
"Mr. Sarkozy has to overcome these prejudices," Erdogan said. "If we are going to integrate civilizations inside the European Union, and say that the European Union is not a Christian club, Sarkozy has to look at his thoughts once more."
What would Ataturk think?
Mango said the nation builder had no feeling of inferiority when dealing with Europeans. If Ataturk were to encounter Sarkozy today, he said, "he wouldn't have felt that this just shows how civilized people hate us; it would just mean that Sarkozy is not a very civilized man."
An autocrat, a drinker and a nation builder, Ataturk set about assembling a state meant to wrench his countrymen out of their backwardness.
Today, Turkey is poised to join Europe - if the Continent will have it - in what would be the fulfillment of Ataturk's vision. But in an irony of history, a group of politicians who value Islam are hoisting Turkey toward the club, which Ataturk's secular contemporaries never were able to do.
So a look to Turkey's past is useful to understand its complicated present.
The model for a new Turkish state, Ataturk believed, was to be found in the nations of Europe and the West, where modern thought and reason had made the societies rich. Religion, he concluded, was a major hindrance to becoming modern.
"My people are going to learn the principles of democracy, the dictates of truth and the teachings of science," a well-known quotation of his goes. "Superstition must go. Let them worship as they will; every man can follow his own conscience provided it does not interfere with sane reason or bid him act against the liberty of his fellow men."
Andrew Mango, author of "Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey," said that Ataturk "accepted religion as a social fact, but he had no time for it."
So Ataturk instituted radical secular reforms. Changing the alphabet, replacing the Shariah with the Swiss civil code, criminalizing the wearing of the fez and traditional dress and discouraging the veil were intended to protect the state from religion, not just separate the two. And the approach was not unusual in Ataturk's day.
Revolutionaries in Mexico and Russia also linked the concepts of modernization and anticlericalism. A few years later, in Iran, Reza Shah would copy Ataturk's approach wholesale.
Over the next eight decades, the system that Ataturk built settled deeply into Turkish society. It brought Turkey up to levels of economic and social development on par with Europe's. The secular establishment produced wealthy families who established generously endowed private universities and museums. Turkey became largely literate and acquired a growing middle class.
But politically, it remained frozen in time.
While Europe redefined its ideas of modernity in ways that emphasized democracy, tolerance and human rights, Turkey's leaders continued down a path of rigid, corrupt and sometimes harshly repressive rule. The military remained the central guardian of Ataturk's legacy, ousting four elected governments in the last four decades of the 20th century. A period of economic openness in the 1980s was the one sustained break in the pattern of state control.
So the political group that claims to defend Ataturk's legacy became the one offering the least in the way of new ideas. "They defend secularism in a religious, dogmatic way," said Akif Emre, a columnist for Yeni Safak, a conservative newspaper here.
A turning point came in 2002, when voters rebelled against a spectacular display of corruption and incompetence by the secular parties and elected instead the party of Recep Tayyip Erdogan - a former mayor of Istanbul whose party, despite its Islamic roots, had proved adaptable to the rules of democracy while holding municipal power.
In the last four years, as the dominant power in Parliament, it has drawn more Turks into the political process and adopted as its major goal membership in the European Union. It has passed more than 800 laws to make Turkish laws and standards match those in Europe. It has scrapped the death penalty. It has removed military representatives from several layers of the civilian government.
Its domestic audience remains fearful of where any party with Islamist roots might one day lead Turkey; thousands of Turks have rallied in at least three major cities in the past month to express those concerns.
"If Ataturk came back today, he would say, 'I'm afraid I need to erase this and start all over again,' " said Guldal Okutucu, the head of the women's branch of the main secular opposition party. "He would have told his nation to wake up."
But a number of foreign experts and officials have concluded that Turkey's new leaders seem committed to the kind of dynamic, pluralist society that Europeans might welcome into their club.
"They opened up a system that had to be opened up to get into the EU," said Joost Lagendijk, a member of the European Parliament who heads a committee on Turkish issues. If the parties of the secular elites "had remained in the government it would have been impossible to start EU negotiations," he said.
Israel, which developed a military partnership with Turkey in the 1990s and might have been expected to be suspicious of the new government, has instead expressed enthusiasm. "We are at the highest moment in relations with Turkey ever," said Pinhas Avivi, Israel's ambassador to Turkey. "No prophet could have seen it in advance."
Trade with Israel is now $2.5 billion, double what it was before Erdogan came to power, he said.
But some important Europeans remain skeptical. Nicolas Sarkozy, the new president of France, put opposition to Turkey's membership in the European Union into his campaign platform, arguing that the country is neither culturally nor geographically part of Europe - a stance that Erdogan took issue with last week.
"Mr. Sarkozy has to overcome these prejudices," Erdogan said. "If we are going to integrate civilizations inside the European Union, and say that the European Union is not a Christian club, Sarkozy has to look at his thoughts once more."
What would Ataturk think?
Mango said the nation builder had no feeling of inferiority when dealing with Europeans. If Ataturk were to encounter Sarkozy today, he said, "he wouldn't have felt that this just shows how civilized people hate us; it would just mean that Sarkozy is not a very civilized man."
Sunday, May 20, 2007
World View Podcast
CALVIN SIMS. Welcome to The New York Times World View podcast, a weekly conversation with Times foreign correspondents from across the globe. I’m Calvin Sims of The Times. I spent 10 years as a foreign correspondent for the paper.
This week, I speak with Sabrina Tavernise, Times Istanbul correspondent, about the recent political crisis in Turkey, which is struggling to reconcile secularism, Islam and democracy.
Q. Sabrina, Turkey recently suffered its worst political crisis in many years when the military threatened to intervene against Turkey’s moderately Islamic government. What happened? What brought this all about?
A. Well, it was initially a fight over the position of the presidency. And the presidency is not as powerful as the prime minister — Turkey has a parliamentary system, so its prime minister is the most powerful — but the presidency is seen as the highest post in Turkey’s secular establishment. Turkey’s a secular state, founded in 1923, and the state itself and the people who control the state and run things are secular elite that have been running the state for many years, since the state’s founding. And they felt very threatened that this post was about to be taken by a young and up-and-coming government, political party, that had belonged to several political parties in the past with backgrounds in political Islam.
It’s a little bit difficult to understand, but the political party now in power that’s run by Prime Minister Erdogan, it’s called the AK party, that stands for justice and development, and the party has been really doing phenomenally well economically, has been opening up the country in terms of democratic reforms, taking away military leaders that had been members of civil councils and ministries — really has been doing a lot to open up the system that had existed for about 80 years.
Q. Prime Minister Erdogan’s party, how can you characterize it? Is it an Islamic party? Does it have Islamic leanings?
A. It’s really not an Islamic party. But the people who formed the party came from backgrounds in Islamic politics. So the party really takes offense when people describe it as an Islamist party. It’s really not. They are very, very devout Muslims, however. They do not want their religion to run the country; they don’t want their religion in politics; they don’t want to apply religious views in matters of state. And they really have pretty much stuck to that line throughout their fours years in power. They came to power in 2002.
Q. And so Prime Minister Erdogan was going to nominate the foreign minister to the post of the presidency. And why is it the secularists didn’t like this? What was wrong with this foreign minister from their standpoint?
A. Well, Abdullah Gul has been a very agile and skillful foreign minister. However, his wife wears the Islamic head-covering, headscarf, hijab, and that was something that’s deeply symbolic in Turkey and was something that was quite distasteful to the secular establishment.
Now the argument that the AK party and Mr. Erdogan and his supporters make is that, in fact, the objection to Mr. Gul is much more about the secular establishment wanting to stay in power and much less about objections to religion.
The concern by secular Turks who are not members of the elite, however, also has its merits, which goes essentially like this — Mr. Erdogan and his supporters may not be bringing Islam into politics now, say that they won’t, say that they don’t want to, but they have a large grass-roots constituency of supporters who really would like to see more freedom to practice their religion.
And secular Turks say, We don’t really know what their vision for a future for Turkey is — Do they want to see it more religious? Do they want to see it more devout? Will I be able to walk around not wearing a headscarf? Once they have freedom to practice their religion more, how free will I be to practice my secular lifestyle? And that’s essentially the conflict.
Q. And so this comes to nearly a head when the vote is about to take place to approve Gul. And in the midst of this the military issues basically a warning. Now that would seem very strange to most Americans, that the military would issue a warning that if this foreign minister is actually elected president that they might actually take some action. How does that come about?
A. Well the military is extremely powerful in the Turkish state. It’s the last check in the system of checks and balances for secularism. It considers itself the protector, the defender of Ataturk’s secular legacy. It’s deposed, by military and non-military means, four elected governments since 1960. It really plays a large part in the foundation of the Turkish state also. Ataturk was a military man. It’s not quite as nefarious as everybody would like to make it out to be, but a lot of Turks are arguing that its messing in politics has outlived its usefulness, and it’s unlikely and unhelpful if it interfered now. People don’t really expect it to, but of course it’s not out of the question.
Q. And we should point out that the military there in Turkey has intervened and launched several coups on the past. Right?
A. Yes, four elected governments since 1960 it has ousted.
Q. So how was this resolved? Obviously Mr. Erdogan nominated Mr. Gul. And was there a vote? Did the military actually start to launch a coup? How did this resolve itself?
A. No, the military simply gave a warning on April 27, although it was a very stern one and highly unusual, and that is what made everybody worry that there might be a coup. Soon after there was — essentially an opposition political party filed a case against Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Gul in the constitutional court, arguing over procedural details basically — saying that there were not enough people present at the voting for Mr. Gul in order to make a quorum in order to have the session be valid.
The constitutional court, which is also really part of the secular establishment itself, of course, ruled in favor of the opposition party. And that’s essentially what blocked Mr. Gul and Mr. Erdogan from getting their way with the presidency.
Now they’re suggesting that the president be elected by popular vote — so essentially taking that extremely sensitive and important position out of the hands of the secular establishment and putting it into a popular ballot in front of Turks across the nation. That is something that could really shake up the power structure as well.
Q. Now there were massive protests by Turks, and in many of these protests they were speaking out not only against military intervention but also what they saw as a move toward a more Islamic state. What do most Turks make of this? Do they think this is a normal part of democracy there? Are they upset with the secular establishment for blocking what would be a democratic vote under their current system for Mr. Gul? What’s their take?
A. It really depends on who you talk to because, you know, the nation really is split. There are a large group of people who are more religious, had never really had any real access to power, were thought of almost kind of as second-class citizens I would argue, although people would dispute that, and are now coming into their own. There’s been an economic boom. People have become middle class, lower-middle class and they’re pushing up into power. Those people are saying, What’s wrong with us wearing a headscarf in the university? What’s wrong with that? These ideas you have of modernism are very outdated.
And then you have the group of people in society who are saying, I don’t really know where Mr. Erdogan is taking all of this. What is his vision for gender equality? What is his vision for protecting my secular lifestyle once we start giving more religious freedoms? I don’t trust that the rank and file of his party will respect my secular ways.
Q. You make a very good point, Sabrina, which is that behind this, this is a struggle — a struggle between this urban secular elite and this new emerging middle class of religious Turks who are perhaps, as maybe you’ve written, chipping away at the economic and political power that had been there with the elite. Right?
A. Right.
Q. Why are secular Turks so fearful of Erdogan and his government? What do they think will happen? They’ve not promoted or proposed any laws that would challenge the secular tenets of the Turkish Constitution, have they?
A. Well, they first of all come from a deeply conservative and religious background, and the party that they belonged to that was shut down by the state in 1997 was very, very much a religious Islamic political party. They remember that that was their very recent past. You know, these are deeply emotional issues — I mean do you go to a public swimming pool where it’s separated by men and women? I mean that’s something that some Turks would say that’s old-fashioned and absurd and I don’t want to have to have my family and my home and my neighborhood be subject to that. And then others would say, This is the only way we can go to a public swimming pool. We can’t be in a bathing suit in front of other people’s husbands. You know, they are emotional things.
I think that there is some exaggeration of the Islamist threat. But there’s also some real concerns that just aren’t being addressed by the politicians. They’re not talking about it. No one’s saying what their vision for the future and for secular lifestyles is. In fact, they dismiss the demonstrations and the secular people who have concerns as kind of irrational, irrelevant and not worth their time talking about.
Q. At the same time, Prime Minister Erdogan’s government, as you pointed out, has proven itself to be quite efficient in delivering basic needs and services there and the economy is booming. So I would imagine — Is this government very popular because of the way it’s running Turkey?
A. They definitely had many voters, there were some political analysts who told me, in the last election who voted for them because of the corruption by previous governments and these guys seemed less corrupt. And they were — Mr. Erdogan was very active as Istanbul’s city mayor. So, yes, they did definitely win votes because of their performance. But it’s also part of it is a religious identity vote, not all of it.
Q. How should we in the United States view what is happening there in Turkey? Turkey has been somewhat of a model of how democracy in a predominantly Muslim country can be compatible. How should we view what is taking place there — this sort of clash between democracy, secularism and Islam?
A. I think it still is a model. I mean I think that it still has a lot to teach the world and it hasn’t gone backwards in any way. I think it’s just trying to, itself, work out in its own mind where this is going. And I think in a lot of ways it’s healthy, that it’s a very public process that’s happening on the streets and in newspapers and on television talk shows. They are being extremely thoughtful about it.
Q. What are political analysts there predicting will happen, especially this summer when new elections are going to be held again?
A. A lot of them say that Mr. Erdogan and his AK party will probably do better in the popular vote than it did in 2002.I It’ll probably get more votes. However, they expect that it will have fewer seats in Parliament because the opposition parties will probably band together and will manage to present a pretty good challenge in terms of parliamentary seats. So that’s what people are saying right now.
Q. Well, Sabrina Tavernise, Times Istanbul correspondent, thank you so much for speaking with us.
A. Thanks, Calvin.
SIMS. And thanks for listening. I’m Calvin Sims of The New York Times. I’ll be back next week with another edition of World View.
This week, I speak with Sabrina Tavernise, Times Istanbul correspondent, about the recent political crisis in Turkey, which is struggling to reconcile secularism, Islam and democracy.
Q. Sabrina, Turkey recently suffered its worst political crisis in many years when the military threatened to intervene against Turkey’s moderately Islamic government. What happened? What brought this all about?
A. Well, it was initially a fight over the position of the presidency. And the presidency is not as powerful as the prime minister — Turkey has a parliamentary system, so its prime minister is the most powerful — but the presidency is seen as the highest post in Turkey’s secular establishment. Turkey’s a secular state, founded in 1923, and the state itself and the people who control the state and run things are secular elite that have been running the state for many years, since the state’s founding. And they felt very threatened that this post was about to be taken by a young and up-and-coming government, political party, that had belonged to several political parties in the past with backgrounds in political Islam.
It’s a little bit difficult to understand, but the political party now in power that’s run by Prime Minister Erdogan, it’s called the AK party, that stands for justice and development, and the party has been really doing phenomenally well economically, has been opening up the country in terms of democratic reforms, taking away military leaders that had been members of civil councils and ministries — really has been doing a lot to open up the system that had existed for about 80 years.
Q. Prime Minister Erdogan’s party, how can you characterize it? Is it an Islamic party? Does it have Islamic leanings?
A. It’s really not an Islamic party. But the people who formed the party came from backgrounds in Islamic politics. So the party really takes offense when people describe it as an Islamist party. It’s really not. They are very, very devout Muslims, however. They do not want their religion to run the country; they don’t want their religion in politics; they don’t want to apply religious views in matters of state. And they really have pretty much stuck to that line throughout their fours years in power. They came to power in 2002.
Q. And so Prime Minister Erdogan was going to nominate the foreign minister to the post of the presidency. And why is it the secularists didn’t like this? What was wrong with this foreign minister from their standpoint?
A. Well, Abdullah Gul has been a very agile and skillful foreign minister. However, his wife wears the Islamic head-covering, headscarf, hijab, and that was something that’s deeply symbolic in Turkey and was something that was quite distasteful to the secular establishment.
Now the argument that the AK party and Mr. Erdogan and his supporters make is that, in fact, the objection to Mr. Gul is much more about the secular establishment wanting to stay in power and much less about objections to religion.
The concern by secular Turks who are not members of the elite, however, also has its merits, which goes essentially like this — Mr. Erdogan and his supporters may not be bringing Islam into politics now, say that they won’t, say that they don’t want to, but they have a large grass-roots constituency of supporters who really would like to see more freedom to practice their religion.
And secular Turks say, We don’t really know what their vision for a future for Turkey is — Do they want to see it more religious? Do they want to see it more devout? Will I be able to walk around not wearing a headscarf? Once they have freedom to practice their religion more, how free will I be to practice my secular lifestyle? And that’s essentially the conflict.
Q. And so this comes to nearly a head when the vote is about to take place to approve Gul. And in the midst of this the military issues basically a warning. Now that would seem very strange to most Americans, that the military would issue a warning that if this foreign minister is actually elected president that they might actually take some action. How does that come about?
A. Well the military is extremely powerful in the Turkish state. It’s the last check in the system of checks and balances for secularism. It considers itself the protector, the defender of Ataturk’s secular legacy. It’s deposed, by military and non-military means, four elected governments since 1960. It really plays a large part in the foundation of the Turkish state also. Ataturk was a military man. It’s not quite as nefarious as everybody would like to make it out to be, but a lot of Turks are arguing that its messing in politics has outlived its usefulness, and it’s unlikely and unhelpful if it interfered now. People don’t really expect it to, but of course it’s not out of the question.
Q. And we should point out that the military there in Turkey has intervened and launched several coups on the past. Right?
A. Yes, four elected governments since 1960 it has ousted.
Q. So how was this resolved? Obviously Mr. Erdogan nominated Mr. Gul. And was there a vote? Did the military actually start to launch a coup? How did this resolve itself?
A. No, the military simply gave a warning on April 27, although it was a very stern one and highly unusual, and that is what made everybody worry that there might be a coup. Soon after there was — essentially an opposition political party filed a case against Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Gul in the constitutional court, arguing over procedural details basically — saying that there were not enough people present at the voting for Mr. Gul in order to make a quorum in order to have the session be valid.
The constitutional court, which is also really part of the secular establishment itself, of course, ruled in favor of the opposition party. And that’s essentially what blocked Mr. Gul and Mr. Erdogan from getting their way with the presidency.
Now they’re suggesting that the president be elected by popular vote — so essentially taking that extremely sensitive and important position out of the hands of the secular establishment and putting it into a popular ballot in front of Turks across the nation. That is something that could really shake up the power structure as well.
Q. Now there were massive protests by Turks, and in many of these protests they were speaking out not only against military intervention but also what they saw as a move toward a more Islamic state. What do most Turks make of this? Do they think this is a normal part of democracy there? Are they upset with the secular establishment for blocking what would be a democratic vote under their current system for Mr. Gul? What’s their take?
A. It really depends on who you talk to because, you know, the nation really is split. There are a large group of people who are more religious, had never really had any real access to power, were thought of almost kind of as second-class citizens I would argue, although people would dispute that, and are now coming into their own. There’s been an economic boom. People have become middle class, lower-middle class and they’re pushing up into power. Those people are saying, What’s wrong with us wearing a headscarf in the university? What’s wrong with that? These ideas you have of modernism are very outdated.
And then you have the group of people in society who are saying, I don’t really know where Mr. Erdogan is taking all of this. What is his vision for gender equality? What is his vision for protecting my secular lifestyle once we start giving more religious freedoms? I don’t trust that the rank and file of his party will respect my secular ways.
Q. You make a very good point, Sabrina, which is that behind this, this is a struggle — a struggle between this urban secular elite and this new emerging middle class of religious Turks who are perhaps, as maybe you’ve written, chipping away at the economic and political power that had been there with the elite. Right?
A. Right.
Q. Why are secular Turks so fearful of Erdogan and his government? What do they think will happen? They’ve not promoted or proposed any laws that would challenge the secular tenets of the Turkish Constitution, have they?
A. Well, they first of all come from a deeply conservative and religious background, and the party that they belonged to that was shut down by the state in 1997 was very, very much a religious Islamic political party. They remember that that was their very recent past. You know, these are deeply emotional issues — I mean do you go to a public swimming pool where it’s separated by men and women? I mean that’s something that some Turks would say that’s old-fashioned and absurd and I don’t want to have to have my family and my home and my neighborhood be subject to that. And then others would say, This is the only way we can go to a public swimming pool. We can’t be in a bathing suit in front of other people’s husbands. You know, they are emotional things.
I think that there is some exaggeration of the Islamist threat. But there’s also some real concerns that just aren’t being addressed by the politicians. They’re not talking about it. No one’s saying what their vision for the future and for secular lifestyles is. In fact, they dismiss the demonstrations and the secular people who have concerns as kind of irrational, irrelevant and not worth their time talking about.
Q. At the same time, Prime Minister Erdogan’s government, as you pointed out, has proven itself to be quite efficient in delivering basic needs and services there and the economy is booming. So I would imagine — Is this government very popular because of the way it’s running Turkey?
A. They definitely had many voters, there were some political analysts who told me, in the last election who voted for them because of the corruption by previous governments and these guys seemed less corrupt. And they were — Mr. Erdogan was very active as Istanbul’s city mayor. So, yes, they did definitely win votes because of their performance. But it’s also part of it is a religious identity vote, not all of it.
Q. How should we in the United States view what is happening there in Turkey? Turkey has been somewhat of a model of how democracy in a predominantly Muslim country can be compatible. How should we view what is taking place there — this sort of clash between democracy, secularism and Islam?
A. I think it still is a model. I mean I think that it still has a lot to teach the world and it hasn’t gone backwards in any way. I think it’s just trying to, itself, work out in its own mind where this is going. And I think in a lot of ways it’s healthy, that it’s a very public process that’s happening on the streets and in newspapers and on television talk shows. They are being extremely thoughtful about it.
Q. What are political analysts there predicting will happen, especially this summer when new elections are going to be held again?
A. A lot of them say that Mr. Erdogan and his AK party will probably do better in the popular vote than it did in 2002.I It’ll probably get more votes. However, they expect that it will have fewer seats in Parliament because the opposition parties will probably band together and will manage to present a pretty good challenge in terms of parliamentary seats. So that’s what people are saying right now.
Q. Well, Sabrina Tavernise, Times Istanbul correspondent, thank you so much for speaking with us.
A. Thanks, Calvin.
SIMS. And thanks for listening. I’m Calvin Sims of The New York Times. I’ll be back next week with another edition of World View.
Friday, May 18, 2007
To the Turkish people from their European friends
In recent days Turkey's citizens have been carefully watching the reactions of politicians across Europe and the United States to the memorandum by the Turkish military issued on April 27. In these fraught circumstances, it is vital to send an unambiguous message to Turkish society. We strongly regret this intervention that could harm Turkey's progress as well as its relations with the European Union.
The EU decided to open negotiations with Turkey as a result of a striking sequence of reforms that led the European Commission in 2004 to declare that Turkey substantially met the so-called political Copenhagen criteria. One of these criteria is respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Another is a functioning democracy, including as a basic principle, full civilian control over the armed forces. The intervention by the military on April 27 throws Turkey's compliance into doubt.
The Turkish military justified this by the need to defend "Turkish secularism." However, the threat to secularism has been overstated. In fact, Turkey has undertaken a number of important reforms, in sectors ranging from women's rights to education, which provide legal protection for secular values. Much remains to be done - including removing the penal code's restrictions on freedom of speech and working to close the gender gap - and we call on the Turkish authorities to vigorously pursue the reform path. But Turkish legislation has never been closer to European standards than today, and many of these changes have been brought about under the current government.
We believe that it is up to the Turkish political process, and to Turkish civil society, to express the preferences of the Turkish public. Large demonstrations, challenges of political decisions in courts and political campaigns are all acceptable tactics in democratic politics. We understand those who are concerned about the concentration of power, but this should not be taken as an excuse for the military to limit democratic government.
Finally, we call on European governments to reaffirm the promises and commitments that the EU has made in the past. Turkey still has much to do before it meets European standards, but by showing solidarity with Turkish democrats, the EU can now help to keep the process on track.
Urban Ahlin, deputy chairman, foreign affairs committee, Swedish Parliament; Hans van den Broek, former foreign minister of the Netherlands; Daniel Cohn-Bendit, member of European Parliament; José Cutileiro, former secretary general, WEU; Marta Dassù, Aspen Institute Italia; Andrew Duff, member of European Parliament; Sarmite Elerte, editor, Diena; Michael Emerson, Center for European Policy Studies; Joschka Fischer, former foreign minister of Germany; Timothy Garton Ash, Oxford University; Teresa Patrício Gouveia, former foreign minister of Portugal; Charles Grant, Center for European Reform; Diego Hidalgo, FRIDE; Michiel van Hulten, former chair of the Dutch Labor Party; Josef Janning, Bertelsmann Foundation; Dan Jørgensen, member of European Parliament; Mary Kaldor, London School of Economics; Lord Kinnock of Bedwellty, former EU Commissioner; Gerald Knaus, European Stability Initiative; Ivan Krastev, Center for Liberal Strategies; Joost Lagendijk, member of European Parliament; Mark Leonard, European Council on Foreign Relations; Alain Minc, chairman of Le Monde and head of AM Conseil; Antonio Missiroli, European Policy Center; Giles Merritt, Friends of Europe; Kalypso Nicolaidis, University of Oxford; Cem Özdemir, member of European Parliament; Ana Palacio, former foreign minister of Spain; Diana Pinto, historian; Narcis Serra, former vice president of Spain; Aleksander Smolar, Stefan Batory Foundation; Dana Spinant, European Voice; Antonio Vitorino, former EU Commissioner; Gijs de Vries, former EU counter-terrorism coordinator; Stephen Wall, former adviser to the British prime minister.
The EU decided to open negotiations with Turkey as a result of a striking sequence of reforms that led the European Commission in 2004 to declare that Turkey substantially met the so-called political Copenhagen criteria. One of these criteria is respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Another is a functioning democracy, including as a basic principle, full civilian control over the armed forces. The intervention by the military on April 27 throws Turkey's compliance into doubt.
The Turkish military justified this by the need to defend "Turkish secularism." However, the threat to secularism has been overstated. In fact, Turkey has undertaken a number of important reforms, in sectors ranging from women's rights to education, which provide legal protection for secular values. Much remains to be done - including removing the penal code's restrictions on freedom of speech and working to close the gender gap - and we call on the Turkish authorities to vigorously pursue the reform path. But Turkish legislation has never been closer to European standards than today, and many of these changes have been brought about under the current government.
We believe that it is up to the Turkish political process, and to Turkish civil society, to express the preferences of the Turkish public. Large demonstrations, challenges of political decisions in courts and political campaigns are all acceptable tactics in democratic politics. We understand those who are concerned about the concentration of power, but this should not be taken as an excuse for the military to limit democratic government.
Finally, we call on European governments to reaffirm the promises and commitments that the EU has made in the past. Turkey still has much to do before it meets European standards, but by showing solidarity with Turkish democrats, the EU can now help to keep the process on track.
Urban Ahlin, deputy chairman, foreign affairs committee, Swedish Parliament; Hans van den Broek, former foreign minister of the Netherlands; Daniel Cohn-Bendit, member of European Parliament; José Cutileiro, former secretary general, WEU; Marta Dassù, Aspen Institute Italia; Andrew Duff, member of European Parliament; Sarmite Elerte, editor, Diena; Michael Emerson, Center for European Policy Studies; Joschka Fischer, former foreign minister of Germany; Timothy Garton Ash, Oxford University; Teresa Patrício Gouveia, former foreign minister of Portugal; Charles Grant, Center for European Reform; Diego Hidalgo, FRIDE; Michiel van Hulten, former chair of the Dutch Labor Party; Josef Janning, Bertelsmann Foundation; Dan Jørgensen, member of European Parliament; Mary Kaldor, London School of Economics; Lord Kinnock of Bedwellty, former EU Commissioner; Gerald Knaus, European Stability Initiative; Ivan Krastev, Center for Liberal Strategies; Joost Lagendijk, member of European Parliament; Mark Leonard, European Council on Foreign Relations; Alain Minc, chairman of Le Monde and head of AM Conseil; Antonio Missiroli, European Policy Center; Giles Merritt, Friends of Europe; Kalypso Nicolaidis, University of Oxford; Cem Özdemir, member of European Parliament; Ana Palacio, former foreign minister of Spain; Diana Pinto, historian; Narcis Serra, former vice president of Spain; Aleksander Smolar, Stefan Batory Foundation; Dana Spinant, European Voice; Antonio Vitorino, former EU Commissioner; Gijs de Vries, former EU counter-terrorism coordinator; Stephen Wall, former adviser to the British prime minister.
Secular party leaders in Turkey form alliance ahead of general elections
The Associated Press Published: May 17, 2007
ANKARA, Turkey: Leaders of two secular parties said Thursday that they would form an alliance to challenge the Islamic-rooted ruling party in July elections.
"We have agreed to form an election alliance. We will work together hand in hand," Deniz Baykal, leader of the Republican People's Party, said at a news conference. He was accompanied by Zeki Sezer, leader of new partner the Democratic Left Party.
The Republican People's Party is the largest challenger to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government, which faces a secularist backlash over suspicions that he seeks to roll back restrictions on Islamic dress and take other steps to dilute the Western lifestyle of many Turks.
Both secular parties draw support from the secular elite, including teachers, judges, doctors and military officers.
Supporters had urged them to seek a unified platform in challenging Erdogan's governing party in Turkey's general elections. Hundreds of thousands of protesters held anti-government demonstrations in recent weeks.
"The regime, secular democracy, the republic is under threat. We will form a strong unity to overcome this threat," Sezer said. "This will also give a serious alternative to Turkey to run the country."
Under the deal, candidates of the Democratic Left Party will run on the ticket of the Republican People's Party, Sezer said.
However, Sezer himself rejected Baykal's appeal that Sezer to run for the Parliament on the ticket of the Republican party.
"Even if we lead separate political identities after entering Parliament in an alliance, we will continue to work toward uniting (the parties) in a way in which both parties' separate identities are reflected," Baykal said.
Before meeting Baykal on Thursday, Sezer said: "The cooperation between party groups of the Democratic Left and the Republican People's in Parliament would be effective against those who want to steer Turkey toward darkness."
Erdogan's government had pushed for the election of a president with strong Islamic leanings, sparking tensions with the secular establishment, including the military.
Erdogan declared early general elections on July 22, several months ahead of schedule, as a way to ease a political crisis that began when the government picked Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as its presidential candidate.
The government rejects claims by secular circles that it has an Islamic agenda. Gul was forced to drop his bid for the presidency after the opposition boycotted parliamentary votes on his candidacy, and the military threatened to intervene to safeguard secular traditions. Huge crowds staged anti-government rallies, most recently on Sunday in the port of Izmir.
Both secular leaders apologized for taking weeks to form an alliance.
"We may have been a little slow; we may have upset or angered our citizens," Baykal said.
Sezer said the parties needed to work on a detailed plan to "salvage the country" and avoid possible snags in the future.
ANKARA, Turkey: Leaders of two secular parties said Thursday that they would form an alliance to challenge the Islamic-rooted ruling party in July elections.
"We have agreed to form an election alliance. We will work together hand in hand," Deniz Baykal, leader of the Republican People's Party, said at a news conference. He was accompanied by Zeki Sezer, leader of new partner the Democratic Left Party.
The Republican People's Party is the largest challenger to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government, which faces a secularist backlash over suspicions that he seeks to roll back restrictions on Islamic dress and take other steps to dilute the Western lifestyle of many Turks.
Both secular parties draw support from the secular elite, including teachers, judges, doctors and military officers.
Supporters had urged them to seek a unified platform in challenging Erdogan's governing party in Turkey's general elections. Hundreds of thousands of protesters held anti-government demonstrations in recent weeks.
"The regime, secular democracy, the republic is under threat. We will form a strong unity to overcome this threat," Sezer said. "This will also give a serious alternative to Turkey to run the country."
Under the deal, candidates of the Democratic Left Party will run on the ticket of the Republican People's Party, Sezer said.
However, Sezer himself rejected Baykal's appeal that Sezer to run for the Parliament on the ticket of the Republican party.
"Even if we lead separate political identities after entering Parliament in an alliance, we will continue to work toward uniting (the parties) in a way in which both parties' separate identities are reflected," Baykal said.
Before meeting Baykal on Thursday, Sezer said: "The cooperation between party groups of the Democratic Left and the Republican People's in Parliament would be effective against those who want to steer Turkey toward darkness."
Erdogan's government had pushed for the election of a president with strong Islamic leanings, sparking tensions with the secular establishment, including the military.
Erdogan declared early general elections on July 22, several months ahead of schedule, as a way to ease a political crisis that began when the government picked Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as its presidential candidate.
The government rejects claims by secular circles that it has an Islamic agenda. Gul was forced to drop his bid for the presidency after the opposition boycotted parliamentary votes on his candidacy, and the military threatened to intervene to safeguard secular traditions. Huge crowds staged anti-government rallies, most recently on Sunday in the port of Izmir.
Both secular leaders apologized for taking weeks to form an alliance.
"We may have been a little slow; we may have upset or angered our citizens," Baykal said.
Sezer said the parties needed to work on a detailed plan to "salvage the country" and avoid possible snags in the future.
Clash of civilisations / Beleaguered Armenians in Turkey—and a closed border with Armenia
May 17th 2007 KARSFrom The Economist print edition
Beleaguered Armenians in Turkey—and a closed border with Armenia
FOR a seasoned diplomat, Hasan Sultanoglu Zeynalov, Azerbaijan's consul-general in Kars, eastern Turkey, is unusually indiscreet. He openly complains about Naif Alibeyoglu, the mayor, who is promoting dialogue between Turkey, Azerbaijan and their common enemy, Armenia, just over the border. “I don't believe in dialogue,” Mr Zeynalov snorts. He recently ordered his compatriots to boycott an arts festival organised by the mayor after finding that “there were Armenians too.” Like his masters in Baku, Mr Zeynalov is unnerved at the thought of his country's biggest regional ally suddenly making peace with Armenia.
He will have been cheered by the victory of Serzh Sarkisian, Armenia's nationalist prime minister, in a general election on May 12th. Mr Sarkisian is said to have engineered a last-minute ban on Turkish observers of the election. “I think it would be unnatural to receive observing representatives from a country that does not even wish to have a civilised official dialogue,” he commented.
Mr Sarkisian's hawkish views are echoed by Robert Kocharian, the Armenian president, whom he is tipped to succeed in a presidential election next year. Both men hail from Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous enclave wrested by the Armenians from Azerbaijan in a vicious war in the early 1990s. This prompted Turkey to seal its border (but not air links) with Armenia in 1993. The effect on Kars's economy has been disastrous, which is why Mr Alibeyoglu is so keen to reopen the border.
Ethnic Azeris, who make up a third of his city's 80,000 residents, are less enthusiastic. They are likely to vote in droves for the far-right MHP party in Turkey's parliamentary election on July 22nd. The party's fortunes have risen on a tide of xenophobic nationalism that has engulfed Turkey. Dismissing opinion polls that give Mr Alibeyoglu's AK party a big lead over its rivals, Oktay Aktas, the local MHP boss, confidently predicts victory. He would like Turkey to invade northern Iraq and to hang the Kurdish PKK rebel leader, Abdullah Ocalan. He also says there is no question of easing the blockade on Armenia—certainly not until it stops referring to his region as western Armenia and calling the mass killings of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 a genocide.
The sensitiveness of the genocide issue was reflected in January in the killing of Hrant Dink, an ethnic-Armenian newspaper editor in Istanbul, who had talked openly about it. The killer was a school dropout from the port of Trabzon. Mr Dink's lawyer, Ergin Cinmen, says there is compelling evidence that the Istanbul police were given warning of a planned attack at least a year ago, but they did nothing to protect Mr Dink. This week Istanbul's Armenians were shocked once again by a letter sent from Trabzon warning them to defend Turkey against the genocide claims or “face the consequences”. It was delivered to an Armenian primary school.
Such threats have dispelled the surge of goodwill that followed a huge turnout at Mr Dink's funeral and the reopening in March of an old Armenian church restored by Turkey's AK government. Etyen Mahcupyan, who replaced Mr Dink at his newspaper, says some of his kin are now talking of leaving Turkey for good. The border may stay closed for many more years.
Beleaguered Armenians in Turkey—and a closed border with Armenia
FOR a seasoned diplomat, Hasan Sultanoglu Zeynalov, Azerbaijan's consul-general in Kars, eastern Turkey, is unusually indiscreet. He openly complains about Naif Alibeyoglu, the mayor, who is promoting dialogue between Turkey, Azerbaijan and their common enemy, Armenia, just over the border. “I don't believe in dialogue,” Mr Zeynalov snorts. He recently ordered his compatriots to boycott an arts festival organised by the mayor after finding that “there were Armenians too.” Like his masters in Baku, Mr Zeynalov is unnerved at the thought of his country's biggest regional ally suddenly making peace with Armenia.
He will have been cheered by the victory of Serzh Sarkisian, Armenia's nationalist prime minister, in a general election on May 12th. Mr Sarkisian is said to have engineered a last-minute ban on Turkish observers of the election. “I think it would be unnatural to receive observing representatives from a country that does not even wish to have a civilised official dialogue,” he commented.
Mr Sarkisian's hawkish views are echoed by Robert Kocharian, the Armenian president, whom he is tipped to succeed in a presidential election next year. Both men hail from Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous enclave wrested by the Armenians from Azerbaijan in a vicious war in the early 1990s. This prompted Turkey to seal its border (but not air links) with Armenia in 1993. The effect on Kars's economy has been disastrous, which is why Mr Alibeyoglu is so keen to reopen the border.
Ethnic Azeris, who make up a third of his city's 80,000 residents, are less enthusiastic. They are likely to vote in droves for the far-right MHP party in Turkey's parliamentary election on July 22nd. The party's fortunes have risen on a tide of xenophobic nationalism that has engulfed Turkey. Dismissing opinion polls that give Mr Alibeyoglu's AK party a big lead over its rivals, Oktay Aktas, the local MHP boss, confidently predicts victory. He would like Turkey to invade northern Iraq and to hang the Kurdish PKK rebel leader, Abdullah Ocalan. He also says there is no question of easing the blockade on Armenia—certainly not until it stops referring to his region as western Armenia and calling the mass killings of Ottoman Armenians in 1915 a genocide.
The sensitiveness of the genocide issue was reflected in January in the killing of Hrant Dink, an ethnic-Armenian newspaper editor in Istanbul, who had talked openly about it. The killer was a school dropout from the port of Trabzon. Mr Dink's lawyer, Ergin Cinmen, says there is compelling evidence that the Istanbul police were given warning of a planned attack at least a year ago, but they did nothing to protect Mr Dink. This week Istanbul's Armenians were shocked once again by a letter sent from Trabzon warning them to defend Turkey against the genocide claims or “face the consequences”. It was delivered to an Armenian primary school.
Such threats have dispelled the surge of goodwill that followed a huge turnout at Mr Dink's funeral and the reopening in March of an old Armenian church restored by Turkey's AK government. Etyen Mahcupyan, who replaced Mr Dink at his newspaper, says some of his kin are now talking of leaving Turkey for good. The border may stay closed for many more years.
Thursday, May 17, 2007
A generals' election
May 10th 2007 ANKARAFrom The Economist print edition
The Turkish political crisis, continued
“TURKEY is in the throes of a slow military coup,” reckons one seasoned political observer. How else to describe the past few weeks' events, which have forced Turkey's embattled prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to call a general election on July 22nd, before the scheduled November 4th date?
The country is certainly in its worst political crisis in a decade. It has not managed to choose a president to replace Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose term formally expires on May 16th: the ruling AK Party's candidate, Abdullah Gul, withdrew on May 6th after failing to muster the necessary quorum in parliament. Meanwhile millions of pro-secular demonstrators have marched through Turkey's biggest cities to protest against the mildly Islamist AK government led by Mr Erdogan.
The trouble escalated on April 27th, when the army general staff posted a dramatic statement on its website sketching out the dangers posed by “Islamic fanatics” to Ataturk's secular republic, and vowing to intervene if need be. The army has booted out four governments since 1960. Yet its latest outburst took even the savviest politicians by surprise.
A bigger surprise followed. Rather than roll over like its predecessors, the government is taking the generals head on. First came a statement reminding the brass-hats that they were answerable to the government and not vice versa. Then Mr Erdogan's AK Party tried once again to elect Mr Gul as president, even though the army had made clear that it did not want a man whose wife wears the Islamic headscarf—as Mr Gul's wife does (see article).
Mr Gul was forced to withdraw after a second round of voting in parliament was boycotted by the opposition CHP Party under its antediluvian leader, Deniz Baykal. Thanks to the boycott, the AK fell nine short of the 367 deputies that the constitutional court had ruled needed to be present before voting could proceed.
These games have prompted Mr Erdogan to push for a constitutional change to let voters, not parliament, choose the president. Should Mr Sezer veto this measure, as expected, it may be put to a referendum, to be held with the election on July 22nd. A combative Mr Gul vows then to renew his campaign for the presidency.
The AK Party's bravado stems in part from the continued strong performance of the economy. Unworried by political shenanigans, a foreign-led consortium shelled out $1.2 billion for the operating rights of Izmir's port on May 3rd. An Italian bank is in talks to acquire Turkey's fifth-largest bank, Oyak, for $1.5 billion. And foreign investors, who hold around 70% of floating shares on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, have yet to take fright.
What will the army do next? Much will depend on the outcome of the election. The dream scenario for the generals and their civilian allies would be if AK is pushed into opposition and so unable to pick the new president. A coalition government could then take over. The generals seem unfazed by the memory of a succession of weak coalitions that took Turkey to the brink of financial ruin in 2001.
In pursuit of this goal, and after some nudging from the general staff, two centre-right parties announced a merger last week. Mr Baykal says that he is on the verge of cementing a deal between CHP and a smaller left-wing rival. The rising tide of nationalism also means that the ultra-nationalist right-wing MHP may bag the minimum 10% of the vote needed to get into parliament seats. In a bid to surmount this barrier, the biggest Kurdish party says it may field independent candidates in 45 of Turkey's 81 provinces.
Despite all this, AK Party officials predict that they will pick up a bigger share than the 34% of the national vote they took in 2002, and return to power alone. “That won't necessarily be a good thing for Turkey either,” says Morton Abramowitz, a former American ambassador to Turkey. “A strong AK government could have a polarising effect.” Worse, it might prompt the generals to wade in again.
The Turkish political crisis, continued
“TURKEY is in the throes of a slow military coup,” reckons one seasoned political observer. How else to describe the past few weeks' events, which have forced Turkey's embattled prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to call a general election on July 22nd, before the scheduled November 4th date?
The country is certainly in its worst political crisis in a decade. It has not managed to choose a president to replace Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose term formally expires on May 16th: the ruling AK Party's candidate, Abdullah Gul, withdrew on May 6th after failing to muster the necessary quorum in parliament. Meanwhile millions of pro-secular demonstrators have marched through Turkey's biggest cities to protest against the mildly Islamist AK government led by Mr Erdogan.
The trouble escalated on April 27th, when the army general staff posted a dramatic statement on its website sketching out the dangers posed by “Islamic fanatics” to Ataturk's secular republic, and vowing to intervene if need be. The army has booted out four governments since 1960. Yet its latest outburst took even the savviest politicians by surprise.
A bigger surprise followed. Rather than roll over like its predecessors, the government is taking the generals head on. First came a statement reminding the brass-hats that they were answerable to the government and not vice versa. Then Mr Erdogan's AK Party tried once again to elect Mr Gul as president, even though the army had made clear that it did not want a man whose wife wears the Islamic headscarf—as Mr Gul's wife does (see article).
Mr Gul was forced to withdraw after a second round of voting in parliament was boycotted by the opposition CHP Party under its antediluvian leader, Deniz Baykal. Thanks to the boycott, the AK fell nine short of the 367 deputies that the constitutional court had ruled needed to be present before voting could proceed.
These games have prompted Mr Erdogan to push for a constitutional change to let voters, not parliament, choose the president. Should Mr Sezer veto this measure, as expected, it may be put to a referendum, to be held with the election on July 22nd. A combative Mr Gul vows then to renew his campaign for the presidency.
The AK Party's bravado stems in part from the continued strong performance of the economy. Unworried by political shenanigans, a foreign-led consortium shelled out $1.2 billion for the operating rights of Izmir's port on May 3rd. An Italian bank is in talks to acquire Turkey's fifth-largest bank, Oyak, for $1.5 billion. And foreign investors, who hold around 70% of floating shares on the Istanbul Stock Exchange, have yet to take fright.
What will the army do next? Much will depend on the outcome of the election. The dream scenario for the generals and their civilian allies would be if AK is pushed into opposition and so unable to pick the new president. A coalition government could then take over. The generals seem unfazed by the memory of a succession of weak coalitions that took Turkey to the brink of financial ruin in 2001.
In pursuit of this goal, and after some nudging from the general staff, two centre-right parties announced a merger last week. Mr Baykal says that he is on the verge of cementing a deal between CHP and a smaller left-wing rival. The rising tide of nationalism also means that the ultra-nationalist right-wing MHP may bag the minimum 10% of the vote needed to get into parliament seats. In a bid to surmount this barrier, the biggest Kurdish party says it may field independent candidates in 45 of Turkey's 81 provinces.
Despite all this, AK Party officials predict that they will pick up a bigger share than the 34% of the national vote they took in 2002, and return to power alone. “That won't necessarily be a good thing for Turkey either,” says Morton Abramowitz, a former American ambassador to Turkey. “A strong AK government could have a polarising effect.” Worse, it might prompt the generals to wade in again.
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